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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore implications of a necessary 
presupposition of a theory of the person in the aims of Personal and Social 
Education (PSE), with the aim of furnishing a conception of the person which 
retains a significant concept of personal agency in light of constraints on action. 
From the position that the concept of the person as agent is central to the aims of 
PSE, it is argued that given the tension between the conception of the person as 
autonomous and recognition of the plasticity of persons, the justification of the 
unity of persons suggests itself as a relevant and useful approach. This is held 
to provide a means of approaching issues of personhood which are central to 
the concerns of PSE and which also provides important insights into the some 
issues of agency. 
It is argued in the second chapter that the relation between a theory of personal 
identity and the aims of PSE which presuppose such a theory is best understood 
as one of interdependence. From this position, it is argued that the conception 
of the person as potentially autonomous does not necessitate acceptance of a 
strict identity or non-reductionist theory of personal identity. It is argued, on the 
grounds of internal coherence and the ideals evident in discussions of PSE, that 
the alternative, a continuity theory is preferable. 
In the fourth chapter the issue of constraints on the concept of the person and 
their effect on the acceptability of theories of personal identity is addressed. It is 
argued that certain constraints lead to the rejection of reductionism with respect 
to persons but do not affect the acceptability of a continuity theory or its 
importance. The argument supports the view that the concept of personal 
identity and the concept of the person are indeterminate and allow a qualified 
form of social ascriptivism. 
Implications of the conception of the person which has been argued for, are 
illustrated and explored in the fmal two chapters, where the discussion focuses 
on the use of students' autobiographical writing in PSE. The argument is made 
that the conception of the person argued for in the previous chapters has 
advantages over that contained in the traditional understanding of 
autobiography. Consideration of narrative and its role in making sense of 
experience leads to supplementation and refinement of the conceptualisation of 
the person advocated. 
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This thesis is addressed to the defence and exploration of the implications of 
the claim that the central concept in PSE is the person. 
The importance of this claim lies in a presupposition made by all feasible 
aims of PSE, the conceptualisation of the person as agent. Without exception 
the aims of PSE presuppose and promote a conception of the person as active. 
This is not to say that passive aspects of being a person, such as being the 
object of moral concern are not also relevant, but to point to the importance of 
the idea.of agency as a presupposition of the ideals articulated in the aims of 
PSE. Consistent with the claim that PSE should be concerned with helping 
students further their understanding of themselves, others and the world, the 
idea of persons as agents is presupposed in the idea that the aims of PSE should 
include moral education, political education, social and personal responsibility, 
self-knowledge, and the promotion of autonomous personal well-being. 
Clearly, depending on the particular aims of PSE, the perceived ends of agency 
will differ. The point is that no matter the content of particular aims, an idea 
held in common is that persons can reflect on themselves, their social situation, 
their ideals and hopes, the rationality of their action, make plans and carry them 
out in ways that can be distinguished from 'mindless' responses to situations. 
Persons can choose and reflect on their choices, and are appropriately held to be 
responsible for actions. The idea of the person as agent is central so long as all 
feasible aims presuppose an active subject of experience.' 
PSE is centrally concerned with students' relations with others, themselves 
and the world. The perspective on these relations involves appreciation and 
sensitivity to the students' own perceived needs as well as addressing needs 
which are perceived to be relevant to the overall task of preparation for a 
worthwhile personal and social life. PSE is at once concerned with the present 
concerns of the student and the school, and in enabling that student to pursue a 
worthwhile life once she has left the institution. PSE is, therefore, here taken to 
include that subject, or those cross-curricular activities which while 
heterogeneous in content are united by the questions it addresses and the attitude 
taken towards the lives and experiences of students. The particular subjects on a 
PSE syllabus are chosen and related by being responses to the question: What 
does it mean to live a life, and have a meaningful life as a person? PSE is 
distinctive in that as well as adopting this external perspective on persons the 
perspective of the student is taken seriously in the sense that the experiences she 
brings to the classroom, her conception of herself, who and what she is and 
who she is to become are reflected both the content chosen and the pedagogy 
used. PSE is addressed to persons, is for persons and, in an important sense, is 
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about persons both in the sense of what persons are, and what it means to live a 
life as a person, as well as the more personal project of fostering the students' 
ability to make sense of their own lives. PSE can be seen as addressing, along 
with other aspects of the curriculum, 'What am I?', but the particular nature of 
PSE is to address the question, 'Who am I?', and the closely related question: 
'How shall I live my life?' 
A strength of PSE thus lies in the importance it gives to students' experience 
and actual lives. The subjects under study are not, or are not intended to be 
remote from the students' lives and actual or predicted likely concerns. PSE 
takes as central the student herself, the fact that she is a person. In a very 
general sense, the choice of subject and pedagogy is guided by the idea of 
helping students develop their understanding of what it means to be a person.2 
This concern with the experience of students involves recognition of the 
influence of social factors on the construction of experience and sense of 
identity. This where the problem lies. Unless students are considered to be 
persons for whom some concerns are not constitutive, then the characteristics of 
persons which enable autonomous agency are threatened by taking into account 
these constitutive concerns as a legitimate source of the students' sense of 
identity. Hence, there are at least two important givens in PSE: that students are 
agents who can make significant decisions about their lives, can develop self-
understanding and relationships; and that they are acted upon and constituted by 
social influences. Thus, the aims of PSE address problems of personal agency 
within education which at the same time as the agency of persons is asserted, 
recognises the social determination of many beliefs, desires, intentions and 
responses to the world. While talk of persons is essential to education, and this 
problem is not particular to PSE, issues arising from what it means to be a 
person take on some urgency in thinking about the aims of PSE because of the 
distinctive position of PSE as an educational endeavour addressed to persons 
whose lived experience is respected, and whose capacities for reflecting and 
acting on this experience are the focus. 
The relevance of this problem is illustrated by various issues which are at 
the forefront of educational debate. While there is some unease about the 
prominence of terms such as autonomy in the aims of PSE,3 there is also 
concern with the increasing impersonalism, technocratic tendencies in the 
education system and the prominence of technical rationality.4 In addition there 
is also increasing concern from within education with the problem of 
subjectivity and its adequate theorisation,5 as well as increasing emphasis 
through innovations such as PSE on the role of education in enabling students 
to enjoy lives which are personally worthwhile. 
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The approach adopted here is concurrent with recent criticisms of liberal 
theories of ethics mounted from such different perspectives as 
communitarianism and postmodemism6 in that it looks to the conception of the 
person underlying the aims of PSE. While the existence of a pluralist society 
and the ideal of pluralist democracy are taken as given here, it is argued that it is 
important to recognise problems with the notion of the person underpinning the 
liberal conception of ethical relations. 
The issue is interpreted here as a problem of understanding the relation 
between the concept of the person and the aims of PSE, in particular the effect 
of the presupposition of a concept of the person. While there can be little doubt 
that a conception of the person is necessary for an educational undertaking 
which is concerned with issues of personal and social development, in that the 
content of the syllabus, the pedagogy used and the aims which inform these, all 
make at least implicit reference to axiological judgments about the sort or kind 
of person education is designed to foster, the relation between the concept of the 
person and the aims of PSE is not clear. One reason is a certain ambiguity in 
what is meant by 'person'. Clarification of the interest, or interests, in persons 
as evidenced by the aims of PSE is therefore of some importance. Such 
clarification will in turn enable a conceptualisation of the person which is 
adequate to these interests and, importantly, to our knowledge of persons. 
Motivation for investigating this issue is therefore supplied by the different 
interests in the concept of person, and the conflict in interpretations sketched 
above. 
An advantage of this approach is that it serves to show that in any 
discussion of PSE, where the focus is on persons, there are metaphysical 
assumptions at work which affect practice. It is part of the argument to show 
that not only are such assumptions at work, but that they may conflict as a result 
of features of the concept of person. Our concept of the person is sufficiently 
elastic and indeterminate to admit of incompatible interpretations. In essence this 
thesis is an argument for awareness of the implications and associations of the 
concept of person as it is used in the aims of PSE. It is therefore primarily 
addressed to those interested in the aims of PSE,7 with the discussion focusing 
on the aims of PSE defended in the literature. In the following sections the 
nature of the problem and the approach taken are discussed. 
1 
The Problem of the Conceptualisation of the Person 
In order to illustrate the problem of the conceptualisation of the person we 
need only look at the implications of the two dominant conceptualisations. If 
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some form of personal autonomy is accepted as a goal of PSE, the individual 
person is conceptualised as a discrete entity inessentially connected to any social 
concerns or roles. This model is inadequate if it is recognised that sense of 
identity and defmition of self are responsive to factors such as gender, class and 
ethnicity, to take just three prominent examples of constituting elements in self-
understanding and perception. On this model the constitution of the self through 
social relations cannot be explained. Of course, the model is only inadequate if 
the educational task of helping students understand themselves is interpreted as 
involving students' lived experience and the role of influences such as gender, 
class and ethnicity in making them what they are. If on the other hand social 
forces or language are seen as constituting the self, with the person being 
conceptualised as the site of multiple subjectivities rather than the disengaged 
subject so important to the Enlightenment tradition, then the possibility of 
resisting these forces is lost in the recognition of their constituting force and 
effect. With the loss of the possibility of resisting these forces, the possibility of 
autonomous agency is also lost. 
Neither position is acceptable from the point of view of thinking about 
approaches to PSE. Our experience of persons and as persons tells us we need 
to include elements of both positions in the aims of PSE. The position to be 
defended here is that PSE should transmit or involve a theory of the person8 
which is consistent with our experience and knowledge of persons in the 
articulation of what is valuable about persons. 
The problem arises because of the constraint placed on the formulation of 
the aims of PSE by the characterisation of experience as socially constituted, 
and internal inadequacies of the picture of the self as essentially unencumbered. 
This may not seem to be a problem for the aims of PSE which are framed in 
terms of the ideals of persons and are justified by reference to social and ethical 
theories of the good life. On this view, all that needs to be said in response to 
this problem is that we recognise that the agency of the person is presupposed 
by all our accounts of what the aims of PSE should be, but this is legitimate 
given that these accounts satisfy the minimum conditions of persons, and that 
we are engaged in the normative activity of promoting certain values and 
conceptions of personhood which are not justified by reference to the nature of 
persons. This type of response is not, however, adequate to the problem. If 
PSE, in accepting and promoting the importance of students' lived experience, 
is to recognise the situatedness and embeddedness of persons in their social 
context and the effect of this context of what it means to be a person, then the 
ideals of the person contained in the aims must be adequate to this condition. 
There are several ways in which this problem can be approached. One is to 
refer to the normative nature of autonomy. It is a moral ideal, or an ideal derived 
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from a liberal democratic theory. This provides the justification for promoting 
autonomy as an aim of PSE, given the situation of PSE within a particular 
social context or web of social and moral concerns. Arguments against 
autonomy are therefore at the level of disputes between ethical theories, or 
between political and social analyses. This approach, as mentioned above, 
merely avoids the problem. The problem can, alternatively, be viewed as an 
instance of the traditional metaphysical problem of the relation between free will 
and determinism. This however also fails to address the problem as it has been 
posed, as Meyers (1987:27-41) for example, points out. The problem is to 
account for people's capacity to direct their own lives in light of the social 
forces acting on them. It is therefore not a question of reconciling personal 
autonomy with free will or determinism with the social formation of desires and 
beliefs. 
A further approach, and the one adopted here, is to take the fundamental 
problem as the furnishing of a conception of the person which retains what is 
crucial to the conception of the person as active, the idea that the person is a 
subject of experience, but which does so without the attendant Cartesian 
epistemological theses in order that that psychological and social complexities of 
persons can be reflected in our theories and ideals of persons. The motivation 
for striving for such a conceptualisation lies in its broadly ethical implications. 
Posing the problem in these terms leaves two possible approaches: To present 
the issue as a problem of the mutually exclusive character of opposing modes of 
cognition or as a problem of the internal consistency of each position. While the 
latter approach is favoured as it keeps the interest in the question firmly in sight: 
the retention of the conception of the person as active, it is recognised that it has 
the effect of setting up the problem in the form of a dichotomy between the self-
constituting and the socially constituted subject which may turn out to be a 
disadvantage. 
The intention is to argue for centrality of the concept of the person to the 
aims of PSE given its association with issues of agency. This is not to say that 
the idea of PSE is somehow conceptually tied to the idea of person as agent. It 
is possible to conceive of approaches to PSE where agency is not an issue. The 
problem would not arise, for instance, if the students of PSE were not 
considered to be persons. In such a situation, having avoided the issue of 
agency and choice by denial of personhood, a mechanistic view could be 
sustained, and the aims of PSE could consistently be seen as addressing the 
moulding of future behaviours without the intervention of the student. It would 
not arise if students were considered objects but not subjects of moral concern. 
The problem arises because we think of ourselves and our students as agents. 
On our present understanding, as Harris (1989:603) reminds us, "'person' and 
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'mechanism' are contradictory concepts". It is not only a question of thinking of 
students as agents, but the particular model of agency employed. If students of 
PSE were conceptualised on the model of artificial intelligence, for example, as 
immensely complex and sophisticated computers, then the issue of agency 
would not arise in the same form. As Dreyfus (1979:78) points out, if reason 
could be programmed into a computer this would drastically alter our 
understandings of ourselves, as would the converse, if it was discovered that 
computers could not be programmed to reason. 
From a perspective which takes the conceptualisation of the person as 
central, it is possible to set out the problem in the following way. The value of 
the agency of persons finds its clearest expression in the argument that PSE 
should be addressed to developing autonomous capacities in the student. The 
ideal of autonomy is not considered to be a natural state of persons, but to be a 
value associated with and supported by societal or ethical norms. Thus White 
(1991:Ch.6) accepts and expands on Raz's (1986:390-395) argument that living 
in an autonomy-supporting society justifies personal autonomy as an 
educational aim. Pring (1987), on the other hand, while justifying his position 
by the adequacy of its response to social and personal realities draws more 
explicitly on the conditions for personhood, particularly those described by 
Dennett (1978) as constituting the third and fourth conditions of personhood: 
that a certain stance or attitude is appropriate towards persons, and that they can 
reciprocate when such a stance is taken. These two conditions introduce 
respectively the idea of persons as moral objects and moral agents. The 
autonomy of persons is therefore either justified by its societal support or by 
reference to those conditions of personhood which involve or imply the 
possibility of potentially self-determining thought and action. With the addition 
of the relevant modernist theses concerning the person as locus of moral 
authority as well as moral value, the emphasis is on the person as able to make 
choices and perform actions for which they are responsible. 
The idea of personal autonomy and personhood are clearly interrelated. For 
persons to be seen as potentially autonomous they must be conceptualised as 
both unified and distinct from others. The conception of the person as 
autonomous has two dimensions. It requires, as Lindley (1986:6) notes "a 
developed self, to which one's actions can be ascribed", and freedom from 
external constraints. The idea of a developed self in turn requires, as Lindley 
(loc.cit.) says "a consciousness of oneself as a being who acts for reasons, 
whose behaviour can be explained by reference to one's own goals and 
purposes." A self or person is therefore necessarily conceptualised as a unified 
entity separate from other entities and persons, this being necessary both for the 
idea of self-determination and for the idea of making choices for oneself. The 
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necessity of both unity and separateness is illustrated by the distinction Hurley 
(1989:317) makes between horizontal and vertical divisions within a society, 
both of which are essential for the notion of an autonomous person. Horizontal 
divisions "reflect formal and substantive distinctions within agents" and thus 
allow the reflection and deliberation necessary for the element of determination 
in self-determination, which cannot be such that the unity of the person is 
problematic. Common experiences which might be thought to raise the question 
of the extent to which persons are unified, such as inner dialogue and conflict, 
cannot raise questions about how many persons are involved. The 
presupposition is that even in cases of severe internal conflict, there is one 
person involved. The extent to which this belief can be upheld in light of the 
extraordinary but actual cases of commissurotomy and multiple personality 
syndrome, will be discussed later. The point is that for the idea of the person as 
autonomous to be conceptually coherent, the presupposition of the person as 
unitary is necessary. 
The vertical divisions reflect divisions between agents, and are necessary 
for the element of self in self-determination. In order to be a free independent 
enquiring chooser, a person must be both unified and continuous over time 
since to be capable of a degree of self-direction with respect to her thought 
processes the person must be understood as a discrete entity. Thus, similar to 
the horizontal divisions, experiences of identification cannot be understood as 
raising the question of how many people are involved. 
Thus, it is not sufficient for autonomy that a person exercise choice, it must 
be the case that the person who exercises choice recognises that this is what she 
is doing. To be autonomous requires identifying with a particular body whose 
thoughts, desires and intentions are under one's control. The self-reflexive 
nature of autonomy demands that the boundaries between one's self and other 
and an awareness of the distinction between internal and external constraints be 
recognised. Thus, as Kupfer (1987:82) points out: "No matter how free from 
external restraint, an individual is not in control of his life, is not self-
determining, unless he conceives of himself as such". Autonomy requires of 
personhood that a person is self-conscious, that a clear distinction can be made 
between one's self and others, and that a person is both unified and discrete. 
The developed form of agency which autonomy presupposes in turn 
requires a developed self. It involves a recognition of what is and what is not 
myself, and, some notion such as a knowledge of my interests. This conception 
of the minimum necessary conditions for any conception of person conceived of 
as potentially autonomous raises the question of the justification of this unity. 
Traditionally the positing of a unitary discrete subject of experience, with an 
implied or implicated epistemology of self-knoWledge as the foundation, or 
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Archimedian point of all knowledge, ignores and cannot explain the role of 
social forces in producing the subject. The Cartesian-Lockean-Kantian tradition 
associated with this view, takes the self and language as transparent, with the 
self only contingently related to any particular social role. Clearly this is not a 
view of the person accepted in the aims of PSE. There is clear recognition in the 
aims to be considered here of the importance of social relations and the 
influence of social factors in the forming of a sense of identity. Nevertheless, it 
remains the case that the idea of personal autonomy requires a conception of the 
self whereby the self stands outside the construction. The self must, in some 
intelligible sense, be seen as constituting. This is necessary for the possibility of 
reflection on social forces and influences with the purpose of assessing the 
extent to which one identifies with particular desires, actions and so forth. The 
ability to reflect on situations and distance one's self from a particular role or 
social situation in order to reflect on it lies at the heart of the conceptualisation of 
the person as potentially autonomous. 
It is now something of a commonplace within some philosophical and 
educational circles to reject the conception of the self or person presupposed by 
autonomy. The critiques differ in motivation but share an opposition to the idea 
of the unitary constituting subject associated with the Enlightenment. The basic 
objection to this conception of the self is that it is inadequate to account for the 
lived experience of persons and unable to account for or accept the legitimacy of 
constituting factors other than the self. Thus, Derrida claims that the assumption 
of a constituting subject fails to describe the role of language in the construction 
of meaning and self; Lacanian critiques centre on the inadequacies of the 
conception of a constituting self to explain the complex psychological 
processes whereby the self is created; and Foucault critiques the ability of a 
constituting self as unable to explain the role played by powerful social forces in 
constituting the self. 
Those within educational theory who have responded positively to these 
critiques have rejected the conceptualisation of the self as a secure foundation on 
which to build either an epistemology or an ethical theory. The individual 
subject, as Giroux (1991:29) summaries this position, is no longer the source 
of self-knowledge, with her view of the world being constituted through the 
"exercise of a rational and autonomous mode of understanding and knowing". 
Rather "[s]ubjectivity is now read as multiple, layered and non-unitary" 
(ibid.:30). Quoting Hall (1986:56) Giroux continues, "the 'self is seen as 
being "constituted out of and by difference and remains contradictory"". This 
position replaces the abstraction, objectivism and rationalism of modernism 
with particularism and contextualism stressing the actualisation of possibilities 
to act. Universal claims to truth of a theory of education based on, in Weiler's 
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(1991:469) words, "the concept of a coherent subject moving through history 
with a single essential identity" is called into question. Feminist pedagogies, of 
which Weiler's work is an illustration, focus instead on the development of "a 
concept of the constant creation and negotiation of selves within structures of 
ideology and material constraints"(loc.cit.). The Cartesian self and the 
modernist discourse around it are held by many to be, as Pappas and Garrision 
(1990:306) say "androcentrically distorted in a systematic"way, one that 
sacrifices connection for individual self-foundation". This is to be replaced with 
a freedom from "the dominance of androcentric and dualistic discourse" 
(ibid.:313). On this view, self-determination is no longer situated in the 
"guarantees of transcendent phenomena or metaphysical essences" (Giroux, 
op.cit.:29), it is to be considered as inextricably related to forces beyond the 
self-consciousness of the humanist subject. 
This is clearly an area of thought which is still developing. Giroux is not 
alone in recognising that this conception of the self raises problems for identity, 
intentionality and desire. However, in order to appreciate the strengths as well 
as some of the weaknesses of this view, it is useful to explore the position of 
which it is critical and the motivation for this criticism. One of the most 
significant positive aspects of this developing theory, which will also be 
emphasised here, is the importance given to lived experience and the 
significance accorded to everyday life. Thus, the emphasis is on the sense of 
identity that students have, and not on the particular form of abstraction 
involved in accepting the Cartesian self defined in absence of any constitutive 
concerns, a self constituted solely by self-awareness, a "'punctual' or 'neutral' 
self' as Taylor (1989:49, Ch. 9) refers to this latter conception. This view of 
the self, associated with Descartes but finding its modern expression in Locke, 
involves the disengagement or distancing of the self from ordinary experience 
including desires, habits or inclinations in order that they can, in Taylor's 
(ibid:159) phrase, be "worked on". The Cartesian self can only be contingently 
encumbered by any of its properties since the self cannot be constituted by the 
thoughts and desires which are to reworked with the aim of either strengthening 
or eliminating them. Whereas Descartes emphasised self-mastery and self-
sufficiency, Locke extends the distancing from experience to the self with the 
effect that the self is not only able to adopt a stance to feelings, desires and 
thoughts, but can also distance itself from itself. In Descartes the emphasis is on 
both the unity and the continuity of consciousness with the self distanced from 
its ordinary embodied existence in order to gain the clarity and distinctness 
which is confused and obscured in our experience,9 with the aim of arriving at 
truth, In other words, the aim is to achieve knowledge of how things really are 
(Locke, Essay, 1.4.23.). This can only be achieved by distancing or 
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disengaging from ordinary experience. Thus, what is required is not so much a 
different way of experiencing ourselves and the world, but a disengagement 
from ordinary experience. 
This is the view which essentially causes the problem. The self is 
objectified, with all relations being seen as contingent and accidental. The self, 
on this view, is nothing other than the power to identify particular features, 
such as habits of thought and action or desires, distancing and objectifying 
these features with the aim of reworking or remaking them according to some 
standard. The self, on this view is, as Taylor (ibid:171-2) says, 'extensionless; 
it is nowhere but in this power to fix things as objects". 
Whatever the problems there are with this account, the stance of 
detachment, distance and disengagement, generates our picture of ourselves as 
independent consciousnesses. Consciousness underpins and justifies this 
stance, and is the basis for our ideas of self-control and self-remaking. This 
conception of the self has been tremendously influential, not least in our ideas 
of self-control, personal responsibility and the integrity of the person, and in the 
acceptance of the idea of the person as the location of principles of choice, and 
the self as a possessive concept. This brief characterisation of the modernist 
view as found in Descartes and Locke, reveals its strength, as well as its 
weakness. Its strength lies in furnishing the conditions for autonomy, its 
weakness lies in its abstraction from constitutive concerns. 
The strengths and weaknesses of the modernist conception correspond, 
unsurprisingly, to the strengths and weaknesses of the conceptions which take 
seriously the embeddedness of persons in their social context. In rejecting of the 
Cartesian model of the self, with its certainties and privileging of self-
consciousness, in which Descartes found a secure foundation for a well-
grounded form of knowledge, the possibility of the autonomy of the person is 
threatened. The rejection of the self as the foundation of knowledge involves the 
rejection of the concept of self-consciousness as the foundation for an 
autonomous existence. From Descartes to Hegel the secure foundation of self-
consciousness determined philosophical method and led to the task being, as 
Hegel (1955:217) held, to be "to grasp the inner sphere as such, and to set aside 
the claims of dead externality and authority; the latter is to be viewed as out of 
place here". The problem involved with this move from a certainty of a 
Cartesian unitary indivisible self with self-consciousness performing a 
fundamental role in our conception of ourselves, to a 'decentred' subject, is the 
problem of how to conceptualise autonomy, and personal agency in general. 
There have been attempts to deal with this problem particularly in feminist 
theory and pedagogiesm which have a clear interest in a "conceptualisation of the 
subject able to resist socialisation and socialising forces, while championing the 
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view that the person should be conceptualised as the site of multiple and 
potentially contradictory subjectivities rather than a unitary entity in a- privileged 
epistemic relation to itself and the world. In rejecting the unitary self and 
universalising discourses, action is found in the fragmented particular historical 
and social identities constructed and shaped in the experience of gender, class, 
race and other socially defined identities. 
The problem is to give an account of the subject as able to adopt a position 
of resistance. It is thus the problem of reconciling the idea of contested 
subjectivities with the idea of a person able to change while remaining the same 
person." While feminist analyses in general point to the centrality of social 
factors, including language, on the construction of our sense of ourselves, the 
fragmented view of the person it presents struggles with the central idea of 
personhood and agency: the idea of change, the idea of unity as a necessary 
condition for action and reflection on action. 
The problem, has been ably and succinctly expressed by Soper (1991:126): 
even as we acknowledge ourselves to be decentred and 
fragmented subjectivities, the gendered constructs of patriarchy, 
and the mouthpieces of a discursive ventriloquism, we also seem 
to rediscover a centre, the existential, angst-ridden self who 
must also make sense of it, and seek to reorganize desire, reread 
the world, adjust behaviour and so on, in the light of that 
awareness. As anti-humanist approaches present us as 
splintered, we feel a very humanist splintering between the self 
who acknowledges the Freudian or feminist challenge to 
autonomy, and the self who feels called upon to act as a morally 
responsible agent of self-change. 
The problem is how to reconcile our knowledge and experience as socially 
constructed with the sense of identity necessary for agency and autonomous 
thought and action. 
2 
The Approach 
The problem as posed above concerns the importance of having a 
conceptualisation of the person in the aims of PSE consistent with the 
complexity of our understanding of the constituting nature of experience and 
with the conception of persons as active subjects of these experiences. The 
focus on conceptualisation of the person and support for the conception of the 
person as active draws attention not only to the role of the concept of person in 
the aims of PSE, but provides a means of support for a personal approach to 
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PSE which avoids some of the more obvious pitfallS associated with the idea of 
a constituting self while grounding the concept in its social and psychological 
complexity.12 
It is frequently argued that an important aspect of philosophy of education 
involves the identification of, as Soltis (1981:8) notes in introducing an edited 
work on fairly recent developments in philosophy of education, "an 
educationally important problem, issue, or phenomenon that could be 
illuminated by and located in the context provided by a subarea of philosophy". 
The educational problem identified here can be aptly described as philosophical. 
As Midgley (1990:11) argues, following Collingwood, philosophical problems 
arise from clashes and conflicts between presuppositions currently in use, and 
between large conceptual schemes built on these presuppositions. The problem, 
as already articulated, is between our experience of ourselves as capable of 
some form of independent and self-reflective thought and action, and the 
recognition of our social determination. 
It would be needlessly over-dramatic as well as incorrect to claim that this 
conflict or tension is a result of a breakdown in the consensus of what a person 
is. In such a situation, as MacIntyre (1990b: Ch. IX) correctly remarks, 
questions of personhood naturally arise. It is not being claimed that the concept 
of person either is or should be undergoing radical change. What is clear, 
however, is that interest in the concept of person implied by or advocated in the 
aims of PSE is not only warranted by its taking persons and their well-being as 
its subject, but by changing perceptions of the roles of persons, as defmitions 
of central roles change affecting both expectations and sense of identity. More 
weight is being placed on the individual as the location of authority and 
responsibility in a time when the authority and legitimacy of some institutions is 
diminishing, with a corresponding breakdown, recorded by post-structuralist, 
post-modernist and feminist analyses in some of the certainties of fundamental 
features of personhood. Concern in education with anti-racism, anti-sexism and 
the multiple forms which oppression takes, points to the continuing importance 
of the conception of the person as active, as the subject of experience, even with 
the pressures on persons to recognise their social construction. On this view the 
interest in the concept of person develops from an awareness of changes in 
social roles and concern over social struggles and changes, reflecting a shift in 
the relationships between people and society. Thus Pring (1987:5-6)writes: 
A greater responsibility ... rests on the individual to establish a 
set of values which can provide an adequate guide in a rather 
unpredictable future and which at the same time are socially 
ameliorative. Such a responsibility does of course relate to a 
shifting attitude in society towards authority. Certainly at school, 
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but elsewhere too, it is increasingly difficult to resolves disputes 
by use of power rather than through cooperation and the 
achievement of consensus. 
We are concerned that students will be equipped to deal, as well as we can 
prepare them, with changing perceptions of social roles, for social change, to be 
able to deal with persons in authority such as doctors, to understand 
government and bureaucracies. Our concern is not just that they understand 
these social institutions in order that they may function effectively with or 
within them, but to give students a sense of their own agency with respect to 
them. As Foucault (1982:211-212) points out these relations are struggles 
against "the forms of subjection - against the submission of subjec6ity" 
(ibid.:213) which question the status of the individual: "on the one hand, [these 
struggles] assert the right to be different and they underline everything which 
makes individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they attack everything 
which separates the individual, breaks his links with others, splits up 
community life, forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his own 
identity in a constraining way." Foucault focuses on a form of power as the 
objective of these struggles or endeavours, the form of power "which makes 
individuals subjects" (ibid.:212). While this form of power is not the focus 
here, Foucault's formulation of the problem of the subject in relation to power 
positions is relevant since it situates the problem of the subject firmly within the 
social world in which it operates. 
What is being attempted here would not be correctly characterised as the 
application of a philosophically 'cleaned up' concept of the person to the world 
of education. The idea is rather to clarify a central problem in PSE through 
identification of central concepts using philosophical methods and traditional 
problems. The understanding of philosophy on which this approach is based 
recognises the importance of our ordinary concepts and their usage. It is taken 
as given that central concepts such as 'person' are embedded in the context of 
their use, and can only be understood relative to that context. Thus, attempts to 
abstract the concept of person and submit it to the logical tools of analysis is an 
approach fraught with danger, but necessary if we are to become clearer as to 
the meaning and utility of the concept we are using. The task is conceptualised 
as the application of philosophical methods to a problem in education which 
lends itself to such methods given the nature of the problem. The language and 
methods of philosophy are used, in other words, to illuminate the concerns in 
an area of education. 
A consequence of the analysis of the concept of person, given that the 
concept is functional and responsive in the interests in inquiring into it, is that 
the results of the analysis will be prescriptive rather than descriptive. This 
17 
important implication of the nature of the concept of person allows, though it 
obviously does not necessitate, revisions or suggestions for changes in beliefs 
and attitudes concerning persons. 
On this understanding of the concept of person, in the first chapter the 
general claim that the aims of PSE presuppose a conceptualisation of the person 
is explored through discussion of aims which have been proposed for PSE. The 
aims discussed, principally the accounts by Pring (1984, 1987) and White 
(1990), are chosen for their explicit recognition of the importance of agency and 
the social context of development. It is argued that these aims reveal theories of 
the person, but that they face the problem outlined here, of reconciling the 
importance of personal agency with the social construction of beliefs and other 
mental content. 
There is a strong philosophical tradition that the concept of the person can 
be analysed in terms of the necessary and sufficient conditions for its use. 
While this is increasingly called into question, and will be here also, the 
underlying idea is that our beliefs about persons can be clarified by 
determination of the principles implicit in judgments about persons. This is the, 
approach taken here. The analysis of the concept of person and of personal 
identity is the analysis of, as Perry (1975:7) points out, knowledge we in a 
sense already have. The aim is to assess the importance and utility of the 
concept we have, note connections with other concepts, and, if necessary 
suggest revisions and changes. The approach therefore is an interplay of two 
inquiries: into the requirements made of the concept of person in the aims of 
PSE considered, and what the concept of the person contributes to the aims of 
PSE. The approach is thus guided by the idea that the concept of the person is 
not something which can be definitively isolated from the practices in which it is 
embedded and from which it gains its meaning. 
The argument that the concept of the person is central to thinking about the 
aims of PSE is plausible given the associations and implications of the concept. 
It is not, however, a concept which admits of analysis within any one discipline 
of philosophy.13 The analysis undertaken here is conducted within philosophy 
of mind, which is not to ignore a salient fact, that our interest in the concept of 
the person is inextricably bound up with moral concepts. The method of 
philosophy of mind lends itself to forgetting that the concept of the person is 
normative. The argument is thus not conducted on the level of whether ethics, 
metaphysics or philosophy of mind can be given a position of absolute priority 
in discussing questions of personhood and personal identity, nor is it a question 
of priority of theory to practice, but a matter of working on the interconnections 
between the use of the concept and its clarification. The theory of the person 
suggested here is derived from arguments in the philosophy of mind but this 
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theory is an articulation and refinement of the implications of practice and the 
demands of theoretical coherence, as well as normative arguments concerning 
its function in PSE where persons are both the subject and the object of study. 
Thus in the second chapter the question of which of the various related but 
distinct questioni about persons is relevant to the problem and the interest in 
persons in the aims of PSE is discussed. Although there is no one concept of 
person to be uncovered through analysis which will apply to all contexts of its 
use, it is clear that the concept of person operates in the aims of PSE primarily 
as a forensic notion, to use Locke's terminology. The interest in the concept of 
person in PSE is, other words, primarily an interest in the concept as a moral 
notion, where this is understood broadly to include the conditions for moral 
personhood. Thus, while the question of personhood can be subdivided into 
several distinct but overlapping issues, such as the question of class 
differentiation, individuation and so forth, the salient question from the point of 
view of the problem posed above is the justification for the unity and the 
continuance of persons through time as a necessary condition for agency, since 
the concern is with agency which presupposes an understanding of personal 
identity expressions. 
While the unity and continuity of persons is a philosophical problem which, 
as Maclntyre (1990b:196-198) argues, arises against the backdrop of a complex 
and metaphysical account of the meaning of personal identity, it is argued in the 
second chapter that the presupposition of the unity and continuity of persons is 
not innocuous, and that given the problem to be addressed the investigation of 
the necessary presupposition of personal identity by an explicitly normative 
theory of the person of person is warranted. Thus, the definition of person 
which is considered to be central is a Lockean notion which emphasises self-
consciousness as a condition for self-reflection.14 The justification for this move 
is not only to be found in the interest in the question of persons, but in the 
commonplace that understanding a concept is closely related to its 
understanding its conditions of identity. While this raises special problems in 
the case of persons, it is a philosophical position which is accepted here. In 
order to understand what is meant by person we have to know what could 
change and a person still be the same person. The question of personal identity 
is therefore of more than academic interest. It is a fundamental presupposition 
of agency and its importance to the idea of living a life cannot be overstressed. 
In the second chapter, the argument for the importance of the question of 
personal identity with respect to the aims of PSE is given. It is emphasised that 
the discussion of personal identity has procedural, not conceptual priority to 
other questions of personhood. What a person is, and its identity conditions 
are, however, connected in that the identity conditions clarify what is meant by 
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person, and what is meant by person in turn clarifies the conditions of identity. 
While this approach is philosophically justified and justified by the problem 
which has been isolated, namely the presupposition of agency, it raises 
questions about what this means for the relation between the aims of PSE and 
theories of personal identity. This is given some attention, with the argument 
being presented that the relation should be seen as one of limited 
interdependence. This is to say more than that the analysis of the concept of the 
person is constrained by ordinary usage. If the concept of the person is to be 
more a response to cultural practice than the reverse, i.e., if the concept of 
person is not solely a response to moral, legal, and psychological requirements, 
then clarification of the use of the concept in education, and in particular in 
PSE, requires more in the way of argument than appeal at ,the level of intuitive 
plausibility to compatibilities between aims and our ideas of persons. This does 
not avoid, or deny the relevance of the question of what is valuable about 
persons, and more specifically, what valued characteristics or attributes of 
persons should PSE promote. 
One of the problems with taking personal identity as a central issue is that it 
is presupposed by all conceptions of the person which recognise the agency of 
persons. The argument for the relevance of personal identity must therefore 
show that there are significantly different implications for the aims of PSE from 
different theories of personal identity. This leads to consideration in the third 
chapter of the argument that the autonomous person requires a theory of strict 
identity, or a non-reductionist theory of personal identity. Several arguments are 
given to show that there is no necessary connection between the conception of 
the person as agent and a strict identity theory. The first argument is related to 
the objection to the Cartesian self given above, that it does not take into account 
the validity of other theories of self and senses of identity. If constitutive factors 
other than the constituting self are recognised then these cannot be assumed to 
be irrelevant to the formulation of the aims of PSE. This approach to identity 
serves to undermine the strict identity theory which presupposes metaphysical 
realism in its claim that persons are unanalysable, and that the identity 
conditions for persons are unlike the identity conditions for other physical 
entities. In addition, although a strict identity theory corresponds to certain 
central intuitions about persons, it is argued that it is not as plausible in terms of 
its internal consistency, as the alternative, a continuity theory. However, a 
continuity theory appears to imply a reductionism with respect to persons with 
the effect that the conceptualisation of persons as agents is denied. 
This objection is addressed in the fourth chapter through the idea that the 
analysis of the concept of person and the concept of personal identity are 
constrained by factors other than logical adequacy. In other words, the concept 
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of person operates within a complex interrelationship of logical adequacy and 
the demands made upon it. Among the candidates considered as likely 
constraints are moral, pragmatic, metaphysical and epistemic. These constraints 
all appeal to the use of the concept of person. It is argued that, with the 
exception of the last which appeals to our knowledge of persons, these factors 
do not act as constraints in virtue of the nature of the concept of person, which 
it is argued is indeterminate, and cannot be used as an independent measure for 
the adequacy of a theory of personal identity. This reinforces the point made in 
the first chapter concerning the interdependence of the concept of the person and 
the conditions for its identity. The epistemic constraint is consistent with the 
continuity view of persons, but undermines the reductionist claim. This position 
is further strengthened by consideration of the type of reductionist claim made 
by Parfit (1984) which is shown to be inadequate independently of the 
argument from our knowledge of persons. The reductionist claim is therefore 
shown to be unsustainable. This leaves us in the interesting position of being 
able to support a continuity view, with its rejection of the unity and continuity 
of persons as a given, while at the same time being able to give an account of 
the subject of experience. 
The implications of this view for practice are considered in the fifth chapter 
where the use of autobiography in the PSE classroom is considered from the 
point of view of the theory of the person endorsed. Autobiographical writing by 
students is a particularly clear example of the influence of theories of the person 
on practice and brings to the fore practical implications of the foregoing 
discussion. Conceptions of the self, sense of identity and implicit theories on 
what constitute personal identity are all in evidence in this classroom activity. 
Depending on the conception of the person underlying the theory and practice of 
autobiography, certain aspects of selfhood and personhood will be emphasised. 
It is argued that a continuity theory of personal identity is consistent with certain 
aspects of the narrative view of experience. Moreover, the refinement of Parfit's 
view suggested in the third chapter supplements the narrative view which either 
undertheorises or neglects the issue of personal agency. Further implications of 
the conceptualisation of the person are explored in the final chapter where some 
of the problems associated with the use of student autobiography are discussed 
with the aim of showing how the conceptualisation of the person suggested here 
sheds light on, and can go some way to resolving some of these difficulties. 
This ties together various themes addressed throughout the thesis and 
addresses a recurrent problem, the problem of the reconciliation of those 
perspectives. on persons which have seen to be central to the theoretical and 
practical concerns addressed in PSE. 
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Notes 
1. The use of the concept of person to refer to issues of agency is not unduly 
restrictive and prescriptive in this context. Although it can be argued that that 
what is potentially of most value about PSE is the possibility it affords for 
addressing the interrelationships between different senses of 'person' and 
exploring how they may be integrated, this is not inconsistent with the approach 
taken here. It is not uncommon to find expressions of the idea that PSE deals 
with the person as a whole, as opposed to concentrating on those particular 
aspects which have traditionally been the main or overt concern in education, 
namely persons conceptualised as cognitive or rational. In advocating a broader 
conception, the Boethian idea of a person as "an individual substance of a 
rational nature" (Boethius Liber de persona et duabus naturis, in J-P Migne 
(Ed.) Patrologia Latina, lxiv, 1338-54, quoted in Gi11,1990:1) is rejected for a 
richer conception. The emphasis on agency given here is not a circumscription 
of this desire to keep in mind the various aspects of what it means to be a 
person, or a denial that one of the aims of PSE is to furnish or retain a broad 
conception of the person. The form in which the problem has been posed has 
set the limits and raised particular problems but this should not be taken as 
implying that this is the extent of the interest in persons in the aims of PSE. 
In arguing for the importance of the concept of person as agent, it is, however 
necessary to note what this is taken to imply. It is likely as Teichman 
(1985:179) says, that the proverbial man in the street would give the sense of 
person as 'an individual human being'. Although our concept of the person is 
locally co-extensive with that of human being, this is not the only meaning of 
person, of course, and not the main concern in the aims of PSE. The interest in 
persons in PSE is not centrally either with whether persons are animals, or 
whether the concepts of person and human being are co-extensive, but these 
aspects of our concept cannot be definitively separated from the concern with 
persons isolated here. The fact that persons are embodied and that they are 
identified with individual human beings is influences our theories of personal 
identity. As mentioned above, it can however be taken that the primary interest 
in persons in education is in persons as unified centres of choice and action, the 
unit of responsibility, the locus and subject of experience and value. Thus the 
concept is essentially the Lockean idea of persons as "a thinking intelligent 
being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same 
thinking thing in different times and places" (Essay II, xxvii. 9) Although this 
concept of person is emphasised it should not be expected that it can be 
discussed without the influence of other ideas, such as the idea of persons as 
human beings. 
The argument presented here is therefore to be distinguished from arguments 
such as Langford's (1980, 1985) in that it is not argued to become educated is 
to learn to be a person. In particular, while the emphasis is on the continuity and 
unity of persons as a precondition for agency, which in turn is presupposed by 
the particular aims of PSE, the concept must make reference to personal facts 
other than psychological which effectively undermines, in this context, talk of 
developing as persons as an aim. The argument advanced recognises that the 
concept of the person is prescriptive, and cannot be divorced from the values it 
contains. In this the position advanced is in some ways similar to Thatcher's 
(1980). 
2. This should not be taken as implying that this type of concern is new to 
education, or that these concerns have not long been among those of education, 
however, its presence as a distinct subject or area of explicit educational concern 
and the reasons for its development bring to the fore many philosophical 
questions concerning the relation between persons and education. 
3. See, for example, Garnett and Lang (1986), Leicester (1990) and Regis 
(1991). The unease seems primarily motivated by the connection between 
autonomy and individualism which is seen as antithetical to the purposes and 
methods of PSE and the lack of emphasis it gives, relative to the value of 
autonomy, to other values such as community. 
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4. Concern over technical rationality and the technocratic education are clearly 
distinguishable, but exhibit two major current concerns over the direction of the 
education system. One of the foremost critics of technical rationality and its use 
in citizenship education is Giroux (see, for example, 1983:176-184). The issues 
involved in technocratic education are various, for a useful overview see T. 
Lewis (1991). 
5. See, for example, Henriques et al. (1984) for a theorising the subject of 
psychology in terms of the notion of subjectivities. 
6. See, for example, Sandel (1982) and Kolb (1990) 
7. The conflict between conceptualisations of the person will clearly have an 
effect on teaching practice. An interesting discussion of how this sort of conflict 
is worked out by teachers in the practical activity of teaching is to be found in 
Billig et al. (1988). 
8. It is clearly beyond argument that the aims of PSE involve a theory of the 
person. It is addressed to persons and is designed to enhance the lives of 
persons. The debates over what the aims of PSE should be centre on . To make 
the theory of the person prominent, as here, is not to argue that the theory of the 
person is prior to questions such as what is the good for persons, and how 
education can facilitate the achievement of these aims, but to their 
interrelationship which is particularly clear when thinking about the aims of 
PSE. 
9. In both Descartes and Locke this idea of the self is bound up with theories of 
rationality and epistemology, and cannot be considered in abstraction from these 
given that they support this view of the person as independent of psychological 
states which on this account are understood as contingent. Unfortunately, in 
this brief sketch these positions cannot be explored. 
10. Feminist pedagogy draws on postmodern theory, particularly Foucault's 
emphasis on the connection between power and knowledge and Derrida's 
theory of difference with the focus being on the different meanings of 
oppression and the potential for simultaneous and contradictory positions of 
dominance and oppression. In other words, feminist pedagogy focuses on the 
difference in subjectivities and interests. 
11. This problem is not particular to feminist pedagogies, of course. It is 
evident in all theories which reject the Cartesian self, whether this is from the 
perspective of psychoanalytic categories, as in Chodorow (1986), for example, 
or from the perspective of the imbrication of self in language and social 
structures. Theories such as Kristeva's (1984, 1987), which fall into the later 
category, provide complex analyses in order to reconceptualise the unitary 
Cartesian subject in such a way that it can take account of our complex 
understanding of the relation of the person to the world and herself which at the 
same time can provide an account of socially significant agency. Kristeva's 
account, in common with others which emphasise that agency is not the 
possession of individual selves, but the product of discursive forces which 
produce fragmentary and contradictory subject positions, leaves many questions 
unanswered. Not least among which is an explanation of our sense of identity 
and agency through time. Kristeva provides an interesting example of the 
problem of the conceptualisation of the subject since she does not attempt to 
somehow graft the Cartesian conception of agency onto the constituted subject, 
while leaving behind ideas such as epistemic privilege of the subject. To avoid 
the abandonment or rejection of the subject she explicates agency in terms of the 
relationship between the semiotic and the symbolic, looking to the different 
subjects which have been constituted by different forms of discourse with the 
subject being conceptualised as as a subject in process, its agency being 
constituted through the conflict between the semiotic and the symbolic. This 
account is based on the importance of language in the construction of the self, 
an idea we shall return to when the use of autobiographical writing in PSE is 
discused in chapter 5. 
12. At this point the objection could be raised that the wrong concept has been 
isolated as the subject of the investigation if the concern is with how persons 
can be both agents and socially constructed in their actions, desires and 
intentions. 'Person', however, as opposed to related concepts,such as 
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individual, self, character, or subjectivities, has certain connotations and 
associations. Primary among these is the perspective it affords on agency, and 
on moral agency in particular. The attribution of personhood says among other 
things, that a certain stance is appropriate to that entity in virtue of its having 
certain properties or attributes, or the potential to have such. Thus, the 
importance of the focus on the concept of the person is that by keeping this 
concept and its associations and implications in mind it is possible to also keep 
in mind the interest in the problem, namely to retain the sense of person as 
agent. The privileging of the concept of person over, for example, the concept 
of contested subjectivities is not open to the major objection which could be 
raised it, that the latter provides a wide frame of reference given the implication 
of subjectivity in social structures, while the position taken here presumes a 
certain individualism, in that the person is conceptualised as a discrete entity. 
This, however, should be considered the point of departure for the discussion, 
not its end-point. The fundamental problem is not how these subjectivities are 
structured, but how to retain the idea of a subject in the understanding of the 
deep relation between ideology and domination, to put it in Althusserian terms, 
or of how to focus on the agency of the individual without at the same time 
privileging the relation between beliefs and self-determination with its attendant 
criticisms, not least of which is the claim of the individual to epistemological 
privilege. Once the construction of subjectivities is recognised it is permissible, 
given the context and orientation to the problem, to move back to the concept of 
the person with its presumption of unity to investigate its justification. The 
primary advantage of this approach is that it retains the value of persons, as 
agents, throughout. There is no opportunity to forget the purpose of the 
investigation. 
13. The method employed essentially denies that ethics, politics, ontology and 
epistemology can be treated as discrete concerns. The position taken is therefore 
is analogous to that of recent feminist philosophy which has pointed to the 
problems involved in the contemporary treatment of issues within separate 
disciplines with discrete concerns. Not only are such divisions unable to 
withstand critical scrutiny but examination of these divisions exposes their 
political nature, as Flax (1983:248ff) for example argues. The division of ethics 
from philosophy of mind or the metaphysics of the person allows, for example, 
the idea that the analysis of concepts in the latter area can be entirely objective, 
and transcend political social and ethical identity. Pointing out the necessary 
interconnections between ontological, epistemological and political commitment 
in philosophical discourses is, as Gatens (1986:26) says "akin to turning over a 
tapestry and examining the interconnections of the threads that from the 'right' 
side of the fabric give the impression of discrete figures and patterns". 
Examining these interconnections is necessary if the ways in which philosophy 
has constructed fundamental concepts such as 'person' is to be explored. Such 
an ambitious topic is not undertaken here, however. 
14. Commonly perhaps, the idea of being a person involves the idea of self-
consciousness and intentionality. Persons are rational, self-conscious beings, 
aware of themselves as distinct beings with a past and a future. As Taylor 
(1985:97) says, they can make choices, hold values, can "adopt life-plans". 
This idea of a continuous entity which can reflect and knows its self to be itself 
is seemingly essential to PSE. The problem is with the attribution of a strong 
form of agency where persons are conceptualised, as Taylor (op.cit.:98-99) 
says, as beings for whom things matter, which is to say "we can attribute 
purposes, desires, aversions to them in a strong, original sense". The 
importance of having a desire in "an original sense", and thus Taylor's familiar 
view that persons are respondents, is that we need some account of how people 
can change their mind about basic things. 
Chapter 1 
PSE and the Conceptualisation of the Person 
PSE addresses the question of which qualities, skills, dispositions should 
be stressed to enhance personal and social development given that persons are 
agents. It is from this perspective that PSE aims to help students make sense of 
themselves, others and the world. 
It is clearly not the case that PSE is unique among the subjects on the 
curriculum in presupposing that persons are active, but it can be viewed as 
making a distinctive contribution in the focus it permits and encourages on 
students' questioning of themselves, reflecting on themselves as persons, or 
selves, in the asking in different ways of the question 'Who am I?' Thus 
although questions concerning what persons and human beings are, how they 
function and behave, their culture, history and social life, all form part of PSE, 
it is in the stimulation of self-reflection and questioning concerning the students' 
own lives, in the asking of what they should do, how they should live, that lies 
the strength and value of PSE. 
The aims of PSE involve, at least, an understanding of what is valuable 
about persons. Whether explicitly stated or labeled as such, discussions of the 
aims of PSE involve an ideal, or ideals of the person, and assumptions about 
what it is valuable for persons to acquire. The ideal of the person which has had 
most influence is that of the autonomous agent. While interpreted differently 
and admitting of conceptual and moral problems, there can be little doubt that 
even if it is not considered the major aim of PSE, any feasible aim presupposes 
that persons are active and capable of some form of self-determination. If we 
take the idea that PSE is concerned with the perceptions students have of 
themselves, others and the world around them, while implying the development 
of those individual qualities, skills and dispositions considered personally and 
socially valuable, it also makes certain assumptions about persons in the 
formulation and articulation of those ideals which supply the content for the 
notion of personal development. 
These ideals, which may or may not be moral, are determined frequently, 
though not exclusively by reference to theories only indirectly concerned with 
what persons are. In other words, arguments for what the aims of PSE should 
be, make use of sociological, political, psychological and ethical theories in 
articulation and defence of the valued qualities to be promoted, but lacking in 
these accounts is much attention to what is meant by the term 'person',1 
attention being directed to the determination of what is of value to both persons 
and society. It is the relation between these two issues - what a person is and 
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what is valuable about persons, and the relation of both to arguments for the 
aims of PSE - which is of concern here. Although the existence of these 
relations is occasionally made explicit,2 more often they are implicitly invoked 
in arguing for an explicit conception of the person. 
Notwithstanding concern with explicitly normative questions of 
personhood, the theory and practice of PSE necessarily presupposes a theory of 
the person. A theory of the person is necessary to making sense of PSE, as a 
subject on the curriculum addressed to personal and social concerns.3 While 
such a theory could not be considered sufficient for either the articulation or 
defence of the distinctive contribution PSE makes to the curriculum, the 
necessary assumption of a theory of the person is important in virtue of the 
assumed relation it has to other matters of concern in PSE. What constitutes 
living well and ideas on social and personal well-being require arguments for, 
or assumptions about, what persons are. As Sprigge (1988:247) points out, the 
difficulty in answering questions such as "'How is it best that we, or how 
ought we, to act in the world?', lies as much in deciding what we really are, 
what action really is, and the world really is as in deciding what ought and best 
are." It shall be argued here that what it is to be a person, is a question which, 
in an important sense, has a legitimate claim of relative priority to the more 
obviously normative question of what is valuable about persons. This is not to 
claim the stronger position, that from what persons are, substantial ethical or 
political claims can be derived, but to begin to address a neglected connection 
between questions concerning the person in philosophy of mind and social, 
political and ethical theories drawn on in the defence of aims of PSE. Since this 
is a contentious position, perhaps giving the impression of putting the cart 
before the horse, in the first section the importance of this issue for PSE will be 
argued by showing that the aims of PSE, although divergent in both arguments 
and conclusions, have in common an underlying conception of the person. 
It will be argued that at least among the aims to be considered, which are 
intended to be representative, the basic insight is that the person, in this context, 
should be conceptualised as complex. Thus, the interest in persons in PSE, it 
will be argued, is in the person as a complex entity which has, in particular, 
both active and passive aspects which need to be taken into account, and 
accounted for, in arguments for what the main aims of PSE should be. 
Although the conception of the person held in common is often implicit, it will 
be argued here that it is precisely this complex conception of the person which, 
in large measure accounts for, and provides grounds for, the value and 
importance of PSE as integral to the curriculum, notwithstanding the problems 
of coherent articulation of this conception of the person. The difficulty, of 
course, with this understanding of the person lies in the attempt to realise it 
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within the constraints of coherence and adequacy, given that it involves the 
adoption and reconciliation of two perspectives which are not obviously 
compatible. It is not at all clear that this is possible. Nevertheless, it will be 
argued here that a sincere attempt needs to be made to give a coherent account of 
the person which, similar to the aims considered in the following section, takes 
our ordinary understanding and experiences of persons and of being persons, 
seriously. In starting from our ordinary experience coupled with our interest in 
persons in PSE, the aim is to focus on the role played by some commonly held 
assumptions about what persons are in the formulation and argument for 
specific aims of PSE.4 
Having argued for the importance of a complex and rich account of the 
person in PSE, some of the problems with accomplishing this will be 
examined. In the next chapter, it will be argued that the question concerning 
persons which is most relevant given the problem of conceptualising the person 
as both active and subject to social forces, is not as it may at first have appeared 
to be, the normative question, but rather the metaphysical question of 'what is a 
person?'. That this should be the case is suggested by the interest in persons in 
PSE, which is interpreted as addressed to the person as subject. The argument 
stresses the importance of making our interest in persons explicit, and draws 
attention to features of the concept of the person itself, raising the question of 
whether it is possible and what would be involved in giving a single coherent 
account of the person which is both consistent and useful in the context of PSE. 
The discussion implies a close connection between the meaning given to the 
concept of the person and the context of its use, in that it implies that the former 
is dependent on the latter which includes the interest in inquiring about persons. 
This raises questions about the concept of the person and its analysis. It will be 
argued here that although definitive disentanglement of the meaning of 'person' 
from its context is neither possible, nor desirable, this does not preclude the 
identification of a specific conception of the person which is central to our 
understanding of the person as subject. This does not presume normative 
neutrality, but legitimates consideration of assumptions concerning the person, 
as at least having procedural priority to explicitly normative questions. 
1 
Issues Concerning the Theory of the Person and the Aims of 
PSE 
In this section conceptions of the person contained in proposed aims for 
PSE will be examined with the aim of showing that despite differences, there is 
a common underlying conception of the person. The general aim of this section 
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is to lay out some of the issues involved in the attempt to determine the nature of 
the relation between the theory of the person necessarily contained in 
discussions of the aims of PSE and the aims themselves. This issue will be 
approached through examination of the conceptions of the person implicitly 
referred to, or explicitly adduced in support of arguments for the aims of PSE. 
These conceptions, it will be argued, are distinguishable from the question of 
what is valuable about persons. This provides the framework for subsequent 
discussion of the relation between these conceptions and the explicitly 
normative issue of what is valuable about persons that we wish to promote in 
PSE. The distinction on which this argument is based is necessarily qualified by 
the functional nature of the concept of person, but this does not disturb the case 
made for the usefulness and validity of considering the question of what a 
person is, in this context. 
Arguments for the aims of PSE will be taken here to involve a 
presupposition about persons, their agency. For this reason the emphasis here 
is on those aims which stress this aspect of persons. Other conceptions,5 in 
virtue of holding the same presupposition but not emphasising it, are considered 
to the extent that they reveal inadequacies in the conception of the person as 
autonomous. The concern is to be illustrative and representative rather than 
exhaustive in the examples chosen. It will be shown that despite important 
differences, the aims of PSE share a common goal: to embrace the idea of the 
person as both an autonomous and social entity. A problem in the formulating 
of the aims of PSE will therefore be seen to lie in the attempt to realise the basic 
insight held in common, that our understanding of the person is complex and 
that PSE should attempt to reflect this complexity in the statement of what it 
hopes to achieve. 
This position naturally depends on a particular understanding of the 
problems PSE is to address. Here it will be assumed that common to all 
approaches is the problem of how to characterise, or how we are to understand 
the relation of a person to herself, and the relation between a person and the 
world.6 
Since the focus is the conception of the person, a few preliminary words 
need to be said about the nature of the concept of the person itself. A working 
assumption of the approach adopted here is that the concept of the person is 
functional, thus is appropriately applied to any being which satisfies a given 
criterion in the context of its use. Thus, the philosophical commonplace, that 
there is no univocal concept to which all usages conform, is accepted. This 
argument, which has been made most forcibly by Rorty (1988), claims that the 
term 'person' functions as a place-holder for a plurality of different concepts, 
and as the focus for a complex of quite different concerns. On this view, no 
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single formulation can be accepted as being the definition of the person. Rather 
than it being the case that there is a determinable underlying concept of the 
person which is independent of our interest in person, these interests 
themselves inform the definitions. This requires that any account of the person 
must be sensitive and relevant to the context of its use. Hence, one of the 
criteria against which the adequacy of the analysis of the concept of the person 
can be measured is the extent to which it illuminates and clarifies those features 
of PSE which are distinctive and give it value, this being determined, in this 
case, by the desire to reflect and illuminate features of our experience as 
persons, and the ideals which reflect what is considered valuable about this 
experience. 
Starting from this position, which will be qualified later, it is appropriate not 
to provide a detailed definition of the person at the outset, but to look, in the 
first instance at our interest in persons in this context, as what a person is 
considered to be will be responsive to this interest.? This may seem a tall order 
in our present context, since, it could be argued, there is no widespread 
agreement on what PSE iS,8 and that even if there were such agreement, the 
interest in persons comes not from PSE but from wider theoretical perspectives 
which inform the major functions of PSE. Even if this is accepted, it cannot be 
concluded that there is no agreement on the interest in persons, as shall be 
argued. All that needs to be shown for this approach to be acceptable is that 
there are isolatable interests in persons which are evident in PSE. The source of 
these interests does not affect the validity of the approach. The approach while 
not directly addressing the source of our interest in persons does in fact 
indirectly draw attention to this issue. The assumption is that by not providing a 
definition of person at the outset we shall, by following the arguments for the 
aims which have been put forward, clarify the interest in persons in PSE. 
This approach has the advantage of forestalling an objection which could be 
raised to an inquiry which focuses on the concept of the person in arguments 
for specific educational aims. By looking in the first place to the stated concerns 
with persons in PSE and moving from this to analysis of the concept isolated 
we avoid the more obvious charge of misguided foundationalism, or of 
assuming that there is only one concept of the person which will 
unambiguously pick out the same entity in all contexts of its use.9 
Fundamental to this approach is the argument that any discussion of 
persons starts from a particular perspective, and that lack of explicitness as to 
the perspective may have the consequence of making the analysis inapplicable to 
the particular context of its use. For example in some contexts we are concerned 
with persons as physical objects: as the objects of biological and anatomical 
inquiry. In determining whether some disease only afflicts persons, for 
29 
instance, characterising the class of persons by their possession of an immortal 
soul, is unlikely to be most pertinent or useful. In education, if we assume that 
a behaviouristic approach is being considered, it would only be useful to start 
from a definition of persons as essentially disembodied souls as a definition to 
be criticised. One must at the outset have an interest in persons, an interest 
which focuses the discussion and delineates the area of inquiry. From this it 
cannot, of course, be assumed that the interest isolated in the first instance will 
capture what is important about persons in that context given that many of the 
issues concerning persons are not only ambiguous in their first formulation, but 
the concerns which initially appear separate often overlap and cannot be 
considered in isolation from other issues.10 Even if it were to be disputed that 
every discussion of persons must necessarily be undertaken from a certain 
perspective, it is clearly the case here, given that we are concerned with the 
education of persons within a specific educational and social context. 
For different reasons, in outlining the various approaches to the aims of 
PSE, the question of similarities and differences between the principal terms 
used, such as person, individual and self, will not be addressed. This strategy 
has the advantage of keeping it as open as possible which question concerning 
persons is most pertinent whilst discussing the various aims that have been 
proposed for PSE. While it will be argued later that the concepts of person, 
individual and self as they are used in PSE, raise relevantly similar issues, it is 
important not to overlook the fact that these concepts are taken to address 
different issues in general,11 and the prioritising of the concept of person 
effectively prejudices the argument by marginalising some issues which are 
properly addressed by these other concepts. This is a useful strategy as it helps 
show the extent to which the concept of person is central to PSE, without 
becoming embroiled in definitional questions at the outset. The aim is to focus 
on often unacknowledged beliefs about persons, and the effect of these on the 
formulation of the aims of PSE. The reason for proceeding in this way, is that it 
allows the common features of the approaches to be more easily seen, and at the 
same time revealing some of the complexity of the concept of person as it is 
used in PSE. 
2 
Conceptions of the Person in the Aims of PSE 
In this section the conception of the person in writings on the aims of PSE 
is considered. Pring (1984, 1987), and White (1990) provide the focus for 
several reasons. Both contain clear expressions of the importance of the concept 
of person, and both argue for the importance of a form of autonomous thought 
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and action as an aim of PSE. A further reason for considering these two 
accounts of the aims of PSE is that they illustrate the problem with conceiving 
of the person as an agent, namely how to give adequate recognition to the 
conception of the person as active and passive. 
Both argue for a privileging of the personal in PSE, although. the meaning 
given to 'personal' is importantly different. Whereas Pring argues for a 
conception of the person closely connected to moral theory, White's conception 
relies on a conception of personal well-being which does not place the demands 
of an impersonal and objective morality at the centre. Although there is this 
crucial area of disagreement, both positions are clearly within a philosophical 
tradition which prizes the idea of person as the source of authority in significant 
areas which informs the underlying conception of the person and its 
importance. Although differing significantly in the basis for their position and 
their recommendations, they are united in their emphasis on the person as the 
primary location for agency, and in the importance of personal choice and 
action. 
Pring (1987:12) argues for a "shift ... to the personal" and a "deeper 
concern for the person" (ibid:27) which leads to more emphasis on curricular 
innovation aimed directly at developing those abilities which are personally and 
socially desirable. This includes awareness of students' needs, and a rejection 
of the impersonal attitude traditionally seen as the focus of academic inquiry. 
This shift to the personal is justified by what it means to be a person, and by the 
social and cultural context within which PSE is to exist and flourish. 
Among those features of the social and cultural context which Pring 
mentions as relevant are the unpredictable future facing students, including 
changing employment patterns and a certain fluidity in social roles, and the 
pluralism of society such that no common core of values can be assumed to 
hold. The conception of the person refers both to the conditions for personhood 
(ibid:15, 1984:12-13) and to an explicitly moral conception of the person 
(1984:13), with the idea of the person or self essentially connected to the idea of 
the good: "'persons' picks out objects that not only have a form of conscious 
life and engage in purposeful activities but also possess moral attributes" 
(loc.cit.). Drawing on the proposition that "[h]ow you treat people depends 
upon your concept of 'person', Pring stresses the idea of a person as a moral 
being in the sense that a certain stance towards persons is appropriate and that 
persons can reciprocate this stance, echoing Dennett's (1978:270) third and 
fourth conditions of personhood. Pring's personal approach is characterised by 
respect for students, a sense of community and objective standards of moral 
decision making. Although Pring takes a neo-Kantian view of personal and 
social development, making use of Kohlberg and Piaget (1984:Ch. 2, 1987:16- 
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18), this rationalist view of persons is combined with an emphasis on the 
"feelings, concerns and self-perceptions" of students. The account of personal 
development involves "enhancement of those powers of problem-solving, of 
self-transcendence, of sensitivity and of imagination" (1987:12) which will 
have personally and socially beneficial outcomes. 
The connection between being a person and the particular conception of the 
good he embraces, leads Pring to endorse Morrell's (1965-6, as quoted in 
Pring, loc.cit.) claim that the only basis for true moral discourse is the 
'objectification of self. Thus from within a personal perspective, from an 
interest in the actual lives of students, taking their concerns and interests 
seriously he takes an objectivist view of moral personhood. His views on the 
importance of the person in PSE are characterised by: 
a deeper concern for the person - a respect for pupils or students as 
persons, enabling them to articulate and to 'refine' their feelings to 
achieve self-esteem and sense of personal worth, to develop the 
capacity to engage in principled thinking, to acquire the ability to 
reflect upon experience, and to accept seriously the values and 
attitudes that they bring to school or college (1987:27). 
The importance of the personal is therefore centred on the autonomy and 
value of the individual, with autonomy being construed as a moral ideal, in 
conformity with standards of rationality. 
A different argument for the personal approach is to be found in a recent 
article by White (1989). Noting a deficiency in recent attempts to formulate the 
aims of PSE in terms of moral education, neglect of the Aristotelian insight that 
personal well-being is central to a good life, he argues that personal well-being 
should be a central aim of PSE. White rejects the view that persons are 
essentially moral agents and thus the implication that a central aim of PSE 
should be the promotion of moral goodness. Instead of focusing on moral 
obligation as central to the worthwhile life, White's account looks to the 
importance of the personal point of view. This cannot be accommodated, 
according to White, if the presumption in the aims of PSE is in favour of moral 
development. This leads White to argue for a redress of the balance of'self-
remembering" over "self-forgetting" (ibid.:17) in favour of the former to 
counteract the emphasis which has traditionally been given to the latter in 
education. 
In arguing for the importance of personal well-being as an aim of PSE, he 
draws attention to the motivation to be moral, the "missing element" in the 
promotion of moral education as a central aim of PSE. A motivation for the 
promotion of personal well-being as expounded is awareness of the 
indispensability of the personal, subjective life of the individual in a worthwhile 
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life PSE. In drawing attention to this aspect of morality, that it must involve the 
'inside' and not just be external to the person, in the forms of demands or 
commitments that attach to the person, he joins a recent tradition in moral theory 
the most notable exponents of which are Nagel (1986) and Williams (1976, 
1985). Thus, the account of personal well-being is influenced by Williams' 
criticism of morality as well as an Aristotelian conception of the good life. 
White takes seriously Williams' view that moral obligation is a form of 
alienation. 
This is an argument for recognition of the importance of "subjective 
involvement in one's own ends and their interrelationships" (loc.cit.). The 
notion of the individual person White stresses is personal in the sense that it 
emphasises that distinctive aspect of being a person, the subjective, distinct 
from objective descriptions of what it means to be a person. Thus, White's 
account emphasises the importance of the idea that persons have a point of view 
on the world. Arguing from the importance of the subjective view of the self, he 
argues that the connection.between the self and moral demands is such that it 
supports the idea that PSE should be engaged in enhancing the individual 
person's perception of her own well-being. 
These positions on the person support White's criticism of impersonal 
approaches to moral education, where the impersonality of the approach is 
found in the emphasis on one's behaviour towards others. Situating this view 
of moral education in an historical context, in the idea of an education as, in 
part, serving others, White objects that this view of education involves the 
adoption of an inappropriate stance to PSE for several reasons: It is only one, if 
influential, view of the worthwhile life; it is based on particular cultural and 
historical conditions; and it neglects the basis of human motivation for action. It 
is only our desires which give us reason for action, so if the reasons for action 
are not related to our desires they remain external to us. This holds equally for 
moral reasons for action. White's account attempts to incorporate this theoretical 
perspective on the connection between individual desire and reasons for action 
in his articulation of personal well-being as the aim of PSE. 
Pring and White provide two arguments for autonomy as the aim of PSE, 
two views which principally diverge on the connection between morality and 
the person. 
The tension between the views is highlighted if we look more closely at a 
central claim of White's against positions such as Pring's, which emphasise the 
importance of moral education. White, addressing a point made by Pring 
(1984:68) that "some sense of moral obligation, of duty" is needed argues that 
unless moral demands are somehow related to the students' desires they will 
remain external to the student and thus alien to them. The strength of the 
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argument, as presented by White, lies in the claim that "it is only our desires, I 
would argue, which give us reason for action" (op.cit.:9). This supplies the 
warrant for "start[ing] at a different place" (ibid:10), one which is not premised 
on the idea that moral goodness is a central aim of PSE. 
Although White does not make distinctions between desires, as it stands this 
claim can be interpreted as having the implication that reasons for action which 
are not based on desires are less significant for the person performing the action 
than actions performed from desires. Significant in this context can mean either 
less motivating or less part of a person's conception of themselves. This view 
seems to draw on several philosophical arguments. Given White's (ibid:10) 
positive citing of Williams' views on morality, it is plausible to assume that 
Williams' objections to impartial morality developed in his earlier work,12 and 
especially Williams' notion of a ground project and the absurdity of an 
impersonal morality, are accepted. White's account could also be seen as 
endorsing a Humean view of the relation between reason and passion. On either 
of these positions, the claim, as it stands, and the context of the argument, 
suggests that an important distinction is being obscured: between what makes a 
reason a good reason and what gives that reason force for a particular person. 
It seems that White does not make this distinction because of his perspective 
on the person and its relation to morality. On a view other than White's, a good 
reason for action need not have anything to do with the desires of particular 
individuals. To see this we need only take the idea of action within a rule-
governed practice. It can be assumed that in the absence of particular personal 
desires extrinsic to the goods specific to the practice, once engaged in a practice 
it is the goods of the practice itself, and not particular personal desires which 
determines reason for action, except where the practice is engaged in for the 
sake of goods external to the practice. In a world of practices prefacing action 
with 'I want' or 'it pleases me' plays only a very specific role, as Maclntyre 
(1982:299-301) notes. Thus, while a certain state of desire is necessary to 
generate action, and a practice may be engaged in for reasons other than the 
goods of the practice, once engaged in the practice personal desire has no role. 
One could only hold the contrary position if the above distinction was obscured. 
In rule governed practices, as Maclntyre (ibid:300-301) points out, what 
determines a good reason for an action are the rules defining and constituting 
the practice, not the desires of individuals participating in the practice. White's 
position, as opposed to Pring's, does not recognise good reasons for action in 
absence of desires. Thus, White's views on the role of desire in providing 
reasons for action is only applicable to the initial stance to the practice, which is 
all that is required for an action to be autonomous. 
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Borrowing from Brink (1986:432), we can say that White's worries are 
about morality rather than moral worries. His objection is essentially to morality 
as a practice which does not give sufficient importance to the personal point of 
view. On White's view the person or self can choose to be moral, but need not. 
There is nothing in what it means to be a person, in White's account which 
requires obedience to an impersonal moral order. A salient characteristic of 
persons on this account is their ability to form second order desires. This is 
frequently taken to be a condition of personhood,13 as one of those 
characteristics which distinguish persons from other entities. For White second-
order desires are characterised as arising "from the regulation of conflicts 
between lower-order desires" (ibid.:12). The first order dispositional desires to 
be inculcated in children are determined by inter-subjective agreement: "there is 
a broad, taken-for-granted, agreement among (nearly all of) us about what 
desires are worth fostering"(ibid.:11). Higher-order desires are added to these 
for the purpose of adjudicating conflicts between first-order desires. First order 
desires are thus socially constituted and non-autonomously acquired, and 
occupy a lower position in a desire hierarchy. 
There are significant differences between this account and Taylor's (1977, 
1985b, 1989) notion of strong evaluation which are instructive in this context as 
they concern the relation between the person and moral demands.15 Taylor 
makes use of Frankfurt's distinction between first and second order desires as 
the basis for his distinction between strong and weak evaluation. In White's 
desire hierarchy "those of higher order found among our major desires" 
(op.cit:11) are not distinguished from first order desires in virtue of being, as in 
Taylor's scheme "worthier, or nobler, or more integrated" (Taylor, 1977:25). 
In Taylor it is not so much the capacity to override first-order desires which is 
important, but the reasons for doing so. The strong evaluator is distinguished 
from the weak evaluator by the kind of evaluation involved. Unlike White, the 
assessment of first order desires is carried out from a specifically ethical 
standpoint, where ethical is broadly understood to involve the idea of personal 
growth, as the growing beyond "a baser, more self-enclosed and troubled" 
motivation, to "a higher, more clairvoyant, more serene" one. Hence, 
"[i]mplicit in this strong evaluation is thus placing our different motivation 
relative to each other, the drawing, as it were, of a moral map of ourselves" 
(1985b:67). White, like Owen (1990) would argue that this account of the 
person overemphasises the centrality of ethical identifications in human life, and 
its importance to our sense of who we are. Second order desires in White are, 
as mentioned above, required for the resolution of conflict between first-order 
desires. There is no requirement for second-order desires if there is no conflict 
or need to prioritise desires. There is no need for reflection on desires, in other 
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words, if the desires are consistent. The degree of reflectiveness required can 
therefore be minimal in a well-ordered life. The overall aim seems to be for a 
form of personal harmony and integration. The conditions for autonomy are 
required, just in case they are needed, not because they are necessary to the 
living of a good life. Thus, although second order desires are more important, 
being higher in the desire hierarchy, their value and function is significantly 
different from Taylor's strong evaluations. 
Although White's account is consistent with the person as a socially 
constructed entity, in that first-order desires are socially constructed, the person 
is understood as a primarily an individual with a discrete existence, with the 
theory of valued action being guided by the theory of the self. 
Both Pring's and White's approaches retain a core idea of personal 
autonomy, that the autonomous person does what she really wants to do, not 
just what she wants to do. The two approaches are distinguishable, however, in 
terms of the the standard by which actions are to be judged worthwhile. In 
Pring impartial rationality performs this role. This involves the 'objectification 
of the self in the following of moral principles guided by a theory of 
rationality. In White the objective of autonomous action is achieved through 
'second-order desires', with intersubjectively agreed upon values which have 
been internalised providing the standard. 
While the avoidance of notions such as a true or authentic self seems 
correct, without using these or similar ideas, it is not clear how successful the 
shift to the personal can be. In both cases the standards are external to the 
student, or are only contingently internal. When a student in Pring's PSE class 
asks herself "Do I really want to do this?" or "Do I want to be the sort of person 
who does this?" the reference is "positions which are objectively defensible" 
(1987:13). This may seem to raise problems about choice, a notion bound up 
with autonomy." The standards by which actions are judged are supplied by an 
objective morality enhanced by a developmental programme. Together these 
provide the source of the objectively defensible positions. In White the 
inculcation of intersubjectively agreed upon first-order desires according to 
agreed upon values, with second-order desires being fostered for the purpose of 
regulating conflicts between first-order desires, provide a non-arbitrary standard 
for judging the worthiness of desires. In both cases therefore there are 
standards, rationally or socially derived which provide criteria for judging 
whether a thought or action is autonomous. 
The standards or assurances provided by objectively defensible positions, 
or intersubjectively agreed upon values, assure the possibility of autonomous 
thought and action, which brings us to the central problem. In both cases these 
standards, which need to be inculcated or fostered through PSE have a higher 
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status than the standards of any particular individual. The validation of these 
standards is not derived from or dependent on the individual. In the case of 
Pring they are standards provided by moral theory and a theory of rationality, 
and in White by commonly agreed upon values. It is not claimed that these 
standards are universal, rather both Pring and White situate their arguments for 
the aims of PSE firmly within the context of a particular society and set of 
traditions. The emphasis on the development of autonomy is motivated by, and 
a reflection of, these wider values. 
The emphasis is therefore not on the personal in the sense that the goal is 
that each individual person thinks and acts according to her own independently 
arrived at maxims or principles. These are only sanctioned in so far as they 
conform to principles external to the individual. The aim, of course, is that these 
will become internal, that the individual will identify with these desires or 
principles so that they constitute what the person 'really' wants to do, but they 
are only contingently internal at the start of the process. 
The idea at root is that persons are malleable, their desires and thoughts are 
influenced by factors external to themselves. On this view, a function of PSE is 
to foster the identification with and 'owning' of ideas, principles and desires 
which are justified by reference to ideals found in morality, agreed upon values 
and standards of rationality. The issue of identification and the owning of 
desires and thoughts therefore bears directly on the question of the 
conceptualisation of the person. 
3 
The Person and The Personal 
Before addressing this directly, it is important to be clear what is not being 
claimed by Pring and White, and in the process clarify the nature of the 
problem. It is claimed in objection to the view that the aims of PSE should 
emphasise some form of autonomy, that such accounts do not sufficiently take 
into account the extent to which the person is socially constituted. 
There is a distinction to be made here between the idea that the concept of 
the person is socially constituted and the idea that a person is socially 
constituted. According to the first idea, the definition of personhood and thus 
the extent of its attribution and the consequences of attribution are dependent on 
social context. Hence, in some societies very young human beings may be 
excluded, in others entities other than live human beings may be included as 
persons. The second idea is that desires, intentions, thoughts and so forth are 
socially constituted. It is from this latter position that the objection is raised to 
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the emphasis on the person as potentially autonomous in significant areas of her 
life. 
This is a far more radical objection than that raised by those who object to 
the emphasis on autonomy in the aims of PSE. Garnett and Lang (1986), who 
argue for the treatment of "the individual in a collective context" which "locates 
self-identity in a social environment" (ibid.:163), and Regis (1991) who 
endorses this view, do not take a totally constructivist position on the person. 
Rather the objection is to the implications of the dominance of an individualist 
conception of the person on the individual. The objection looks to the mismatch 
between this conception and students' needs and social reality. On this view 
attachment to the idea of educating for rational choice, and its underlying theory 
of the person, has obscured the lack of consonance between this conception of 
the person and social reality, leading to undue emphasis on procedures for 
choice and on individual decision-making, leading to neglect of the legitimate 
role played by family, friends and other communities in making decisions. Thus 
Regis (1991.:8) points out "the young person may depend on this group for a 
sense of identity, and for development and maintenance of his or her self-
concept." The concern expressed by this objection is that adequate recognition 
needs to be given to the idea that persons are necessarily social beings. 
Emphasis on developing autonomous thought and action, based on the 
individual, is considered to have harmful outcomes for the individual, by failing 
to recognise that social relations play a role in constituting who we are. 
The objection does not, however, involve rejection of the importance of 
enhanced autonomy, for example, as a legitimate aim of PSE: the notion of an 
autonomous person is still recognised as a value. The more social orientation is 
perceived as a corrective to the flaws in, rather than a substitute for, the 
individualist conception. The idea is to elevate the importance of the social 
conditions for personhood, with the group of which the person is a part being 
given increased importance such that it is considered integral to a person's sense 
of identity. 
This type of criticism does not raise a serious problem for positions such as 
Pring's and White's if the objection is understood as simply a call to include 
social influences on the formation of desires, concerns and orientation to 
problems, or if the demand is to recognise the existence of social constraints on 
the achievement of autonomous thought and action. Opponents to the stress on 
autonomy in the aims of PSE do not want to reject the idea of the person as a 
decision maker, which is a main plank of the approach advocated by Pring and 
White. Thus, there is, in principle, no problem with recognising within Pring 
and White's position Regis' criticism of approaches to health education which 
look to the self-concept, that "the self-esteem which health educators may see as 
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an antidote to social influences is in fact the product of social influences" 
(ibid:8, italics in original). This can be incorporated into the general 
understanding of the personal, and the stress on students' experience and needs 
which White and Pring both accept and promote. 
The objection does not therefore constitute an alternative conception to that 
proposed by Pring and White, but rather is a reminder of the importance of 
social relations in determining who we are. This, however, may seem to be too 
summary a dismissal of the objection. The objection can be interpreted as 
making a more substantial point by drawing attention to what is perceived to be 
an objectionable form of individualism implicit in the approach to the person 
evident in Pring and White. 
There can be no doubt that the personal approach is individualistic in the 
importance it gives to the individual person as a distinct entity, and in the belief 
that the individual is valued on the basis of her individual existence as a person. 
The person as an individual entity is the focus, with relations between persons 
understood in terms of separate individuals, and with the capacity for some 
forms of autonomous belief and action being recognised and valued. In this the 
personal approach is recognisably part of the liberal tradition, with the 
relationships between persons being represented, as Wolf (1980:131) says 
"extrinsic rather than intrinsic, accidental rather than essential". 
From this it does not follow that the personal approach is guilty of 
promoting a morally objectionable individualism, such as egoism. As Stoutland 
(1990:122), for example, points out, egoism does not follow from the 
individualist claim that if something is good, there must be a particular 
individual whose preferences are satisfied. Egoism would only follow if the 
additional assumption is made that preferences of individuals must be 
preferences for themselves or for their own well-being. It is not necessary for 
the coherence of individualism that one's own preferences need have one's self 
as their object. White need not be committed to this type of individualism, and 
Pring explicitly excludes it in his argument for the importance of moral 
obligation. 
Individualism, as is frequently noted16 is a loosely related and complex 
cluster of beliefs, attitudes or habits of thought not all of which are compatible. 
While other forms of individualism are present, an important strand of 
individualist thinking which the personal approach in general accepts, is 
altruistic individualism.17 Altruistic individualism includes the core belief that 
individual people have in themselves a unique value unconnected to their social 
status or the importance of their community roles. This belief is frequently 
linked to the Kantian principle that the relation between people, and a 
community and individuals should be governed by the idea that people should 
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be treated as ends in themselves. Altruistic individualism holds that many 
preferences are altruistic in that the object is not the fulfillment of one's own 
preferences, but the well-being of others through the fulfillment of their 
preferences. This is consistent with individualism in general as it takes society 
as being instrumental in the satisfaction of preferences, but not as constituting 
them. Thus in the more personal approach the assumption is that the underlying 
individualist belief holds, that "individual uniqueness, initiative and autonomy 
are more important than group identity, conformity and solidarity" (Watt, 
1989:2). Egoism does not necessarily follow from this proposition. 
Fundamental to the individualism which characterises the personal approach is 
the view that the individual decides between actions, conceptions of the good, 
plans of life and what sort of person she will be. While there are recognised to 
be constraints on these choices, the possibility of personal choice in these areas 
is given prominence. Advocates of the personal approach recognise the close 
connection between autonomy and social conditions, and between personal 
well-being and social concerns. The basic point is that the orientation to these is 
from the perspective of the individual person, which is considered apart from, 
though intimately related to the social world. 
This is consistent with the importance given to community and fellow-
feeling in Pring and White. Although the starting point is the person herself, as 
an entity, the person need not, in these arguments, be understood as primarily 
motivated by self-interest. Pring stresses the idea of community and fraternity 
and White (op.cit.:10-11) argues for an education which "so shape[s] 
children's' dispositions from the start ... that they come to think of their own 
flourishing as inextricably intertwined with that of others". Combining the 
Aristotelian idea of the person as social and the importance of well-being, with 
the socially contingent nature of many features of well-being, and the idea of 
rational decision making processes made by reference to context, White 
integrates the idea of the person with its social context. It remains the case, 
however, that although the social is connected to it it is ultimately separable 
from the person in the sense that it is not intrinsic to the conception of the 
person, as a rational agent capable of self-reflection and a certain amount of 
independent thought. 
While this is adequate to address the objection that what it means to be a 
person includes social relations, the objection does not look to the root 
conception of the person presupposed and required by the notion of 
autonomous thought and action, as can be seen by the wish to retain the basic 
idea of choice of roles in the more social conception. The choice is between 
"those social groups or communities with whom we may choose to align 
ourselves" (Regis, op.cit.:8). However, although Regis sees this as not forcing 
a choice between independence and conformity understood in abstraction, it 
does not address the root question raised by the possibility of autonomous 
choice. 
Pring and White use a complex conception of the person, one which 
embraces both passive and active aspects of being a person. Thus a person is 
that which is both capable of action and choice in significant areas of her life, 
and who is deeply affected by social factors in that they play a role in 
determining the particular identity of the person. Thus, as well as being active, 
social relations are recognised to have a role in determining personhood, and in 
the formation and maintenance of a sense of self. Correctly, the first aspect, that 
of the person as agent is emphasised as this is the aspect of being a person 
which PSE is to foster, the social determination of action does not function as 
an aim, of course, but is seen as an aspect of being a person which can be 
utilised, as in White. 
This conception should not be confused with a characterisation of the 
person often found in writings about PSE. Following from the claim that what 
is distinctive about PSE as a subject and a source of its value is the 
interpretation of what it means to be a person, where 'person' is interpreted 
broadly to include more than the cognitive or rational aspect of being a person 
usually stressed in education. Education is often seen as privileging this aspect 
of persons, with the effect that when other aspects are dealt with they are not 
given the status that traditional academic aspects of the curriculum enjoy. 
Leicester (1990:3), for example, who refers to the holistic conception of the 
person in pastoral care in general, argues for a conception such that persons are 
"not disembodied minds but social, spiritual, sexual, emotional individuals 
developing in relationship with other individuals".18 This is clearly not the 
conception argued to be problematic above. To note that PSE should address 
the holistic nature of persons is to draw attention to what may be called the 
multifaceted nature of persons. To note that the person is conceptualised as both 
passive and active is not so much a matter of being more inclusive in our 
definition of 'person' but to note that persons can be viewed from more than 
one perspective. On this view one way of characterising what is valuable and 
distinctive about PSE, is to describe the concern with persons as attempting to 
give adequate recognition to the two perspectives with which we view persons, 
as both subjects and objects of experience. With emphasis being placed on the 
person as subject of experience, persons are viewed as subjects for whom 
things matter, this being of educational significance in and of itself, and not 
something which must be taken into account pursuant to further or other ends. 
Rather than extending our definition of 'person' the demand is for an 
understanding of 'person' in the aims of PSE which does justice to two of the 
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perspectives we have on persons, two perspectives which gain their relevance 
from the context of the aims of PSE where the explicit concern is with the 
possibility of agency and its promotion. The question, in other words, does not 
so much concern the diversity of human experience and its importance in 
determining who we are, but the nature of the subject itself. Thus, in an 
important sense, the aims of PSE should address the nature of personhood, the 
question of how we are to understand ourselves and others as subjects. 
The problem is to give an account of the person which does justice to our 
ordinary experience and knowledge of persons. 
4 
Persons and Their Roles 
The problem of providing a conceptualisation of the person adequate to our 
experience, knowledge of persons and one which therefore recognises both the 
agency and the plasticity of persons, is illustrated by considering the relation 
between a person and her roles. Reflection on and discussion about actual and 
possible social roles is a subject appropriate to a PSE syllabus as reflecting 
some of the social and personal concerns, such as changing roles and 
expectations, which PSE addresses. It is likely, therefore, that reflection on 
social roles will be considered to be both desirable and beneficial for the 
student. 
In order to understand this it is necessary to make reference to how the 
person is conceptualised. The possibility of reflection on one's roles implies a 
certain relation between a person and her roles, which is not only a reflection of 
what we consider valuable about persons, but is also responsive to what we 
take persons to be. A central presupposition of the idea that reflection on actual 
or expected roles is possible, is the possibility of achieving critical distance 
from particular roles. There is no reason, in principle, why all roles should not 
be open to this process.19 The central idea is that a person is in principle 
separable from any particular role. 
The adoption of this standpoint with respect to roles is compatible with the 
recognition that up to the point of reflection the individual is to a large part a 
product of influences of the social environment. What is important is the belief 
that the individual is able to withdraw or distance herself from these influences 
and adopt an attitude towards particular roles and influences which reflects 
preferences which are truly the person's own, assuming that it is possible to 
make sense of the idea of such preferences. We need not assume that all roles 
are chosen, could be chosen, or that it is possible to be without a role to 
recognise the point being made: a person is that which can adopt differing 
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relations to her roles and thus can be understood as separate from them. The 
implication is that any particular role is not essential to a person, a person being 
that which is capable of choosing between them. 
Any particular role, while not essential, can become essential to a person's 
sense of who they are after it has been owned or otherwise recognised through 
a process of reflection on the role and one's relation to it. At this point we can 
leave it moot whether this implies or requires the positing of a 'true' or 'real' 
self, or whether this can be understood as internalisation of the norms of an 
objective morality or an intersubjectively agreed upon set of values. To the 
extent that one's roles do not undergo this process, they are less one's own than 
those which have, and have thereby been 'owned', identified with, or 
conversely, disowned. This does not therefore preclude the unreflective student 
identifying with particular roles. It is clear that this view of the possibility of 
reflection on roles is premised on a particular view of the person, and on 
implicit standards and views on rationality. The advantages or benefits of 
reflection on roles come from the importance we give to identification, and self-
knowledge or self-understanding, and are importantly responsive to what we 
take a person to be. The hoped for outcome of the process of reflection is that 
one either comes to identify oneself with the role on firmer (rational or 
otherwise) foundations, or one comes to understand one's relation to the role, 
and its function in who one takes one's self to be, and thus, it is hoped, self-
understanding in general is increased. Thus, by considering the relation 
between one's self and one's actual or expected roles, as well as the roles 
themselves, it is thought that students' lives will be improved to the extent that it 
extends to students the possibility of greater control and increased 
understanding of the forces that act on their lives, as well as the possibilities for 
action. This process necessarily involves, in consideration of many roles, 
distinctions between the individual person's perception of herself, the extent to 
which roles determine who one is, both for oneself and for others, as well as 
how far it is possible and/or desirable to change them. 
This view of the person seems a basic requirement for living a self-aware 
life which can be pursued with some measure of autonomy. It is, however, a 
view not without problems. It seems guilty of a certain abstractness with respect 
to persons, failing to take into adequate account the essential nature of at least 
some roles to being the person one is. This is not a criticism which can be 
answered by greater sensitivity by teachers of PSE to the actual lives of their 
students, it is a criticism of the conception of the person employed, one that 
privileges the process of reflection over the lived experience of the student. This 
general line of objection is congruent with Regis' (op.cit.:7) criticism of the 
emphasis on the quality rather than the content of students' decision-making 
43 
with the process of decision-making itself in abstraction from the context being 
given importance rather than the decisions arrived at. This is a large issue which 
raises questions about the context dependency of rationality and theories of 
argumentation, however, Regis' comments can be taken as indicative of the 
problem of conceptualising persons as inessentially attached to their roles, but 
governed by some other standard which is considered, in the context of 
education as more important. The implication is that if persons were identified 
with their roles then it would be more difficult to prioritise processes of decision 
making over their content. The argument can, in this way, be taken as a 
criticism of persons conceptualised as 'that which chooses', and the implicit 
view of rationality it accepts. The position Regis generally accepts would give 
greater weight to the view that how we think is a function of our social context. 
Thus, for example, the effect of inculcation into gender specific ways of 
thinking. 
This line of criticism draws attention to other aspects of our self-conception 
which are in conflict with this general picture. As well as being the kind of 
entities able to reflect on their roles and to some extent own or disown them, 
however successful or not this may be in practice, we also recognise that our 
understanding of ourselves is dominated by the social order. Here the self is 
dominated by social relations, society being seen as something from which it is 
not possible to extract oneself, but rather, as Maclntyre (1990a:492) says "the 
source of an impersonal vocation inflicted upon me". This can be interpreted 
along a continuum from the intersubjective nature of the constitution of persons, 
from a Lacanian mirroring of the self in others, to a more general notion where 
our idea of ourselves is determined by the dominant forms or ideals of the 
person in a society. Pring and White recognise this aspect of the self to varying 
degrees: that aspect which measures itself against the standards of society and 
the evaluations of others. 
If we turn then to our ordinary understanding of persons, based on our 
experience of ourselves and others, it is clear that individual persons embrace 
both the idea that persons are separate from their roles and the idea that who 
they are is determined by the reactions of others and the wider society, and thus 
by their roles. It is not the case, in other words, that the incompatibility of these 
two conceptions is relieved by being identified with two types of people who 
conform to either of these models: some seeing themselves as independent of 
the social order, able to stand back and ask what attitude they should take, and 
others who ask what others think of them, how they are to be evaluated by 
others. It is not a question of which conception is to be favoured in the aims of 
PSE, the question is rather recognition that within the same person there exists 
incompatible ideas about what it is to be person, and what a person is. It is also 
clear that along with these ideas we all recognise the possibility of combining 
both aspects in living and understanding our lives. We live with both 
perspectives, with the idea of ourselves as both objects and subjects. This is an 
issue we shall return to, for the moment it raises the question of the extent to 
which the aims of PSE should be concerned with both aspects. As we have 
seen, arguments for autonomy are not conducted in isolation of social concerns, 
and indeed are often prompted by autonomy promoting or supporting social 
institutions. However, the recognition of these incompatible ideas about 
persons need to be taken into account. They explain, for example, equivocal 
reactions to the idea that PSE should be involved with helping students reflect 
on their social roles. 
Encouraging persons to reflect on themselves in this way can be seen as 
both beneficial and detrimental to our sense of who we are. We recognise the 
importance of asking ourselves questions such as 'Am I really the sort of 
person who would do that?', and 'Do I really want to do that?'. This sort of 
questioning of our desires and preferences and setting them against a standard 
of either who we think we are, who we would like to be, or qualities we would 
like to have, is thought to be beneficial for ourselves and others. We also, 
however, are conscious that there is an important sense in which I cannot be 
other than what I am taken to be, that I reflect rather than initiate. We wish 
neither to jettison the idea that persons can think about intimate relations, such 
as the relation between their roles and who they are, or the idea that roles as in 
some sense constitutive of persons. PSE highlights the contradictions in, and 
importance of these two perspectives on persons. 
However, as has been argued previously, the problem is not one of merely 
recognising the social aspect of personhood and how this affects the conception 
of the person as agent, but the very possibility of agency in face of powerful 
social forces which constitute rather than merely constrain the exercise of 
personhood. While it is possible to live with two perspectives on persons, the 
account of the person as agent stands in more need of justification. The need for 
such a justification is evident from problems with the conceptualisation of the 
person which will be addressed further in the third chapter and with the 
inadequacy of a social constructionist view of the person to meet minimal 
requirements for the possibility of autonomous thought and action. 
5 
Justifying Conceptions of the Person 
We now need to look more closely at the conception of the person implied 
by the autonomous ideal. In order to begin assessing the role it plays in the aims 
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of PSE, it is useful to look at its role in the justification of autonomy as an aim 
of PSE. 
While White derives the importance of autonomy from liberal democratic 
theory, Pring looks to the particular situation facing students. It can be taken as 
given that students will, in all likelihood, have to cope with several role changes 
in the course of their lives. The economic climate and alteration in employment 
patterns mean that it cannot be presumed that students will either remain in 
employment or in the same sphere of employment throughout their working 
lives. PSE has a certain responsibility to help students be aware of the relation 
between themselves and their employment or lack of it, and this involves 
thinking about their relation to their roles. Changes in the perception of the 
respective roles of men and women, as well as value stances with respect to 
these roles, also need to be, and often are, taken into account in PSE. In 
addition, given the concern in PSE not only with the future and the wider 
society, but also with the student's perception of the school as an academic and 
social community, reflection is required on the role of student and other 
members of this community. 
As we have seen, the arguments for autonomy are in general derived from 
or make use of social, psychological and ethical perceptions and theories. Both 
White and Pring rely on arguments other than those directly concerned with the 
meaning or referent of 'person'. Both are taken as necessary to their arguments 
for a personal approach, but greater attention is given to the former. Particular 
valued qualities of persons are recognised to be responsive to social conditions, 
and to require certain social conditions for their realisation (see, for example, 
White, op.cit.:15). From this it can be assumed that the social context, whether 
this is the school ethos or something larger, supports the valued attributes of 
persons promoted in PSE. Pring and White do not imply, however, that the 
concept of the person itself is determined by these contexts, rather the value of 
certain characteristics such as autonomy are supported by the social context, or 
suggest themselves as necessary for a worthwhile life in a particular context. 
Thus the function of the mention or use of conditions of personhood is not in 
explicit support of more particular arguments for the attributes of persons 
valued, but to fulfill the condition that the account of the valued characteristics 
to be acquired or developed are consistent with the minimal conditions supplied 
by the conditions for personhood with the implication that these conditions are 
less contentious that the values to be promoted. The position on the theory of 
the person therefore is that the emphasis on the person, in the sense given by 
White and Pring, is responsive to a particular interest in persons which gains 
plausibility from the social context which supports some form of autonomy and 
thus respect for individuals. 
The strength of White and Pring's approach lies in the emphasis on the 
person as a locus of value and as a self-conscious potentially self-determining 
entity. This is a conception of the person which any approach to PSE would not 
wish to lose sight of. White stresses the autonomy of the person, while Pring 
gives importance to the Kantian idea of the autonomy of the moral will. 
Essentially these positions on the importance of the person are arguments for 
the value of the person understood as capable of choice and action. It would be 
difficult to over-estimate the importance of this idea of persons in PSE. Choice 
and action are fundamental concepts required for the coherence of goals such as 
personal autonomy, moral education, self-knowledge, and personal and social 
well-being. If our goals include helping students deal with anticipated 
problems, have increased control over their lives and have the self-awareness 
thought necessary to do this, PSE, as an educational process designed in part to 
encourage and promote students' abilities to reflect on and direct their thoughts 
and feelings in such a way that they can maximise the achievement of these 
personally and socially desirable outcomes, needs a theory of the person as 
active. This is precisely what the emphasis on autonomy provides. 
Conclusion 
We are now able to reach some initial tentative conclusions. It has been 
argued that the concept of the person as agent is central to PSE, given its 
acceptance in all approaches to the aims of PSE, and as a necessary 
presupposition of an intuitive understanding of what PSE should be aiming for. 
The philosophical work has been identified as the provision of a theory of the 
person which responds to the understanding of PSE as concerned with the 
person as a subject as well as an object of experience. 
Having argued for the importance of having a complex understanding of the 
person reflected in the aims of PSE, several issues need to be distinguished. 
The function of the use of 'person' in PSE, it has been determined, is to reflect 
at least two incompatible uses of the concept of person: as an autonomous 
agent, capable of self-defined and self-defining choices; and as social beings 
defined by their interactions with others and by the roles they enact in the 
context of shared lives. To this should also be added the function of the 
attribution of personhood stressed by Pring, that it should give us objective 
grounds for respect. 
There are several approaches to this problem.. In the literature on the aims of 
PSE, the problem is seen as being resolved by reference to theories other than 
the person. In other words, the theory of the person is seen as either 
insufficiently robust, or insufficient in some other way to perform the function 
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of reflecting this complexity. Alternatively, the complexity aimed for is seen as 
subservient to a dominant conception of the person as a discrete potentially self-
determining individual. Either the theory of the person is thought to be held in 
common, or it is responsive to the other theories, psychological, sociological or 
ethical, which are used to support the conception of the person. The assumption 
that it is held in common may be interpreted as meaning either that the relevant 
theory of the person is uncontentious, in that it is generally accepted, or that it is 
too weak a theory to perform either a validating or discriminatory function. 
Psychological, sociological and ethical theories are insufficient to resolve 
the issue precisely because they presuppose what is in question. They 
presuppose that the person is conceptualised as an agent, such that with respect 
to certain significant acts persons are capable of choice. Arguments for the 
importance of some form of personal responsibility can be taken as an example. 
In support of the position that personal responsibility should be a concern in 
PSE, social and political arguments are frequently used. Pring (1987:5-6), for 
example, argues from changing perceptions of moral authority to the need for 
the individual to take more responsibility for the establishment of values. While 
the social conditions supply the need for personal responsibility in this sense, a 
conception of the person is presupposed. While this form of defence of the idea 
of personal responsibility is not always adopted,20 it is clearly a common one. 
This does not mean that it is possible to analyse the concept of the person as 
subject of experience in isolation, but its presupposition by theories which are 
used to support it is clearly insufficient if the concern is with the person as a 
subject of experience. 
In White (op.cit.:11) and Pring (1984:19, 1987:15) reference to 'persons' 
is made in absence of argument that the characteristics of persons isolated are 
completely normative, although both recognise that their conception of the 
person needs to be argued at greater length. This is not to say, of course, that 
these characteristics do not reflect what we find of value or importance in 
persons, but the implication is that, unlike explicitly normative arguments which 
are seen as in need of defence, these characteristics are seen as relatively 
unproblematic, in that argument for the particular concepts of the person can be 
left to be developed later or in other contexts. On both accounts the assumption 
is that the concept the person is less problematic, and requires less argument 
than other parts of the theses. 
The account of the person required here is a theory of the person as subject, 
of the person as actor who constructs and controls, the active base of social 
transactions. The problem is philosophical. Neither role theory in sociology nor 
the person as a psychological construct can provide the analysis of personal 
identity which is central to their explanations and descriptions. This is not 
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surprising given that they are not designed to deal with this issue. In short, a 
theory of the person is required in PSE which supports our intuitions of what 
persons are, a theory of the person in which the person is understood as both 
being essentially social and potentially autonomous to adequately express the 
concern to address both the plasticity of persons and their potential autonomy 
within one coherent conception: persons as partially determined by their 
environment and as capable of autonomous thought and action in virtue of their 
nature as persons. What is required is an understanding of the person able to 
accommodate these conflicting conceptions. 
Given that beyond this general level of description of the person as agent, 
there are serious disagreements on what a person is, an avenue to be explored is 
the basis for the idea of the person as agent. Noting the inability of sociological 
and psychological theories to provide a theory of the person as active does not, 
in itself, however, provide sufficient grounds for requiring examination of the 
presuppositions and preconditions for the idea of the person as agent or as a 
subject of experience. This would require showing that such a theory is not 
only necessary, but useful. In other words, although it may be philosophically 
interesting to point to the need for such a theory for the completeness of any 
acceptable aim of PSE, it must be shown that such a theory has material 
implications for the aims of PSE. For example, if it clarified the implications 
and limitations of attempting to retain a complex conception of the person this 
would be sufficient to warrant further examination of the concept. It is to the 
investigation of such possibilities that we now turn. 
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Notes 
1. The point to stress is that although reference is made to persons, their needs 
and capacities, the concern is overwhelming with the normative aspects of 
personhood, as determined by reference to and extrapolation from sources 
which take the referent and sense of the term 'person' as unproblematic. 
2. See, for example, Pring (1984:Ch.2.). 
3. The idea of educating persons necessarily presupposes some understanding 
of the kind of entity persons are, and some, usually implicit, metaphysical 
position on the nature of the world and the relation of persons to it, and thus is 
not a stance particular or unique to PSE (see for example, Gordon and White 
(1979) on the influence of idealism on educational thought and practice). In 
PSE, however, the making of our assumptions about persons explicit takes on 
some urgency, given that PSE is an educational endeavour to which, it shall be 
argued, the concept of person is central. 
4. A consequence of this argument is that plausibility of the assumption that the 
theory of the person implicit in arguments for the aims of PSE should be made 
explicit, is established. 
5. A possible exception would an Aristotelian approach. The approach closest 
to this is White's(1990). 
6. It might be objected at this stage that this identification of this general area as 
of concern to PSE prejudices the argument. Alternatively, it could be said that it 
begs the question. As to the first objection, it is clear that whatever values are 
promoted in PSE they are predicated on an understanding of what a person is 
and her relation to herself, others and the world. As phrased here, the basis of 
particular values are not assumed in this very general formulation, and thus it 
does not exclude more precise characterisations. As to whether it begs the 
question: from specification of the context, it does not follow that the 
conception of the person can be derived. Specification of the context is 
necessary, however, as a limitation on the issues, and as a focus, given the 
variety of available interpretations of what it means to be a person. 
7. This approach may be thought to have the distinct disadvantage of leaving it 
unclear what the principal term, 'person', refers to in this context. However, 
this objection is not as serious as it may at first appear. An advantage of this 
approach is that by consideration of its use in context, coupled with our 
common-sense assumptions about what persons are, we shall come to a better 
understanding of what a person is and what is meant by its use in PSE. 
8. Although there are several definitions of PSE (see, for example, DES 
(1989), ILEA (1984), David (1983) and Devon CC Ed. Dept. (1982) for some 
of the broad definitions available) it is a subject open to various interpretations, 
not only as to what it involves, but its place on the curriculum. (On this latter 
point see, for example Pring (1989) and Nuttall (1988) for discussion of PSE 
as a cross-curricula subject.) While PSE should be distinguished from pastoral 
care (see Watkins, 1985, for example, on the relation between these two areas, 
and Lang (1989) for a contrasting view from a different perspective), Best's 
(1989:7) comment on pastoral care applies equally to PSE. It is "a complex idea 
and, where it has been institutionalised in schools, a complicated phenomenon. 
Not surprisingly there are disagreements about its precise meaning." 
9. The appropriateness of objections such as these might be thought to apply 
given the assumed priority given to the concept of the person above. However, 
as will hopefully be shown, the approach adopted avoids at least the most 
obvious forms of this objection such as are to be found in Rorty (1988). For 
similar reasons a survey of available or possible candidates for the definition of 
the person in the context of the aims of PSE is not undertaken here. 
10. This point holds in general to what we mean by the term 'person', but also 
to what may initially appear to the more specific questions, such as personal 
identity, as has been pointed out by Rorty (1976a). 
11. See, for example, G. Harris (1989) and Rorty (1976b). Both argue for the 
importance of recognising the difference between these concepts from different 
perspectives. 
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12. The criticism of impartial morality and its relation to the person is developed 
in Williams (1976). 
13. In Dennett (1978), for example, the sixth condition of personhood, which 
depends on the previous five, is a special form of consciousness, perhaps self-
consciousness (ibid:281-285). This is consistent with Frankfurt's (1971) 
concern with persons as able to form second-order states. 
14. Downie and Telfer (1971:293), and Dworkin (1988), for example, argue 
for choice as constitutive of autonomy. Dan-Cohen (1992), argues for a 
conception of 'willing' as a more appropriate conception for constructing an 
adequate account of autonomy. 
15. Taylor's claim is that strong evaluation as a necessary condition of 
personhood. This privileges reflection in a way not implied by White's idea of 
personal well-being, even with the prominence of the idea of second-order 
desires. White does not claim that one is not a person if one does not have 
second-order desires. 
16. Lukes (1978), for example, distinguishes eleven claims of individualism: i) 
the dignity of man; ii)autonomy; iii)privacy; iv) self-development; v) the abstract 
individual; vi) political individualism; vii) economic individualism viii) 
religious individualism; ix) ethical individualism; x) epistemological 
individualism; and xi) methodological individualism. Watt (1989: Ch 1), who 
provides a comprehensive discussion and critique of the dominance of 
individualistic ways of thought in educational theory, distinguishes between 
egoistic and altruistic individualism. Hargreaves (1980), isolates three distinct 
forms of individualism in education namely, developmental, moral and 
meritocratic. 
17. It is not necessary to identify and distinguish between all the forms of 
individualism evident in PSE. It only necessary for present purposes to note 
that the personal approach accepts a form of individualism, and that this has 
provided grounds for its challenge. For a specifically sociological critique of 
individualism in education see Hargreaves (1980). 
18. Further examples include Hibberd's (op.cit.:174) characterisation of the 
concern of pastoral care programmes with "the 'whole man' philosophy". 
Andrews (1990:39) argues that PSE should be concerned with more than "the 
social self, the vocational self, the bodily self, and the sexual self', advocating 
the inclusion of the idea of the philosophical self which he equates with moral 
education. In general, the interest in the wide variety of personal and social 
experience in PSE leads to a complex view of the person. 
19. This does not imply, of course, either that all roles are, or should be open to 
reflection in PSE, or that all roles can or should be reflected on simultaneously. 
20. Lord's (1983:9) statement of the importance of educating for taking 
responsibility for one's life and for the general acceptance of an underlying 
principle of autonomy and its value, is an example of an argument for the aims 
of PSE to include personal responsibility where reference is not made to the 
social conditions encouraging this stance. While Lord's argument for the "twin 
goals of autonomy and rationality" is in part justified as a counterbalance to a 
form of social determinism, they are also justified by the concern to help 
students move towards taking more responsibility for their lives and 
recognising their own capacity for self-determination. Thus he seems to endorse 
a view close to McNiff s (1988), that the attitude taken to persons in PSE can 
be generally, if vaguely characterised as embodying "a positive vision of the 
intrinsic value of personhood". 
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Chapter 2 
Personal Identity and the Aims of PSE 
The most obviously relevant question about persons posed in considering 
the aims of personal and social education, is the normative question 'What 
qualities, dispositions, values and skills should be promoted?' The responses 
considered in the last chapter revealed a common presupposition, the concept of 
the person as agent. This is commonly seen as an unproblematic presupposition 
given that the agency of persons is a minimal requirement for any acceptable 
aim of PSE. It has however become problematic in light of recent challenges to 
the idea of the subject it presupposes. The first issue which needs to be 
addressed is which approach to this issue is appropriate given the aim of giving 
an account of the person which is responsive to both our intuitions concerning 
the person as able to resist, as well as being formed by social forces. 
1 
A Minimum Condition for Agency 
If persons are to be conceived of as active, creative and potentially self-
determining, persons must satisfy certain minimum conditions. Persons must 
be continuous through time and distinct. These conditions are necessary in 
order for persons to have purposes, choose between options, plan, form 
intentions and carry them out, and be responsible for actions. In other words, in 
order for persons to be the locus of agency they must be unified, continuous 
through time and discrete.' The idea of the person as an agent, presupposes that 
a person can be both individuated and identified, and reidentified over time. The 
necessary presupposition of a theory of personal identity, as a theory of the 
sameness of persons at a time and over time is common to the conceptions of 
the person we have been considering, as well as to our ordinary understanding 
of what it means to live a life. Thus, criteria of reidentification have an 
importance in thinking about the aims of PSE, which other criteria, such as 
those required for class differentiation do not have. The question of whether the 
person, x who performed some act at t1 is the same person as y who is being 
rewarded for that act at t2 is clearly more relevant than the question of what 
distinguishes the class of agents from the class of non-agents in this context. 
As argued above, this would only be relevant if certain other conditions 
hold. This minimal condition for agency, that persons be conceptualised as 
separate and continuous functions as a background condition which all 
conceptions must meet. It does not perform an independent function. Its status 
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is, however, important. It operates as a given, and as more universal and less-
normative than the propositions about persons which presuppose it. 
While the criteria of personal identity, the determination of the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for its being the case that x at ti is the same person as y 
at t2, are presupposed by any aim of PSE which assumes the agency of 
persons, it seems a particularly innocuous if not unimportant presupposition. It 
is probably difficult to overestimate the importance of the belief in the unitary 
and discrete nature of persons to our conceptions of ourselves and others, and 
our relation to the world. Belief in the indivisible unity of the person seems 
natural, indispensable, and clearly has ethical significance. Whatever aspect of 
personhood is stressed, whether it is responsible agency, the search for 
personal meaning, or the building of interpersonal and wider social 
relationships, some theory of the unity of persons is presupposed. It is 
necessary for choice and action to have meaning, and for the possibility of 
personal moral responsibility, for the person to be conceptualised as a decision 
maker, and to be capable of moral integrity. It forms a necessary precondition 
for self-determination and self-consciousness as it is used in modern notions of 
autonomy, and for the possibility of characteristically personal action. It is 
therefore central to the idea of being a person, and living a life as a person. 
Nothing seems more self-evident, or more intuitively known than I am not you 
and you are not me, which is essentially what these beliefs come to. 
As Rorty (1976b:309) notes "[t]he idea of a person is the idea of a unified 
center of choice and action, the unit of legal and theological responsibility". The 
unity of persons, both synchronic and diachronic, allows us to attribute action 
to different people, to talk of different people, and to talk of persons being 
responsible for past actions in virtue of the fact they are the same people now. 
How we conceive of ourselves and our relations to others, two central concerns 
in PSE, makes use of the idea that persons are continuous unified entities. 
These beliefs are significant in that they influence our relations to others, as well 
as the relation between certain social and legal institutions and ourselves. 
The relevance of theory of personal identity to PSE can be seen in its 
relation to central issues in PSE. To take just two concepts: the concept of 
personal responsibility or accountability for actions and personal choice. Any 
conception of persons as individually responsible and accountable for their 
actions requires that persons are continuous and separate entities. A minimum 
necessary condition for responsibility is the individuation and identification of 
the agent who performs the action, and the reidentification of the same agent as 
responsible: it must be possible for two persons, the one performing the action 
and the one responsible for the action, to be identified as the same person. 
Given that the question of personal responsibility and accountability for action 
53 
can only arise within the context of a prior theory of personal identity, the two 
questions can not ultimately be considered in isolation from each other. A 
similar condition holds for the concept of personal choice. If students are to 
make choices which affect their own lives they must be able to identify and 
distinguish their lives from those of others. The individual choosing must be 
able to identify the individual for whom the choice is made and the individual or 
individuals the choices will principally affect. This is held to be central to the 
justification of the action. In PSE good choices are not considered in a vacuum, 
but are considered in the context of the students' lives. It is not choices 
themselves which are important but the possibility and consequences of choice 
in the context of particular students' circumstances and environment. This 
personal orientation is central to PSE, and reminds us once again, of the 
impossibility of avoiding the question of the conception of the person which it 
involves. In general, it can be said that the conception of agency required for the 
idea of choice and planning over time, and personal responsibility presuppose a 
theory of personal identity since operant in both the notion of personal 
responsibility and choice is the idea of 'the same person'. These concepts make 
implicit appeal to some of our basic beliefs about the nature of persons. Beyond 
these essentially third person concerns, the question of what it means to be me 
presupposes that I can identify myself and distinguish myself from others. 
The importance of personal identity to the aims of PSE can therefore be seen 
as a consequence of the relevance of the concept of person. More specifically 
the importance of personal identity lies in its relation to central issues of PSE: 
present and future personal well-being, functioning as a member of a 
community, and moral education. However, it may be objected, all this shows 
is that certain important questions involve questions of personal identity, not 
that these questions, of responsibility, concern with one's future and so on, 
require a solution to the philosophical problem of personal identity. 
Philosophical analysis of the 'same person' is, however, appropriate given the 
concern with the idea of the person as active. On this understanding, the 
importance of personal identity is derivative. It is not personal identity itself 
which is of importance but its connection to other things which do matter. 
To this it may be replied that the question of personal identity is a question 
of the identification of the criteria of identity, and therefore has little to do with 
what it means to live a life as a person, rather than the question of what it is to 
be a person. This overlooks the connection between a sense of identity which is 
closely connected with what it means to live a life as a person, and the criteria 
for personal identity, from which a sense of identity is derived since it 
presupposes beliefs about what constitutes personal identity, even if these latter 
are implicit in our conceptions of ourselves. 
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This understanding of the importance of the metaphysical concept of the 
person draws on the familiar philosophical intuition that the understanding of a 
concept is intimately related to the conditions for its identity over time. An 
account of what anything is, as Wiggins (1976:141) reminds us, recalling 
Aristotle, Leibniz and Frege, is in intimate relation to the elucidation of the 
identity conditions of that thing. The relation between a concept and the 
conditions of its identity is such that the concept determines the conditions for 
its identity through the isolation of its essential features. Understanding a 
concept involves both the ability to pick out individuals falling under that 
concept and to reidentify particular instances of it, at least in principle. If the 
conditions for reidentification were unknown, it would be impossible to pick 
out an instance of the concept as individuation cannot be complete in a moment, 
but is forward looking. As Wollheim (1980:301) has put it, acknowledging the 
debt to Wiggins' (1967) theory of spatio-temporal continuity: "The synchronic 
cut which is what the application of a concept at a time is, necessitates a 
diachronic link, which is what the application of the relevant criterion of identity 
over time effects." While this raises the question of the priority or precedence of 
diachronic over synchronic unity, and the extent to which they can be 
considered in isolation from each other, which will be addressed later, it is clear 
that personal identity is important to our understanding of what it means to be a 
person. What is clear is that if we wish to understand the concept of person, it 
is essential to grasp those conditions under which an individual x at ti would be 
the same individual as y at t2, and under what conditions they would be 
different individuals. The general point being made is substantiated by the 
following outline of the particular discourse about persons available to 
philosophers, given by Ricoeur (1988:214): 
We must be capable of describing persons as basic particulars and 
selves as self-designating subjects of discourse in order to be able to 
characterize actions as intentionally-brought-forth events, and agents as 
the owners and authors of their actions; and we must understand what 
agency means in order to apply to actions a moral judgment of 
imputation and to call persons responsible selves. 
Noting that personal identity forms a necessary precondition for the concept 
of agency, does not, however, show that it is necessary to determine the criteria 
for personal identity prior to consideration of the normative question. This 
would involve, inter alia, showing there are available alternative understandings 
of what constitutes personal identity, and these are significant in that they have 
implications for the explicitly normative issue of what is valuable about 
persons. In other words, the problem of personal identity is relevant if it can be 
shown that our idea of moral responsibility and choice presupposes a particular 
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account of the concept of personal identity over time such that if that account 
turned out to be incorrect, our moral concept of the person would be, on this 
ground, rendered less plausible. 
This raises the question of the relation between personal identity and aims of 
PSE which make explicit use of theories and concepts which presuppose 
personal identity. This will be the subject of the following section. 
2 
The Relation Between a Theory of the Person and the Aims of 
PSE. 
The first question to consider is the nature of the presupposition, since if it 
can be shown that the presupposition is innocuous this effectively stops the 
argument. 
The concept of the person as it is used in the aims of PSE is normative, it is 
used to point to what we consider important about persons. The aims look to 
valued characteristics, attributes, skills and so forth, which are argued to be 
central to PSE. These are derived or supported by reference to social, political, 
sociological, ethical and psychological theories which either do or do not make 
explicit reference to what are taken to be definitive characteristics of persons. 
A possible relation between personal identity and the aims of PSE is 
suggested by Flanagan's (1991) position on the relation between ethics and 
moral psychology. Flanagan argues that the former requires the latter, but it 
should not be presumed that moral psychology is sufficient for moral theory 
construction. Flanagan expresses this relation in the 'Principle of Minimal 
Psychological Realism' (PMPR): 
Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal 
that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are 
possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us. (ibid:32) 
PMPR does not impose actual limitations on moral theory construction 
because the deep structure of moral psychology is minimal, and the 
psychological capacities drawn on in moral theory assume little more than 
"universal capacities to desire and to believe" (ibid:161). Thus the relation is not 
correctly described as implicative or constraining. It is not possible, in other 
words, to refer to the psychology of persons to determine ethical theory, or to 
ethical theory to determine the psychology of persons. 
It is presumed, both in the case of personal identity and the minimal 
conditions of moral psychology, that these are universal. Just as people are 
capable of belief and desire, so they are individuated and continuous. These 
conditions are weak and uncontentious. Any feasible theory which presupposes 
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them need only be consistent with them. Rawls (1974), in arguing for the 
independence of moral theory and questions of personal identity can be 
interpreted as accepting this position. Although Rawls explicitly takes the 
position that moral theory and the theory of personal identity are independent, it 
has been argued by Daniels (1979) that he is more plausibly interpreted as 
claiming their limited interdependence, and can be interpreted as accepting a 
principle similar to PMPR in understanding the relation between moral theory 
and personal identity. 
Rawls (op.cit.) argues that the general conditions supplied by personal 
identity cover a range from weaker to stronger, different moral theories 
requiring criteria from this range. Thus Kantianism requires stronger criteria, 
while utilitarianism requires weaker ones. The important question is the 
feasibility of the moral theory. For Rawls the criteria of personal identity alone 
are insufficient to determine feasibility, which is achieved by the combination of 
social theory and the theory of personal identity. What is especially interesting 
in the context of our present discussion is Rawls' argument that in situations of 
competing theories of personal identity which are feasible according to different 
moral conceptions, the theory of personal identity is insufficient even in 
conjunction with social theory, to determine theory selection. Theory selection 
is achieved through arguments within moral theory. 
There is no reason to depart from Rawls' conclusion that the criteria for 
personal identity alone are insufficient to effect theory selection. However, the 
limited role he sees for the criteria of personal identity can be questioned in so 
far as he views the criteria as being weak enough to support such differing 
moral conceptions as Kantianism and Utilitarianism. The argument that the 
criteria are sufficiently weak to provide general conditions of adequacy for 
moral theory in general is based on the view that the continuities and 
connectedness which supply the conditions for personal identity cannot be 
precisely determined by philosophy of mind, that the actual continuities and 
connections are supplied by the social institutions of a well-ordered society. 
Aspects of this argument will be considered in the fourth chapter. 
Rawls' argument, while reminding us of the limits of the relation between 
personal identity and the aims of PSE, shows that the theory of personal 
identity and the aims of PSE are not independent. To consider them as 
independent would not be to deny that personal identity functions as a necessary 
presupposition, it would however, have the implication that any plausible 
account of the criteria of personal identity would be met by any feasible aim of 
PSE which presupposed personal identity. Thus, the criteria of personal identity 
themselves would have no effect on the aims: no consequence for normative 
theories would follow from criteria for personal identity or vice versa. This 
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would effectively deny that the criteria of personal identity have normative 
content. 
This does not seem problematic given the common-sense belief that 
personal identity is non-normative. This is the belief that there is a difference 
between you and me, and that although there are differences between myself 
today and how I remember myself yesterday, and even greater differences 
between myself today and ten years ago, these are not thought of as significant 
to the question of whether I am the same person. While this question may arise 
in extraordinary circumstances, in the normal course of events changes through 
time do not disturb our belief that we persist through change. These beliefs in 
the separateness and continuity of the persons have the appearance of reflecting 
'the facts of the matter'. They do not have the appearance of reflecting 
something like societal norms and traditions. This is a deep-seated belief, the 
importance of which is such that Trigg (1988:282-3) for example, can argue 
that the idea of a unified continuous person is more a precondition of society 
than a consequence of it. 
As to the dependence of the theory of the person on the aims of PSE, this 
would require showing the nature of persons, in particular the nature of 
personal identity, was either responsive to, or determined by the aims of PSE. 
This would be the case, for example, if the aims embodied a conception 
generally sanctioned by society's practices, with the understanding that what a 
person was was a normative concept entirely determined by, and responsive, to 
these and other concerns, but which denied that there was any 'fact of the 
matter' in addition to these. Rather than recognising that the theory of the 
person has normative aspects, on this view the theory of the person would be 
normative to the extent that any reference to the person would be normative. 
To hold, as has been assumed up to this point, that the relation was one of 
limited dependence of the_ aims on the criteria for personal identity, is to claim 
that the criteria for personal identity while weak, are not so weak that they do 
not affect our beliefs about persons and our relations with others. This does not 
necessitate definitive disentanglement of normative and non-normative 
statements. It has already been recognised that 'person' is normative in both its 
attribution and the determination of its conditions. A relation of limited 
dependence has the implication that if the criteria for personal identity were 
other than we ordinarily believe, this would have effect certain other beliefs, 
i.e., those beliefs which presuppose personal identity. These include beliefs 
about persons which inform the aims of PSE. This is a position which Parfit 
(1984) for example, would accept. A stronger version of the dependent 
relationship would hold that the theory of the person occupies a foundational 
role, in that from the theory of the person substantive normative positions could 
58 
be derived. This latter thesis is open to many objections, and since it is not 
frequently defended, it will not be discussed further here. 
The last option to consider is that the relation between the theory of personal 
identity and the aims of PSE is best characterised as interdependent. On this 
view, each side of the relation would have some effect in determining the 
acceptability of the other. It is accepted that there are criteria of personal 
identity, and that should these be other than we believe them to be, for example, 
this may have an effect on such things as the acceptability of the aims of PSE, 
but what effect they would have would be dependent on many other factors as 
well, including the dislocation of practices. This more cautious approach gains 
its plausibility from its recognition of the complex interweaving of beliefs about 
such matters as the nature of personal identity and our moral practices. 
Pring's (1984:15-31) discussion of the relation between the idea of being a 
person and PSE, provides an illustration of the complexity of this issue. Pring 
gives three interpretations of the central concept of personal development: to 
become persons, to develop as persons, and to develop important personal 
qualities. Concentrating on the second two interpretations, he argues for the 
idea of personal development as developing as a person in terms of "essential" 
characteristics of being a person, such as the ability to pick out others as 
persons. If we take it that this is indeed a characteristic of persons then part of 
what is meant by personal development is the development of what is essential 
to persons. On this view, determination of what it is to be a person precedes 
characterisation of what should be developed and limits what should be 
developed to the results of the prior examination of the concept of the person. 
That this is. not the whole story is clearly recognised by Pring in the stress he 
gives to the third interpretation of personal development, to develop personal 
qualities which are valued. While acknowledging the "raggedness" of this 
distinction, it is one to which he holds: "the distinction ... does seem a valid 
one. There are qualities that are important because they are intimately connected 
with what we mean by someone being a person (and that we identify through 
analysing what we mean by 'personhood'), and there are qualities that we 
cherish because of specific values that we hold" (ibid:21). Thus Pring makes a 
distinction between what is distinctive, and what is of value to persons, 
although the two may coincide. A clear relation is posited between what a 
person is and educational theory and practice: "How you treat people depends 
upon your concept of 'person'. It is necessary, therefore, to sort out first what 
it means to be a person and then what the connections are between the 
'development of persons' and educating them" (ibid.:12). Although Pring 
makes use of both the conditions for persons and the normative use of 'person', 
and recognises that there is a relation between the concept and the aims of PSE, 
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it is not clear whether this relation is limited dependence of the latter on the 
former or whether it is better understood as one of independence. As Pring's 
argument shows, one of the difficulties in deciding this question is the nature of 
the concept of person itself, and in particular to what extent it is both non-
normative and determinate. 
White (op.cit.) implies that what persons are, in particular that they have a 
certain motivational structure and the capacity to form second-order desires, 
influences the acceptability of any aim put forward for consideration. His 
argument against moral education as a major aim of PSE, it will be recalled, 
was that it reflected a particular conception of the good life, which did not take 
into account an important aspect of the nature of persons. His argument 
therefore implies that there are statements which are true of persons which differ 
from statements about what constitute the good life in that they are less 
particular. It is unclear from White's argument whether he considers there to be 
universal features of persons, or whether the features of persons he isolates, 
our reasons for action, are particular to a given social context. He could 
maintain this and still claim that this conception of the person was more 
universal than the understanding of the person implied by or contained in the 
theories of moral education he criticises. The general implication is that the 
theory of the person, or at least that aspect of the theory which concerns the 
rationality of action, is prior to normative theories such as ethics. 
Regis' (op.cit.) position on the relation of the theory of the person to the 
aims of PSE is similar to White's in that both appeal to aspects of the reality of 
students' lives. Thus, Regis contends that a social approach to Health Education 
and PSE is "a more realistic way of thinking about selfhood" (op.cit.:8),2 in the 
sense that it is consistent with a social reality. He expressly denies that this a 
value position: "I am not arguing that it is undesirable to create entirely 
autonomous people" rather he wants to say, it is unrealistic to attempt to do this. 
There are few philosophers of education who would disagree with this 
statement, given the Regis' use of "entirely" and the close scrutiny the concept 
of autonomy has undergone in philosophy of education. The main point to be 
made here is that Regis assumes that it is possible to make reference to 
something other than values, in particular 'reality', in talking about persons and 
their relations with others. 
An interesting position, which may imply the interdependence of the theory 
of the person and the aims of PSE is suggested by Leicester's (op.cit.) 
discussion of the relation between pastoral care and anti-racist education. 
Although she does not discuss this issue, her position implies that the theory of 
the person should be consistent with other educational aims which are 
considered valuable. Depending on the particular way in which this position is 
fleshed out, it could plausibly be a version of the argument that it is not so much 
a question of whether practice precedes and informs the theory of the person, 
but of the extent to which theories need to be coherent with each other in order 
to be acceptable. 
It could also be held that practices precede the theory of the person, and that 
theories should be revised in line with practices. This MacIntyrean (1990b:197-
200) position might be accepted by those like Regis (op.cit.), who argue that 
the emphasis on autonomy in education does not take into account the reality of 
students' lives and how their sense of who they are is constructed by social 
relations. This approach would highlight the perceived discrepancy between the 
theory of the person and the actual practices of persons, it being open how far 
these are to be considered definitive of persons. One interpretation of this view 
is that the theory of the person is explicitly dependent on ordinary usage. A 
stronger version would be that our theory of the person arises from pre-
theoretical practices. Again, this raises questions concerning the nature of the 
concept of the person, and in particular the extent to which we can talk of a 
determinate concept of the person, as well as questions about the extent to 
which a dominant theory of the person informs social 'reality', and to which 
extent the theory is responsive to this reality. Some of these issues will concern 
us later. 
The differences in the approaches can be seen as resulting from (or, 
resulting in) different interpretations of the role of the concept of the person. 
This way of phrasing the problem is important in that it shows that what is 
being attempted is a reflection of the richness and complexity of our ordinary 
experience and understanding of persons. This is not to ignore the importance 
of social and psychological theories in determining what is valuable about 
persons, and the role of normative theories in determining priorities. A theory 
of the person as subject is still required to support inquiries into other aspects of 
the self which presuppose the subject. 
The accounts of the relationship between aspects of personhood and the 
aims of PSE outlined above support the general claim that there are features of 
persons which are isolatable from ethical or sociological concerns and which 
have some effect on the feasibility of the aims of PSE. This survey of the 
implied relation between the theory of the person and the aims of PSE, provides 
some support for the view that there is a limited dependence of the aims of PSE 
on the theory of the person. This not imply that such a relation holds in general 
between theories of the person and normative theories, but it does imply that in 
the particular context with which we are concerned, procedural legitimacy is 
provided for analysis of the concept of the person. There is no need, therefore, 
in this context to disagree with Wiggins' (1991:103, fn. 1.): 
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in my opinion there is more to be learned about the self by study 
of the actuality and substance of morality than there is to be 
learned about morality from the application to morality of 
philosophical theories of the self. I would certainly applaud 
Kant's readiness to proceed in the first of these ways and would 
applaud equally Hume's total disregard in his theory of morals 
of the wretchedly thin metaphysics he gives elsewhere of the 
self. 
What is clear is that aims which emphasise some form of personal 
autonomy see choice and action residing in the person which leads to an 
emphasis on the individual as the locus of authority and responsibility with the 
social context of the individual viewed from the perspective of the individual 
person. Significance is given to the separateness of persons in virtue of the 
strength of the requirement that individuals are potentially autonomous in 
important areas of their lives. The social approach, on the other hand, wishes to 
approach the agency of persons from their socially embedded context. On this 
view less emphasis is placed on the idea of the person as a discrete centre of 
action and decision making. The separateness of persons is, in other words 
accorded less significance. 
The notion of personal identity functions as both "glue and as scissors", as 
Kolak and Martin have phrased it (1987:339). It functions to bind together the 
stages of one person's life, and to separate or individuate persons. These two 
functions are mutually supporting. As Parfit (1984) has argued: "The 
separateness of persons is the denial that we are all the same person. If the fact 
of personal identity is less deep, so is this fact's denial" (1984:339). How these 
functions of personal identity are understood is fundamental to how we 
conceive of ourselves and are central to the conception of the person in PSE. 
We are here concerned with whether all feasible aims of PSE require the 
same strength of glue, and the same degree of sharpness of the scissors. In 
other words, whether the idea of the person as a subject of experience makes 
certain requirements of personal identity. Our ordinary beliefs about persons 
include the belief that persons are continuous over time and that they are unified 
in that each person has one, and only one life and that that life is distinguishable 
from other lives. If certain aspects of what it means to be a person are privileged 
and a source of this privilege is thought to lie in the nature of the person as an 
individual, then there seems to be a clear appeal to a particular theory of 
personal identity. For example, if autonomous action as presupposed rather 
than derived from the idea of persons as discrete continuous individuals is 
valued, this requires a theory of personal identity in support. Such a theory 
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must furnish the guarantees of identity and its importance sufficient to uphold 
conceptions of the person, such as the conception of the person as potentially 
autonomous, which require the separateness of person as a necessary 
precondition. Such guarantees of separateness are not required by conceptions 
of the person where the unity is not taken to be fundamental. 
Conclusion 
Although the problem of personal identity has not yet been specified in any 
detail, it has been argued that not only is personal identity presupposed by the 
conceptualisation of the person as agent, but it has been suggested that there is a 
relation of limited dependence of the acceptability of the aims of PSE on the 
analysis of this crucial concept. 
In arguing for this conclusion, a distinction has been made between the 
explicitly normative question of which qualities or what ideals should be 
promoted in PSE, and the question of what beliefs about persons are 
presupposed in answering this question by reference to the conception of the 
person as autonomous. The argument has provided a means of proceeding 
which has some legitimacy, while not making the unwarranted assumption that 
those qualities which the aims of PSE fosters are necessarily coincident with the 
distinguishing features of persons. Rather, the position of prima facie priority 
of the question of personal identity to other questions concerning persons is 
based on the idea that there is a sense to the term 'person' which is drawn on in 
PSE which can be usefully distinguished from the explicitly normative 
question, and which rests on unacknowledged assumptions and beliefs about 
persons which need to be examined. This is important in our present context, 
given the concern with normative aspects of the person, which are often seen in 
need of defence, as it focuses attention on the background theory of the person 
which is often seen as unproblematic. There is no presumption that it is possible 
to definitively disentangle the normative and metaphysical aspects of the 
question. The extent to which this distinction has validity needs investigation. 
Notes 
1. Clearly, this is not the only condition for being an agent, other conditions, 
such as freedom to act, social and political contexts which define what agency 
consists in and therefore those acts considered valuable to perform and so on, 
are also necessary. The approach adopted here, however, is to start from the 
position of the person as subject of experience. 
2. Regis cites empirical evidence and Hargreaves (1980) in support of this 
claim. 
Chapter 3 
Autonomy and the Question of Non-Reductionism 
It has been claimed that a non-reductionist account of personal identity is 
necessarily implied and required by the conception of the person as 
autonomous. In this chapter, it will be argued that while the idea of the person 
as potentially autonomous implies a theory of personal identity and makes 
certain requirements of such a theory, it is both possible and desirable to reject 
non-reductionism with respect to persons. The importance of this claim lies in 
the supposition, which will be supported in this chapter, that beliefs about 
personal identity have implications for certain other beliefs about persons. This 
is of interest given that different theories of personal identity have significantly 
different implications for these beliefs. While these claims will be mentioned 
here, exploration is left to a later chapter. 
The major claim is that a non-reductionist account of personal identity is a 
putatively non-normative claim about the constitution of persons which has the 
undesirable effect, from the point of view of the aims of PSE, of providing a 
differential base for the valuing of senses of identity. A fundamental tenet of 
non-reductionism: the requirement that the trans-temporal identity conditions for 
persons are different from those required for physical objects, has its source in 
a metaphysical realism about persons. If persons are real entities, individuated 
and reidentified by a strict or non-empiricist theory of identity, and if a person's 
sense of identity is derived from a theory of identity, those experiences which 
do not conform to the strict identity view will, on that basis be accorded a 
different value. While raising the issue of the role played by reports of 
experience in questions of personal identity, a non-normative understanding of 
the constitution of persons rooted in a metaphysical realism has the effect that a 
minimal condition for the conception of the person necessarily contained in the 
aims of PSE cannot be met. This condition, argued in the introduction to 
underlie more particular expressions of the aims of PSE, is that PSE should 
furnish a conception of the person which articulates ideals and values of 
persons consonant with their experience as persons. 
After setting out the problem and its importance for the aims of PSE from 
the point of view of the value of autonomy and the underlying conception of the 
person, the strengths of the strict identity or non-reductionist thesis are 
assessed. 
1 
The nature and importance of the issue 
The notion of persons as capable of agency and autonomous action 
seemingly requires a notion of strict identity. Following Hollis (1977:101), the 
requirement is for criteria "which let the self stand outside the construction", for 
the preservation of "what is strictly himself from one time and one role to 
another" (ibid:103). This requirement stems from the demand that persons have 
the potential for autonomous thought and action, however limited the actual 
practice of autonomy may be. It is, therefore, a conceptual requirement. 
As previously argued,1 the conception of the person as autonomous 
necessarily requires the person to be conceptualised as an distinct entity. The 
division between agents is necessary for the element of self in self-
determination, and the unity of the person is required for the element of 
determination. The suggestion is therefore that this conceptualisation requires 
strict identity of persons since the possibility of autonomous thought and action 
demands of the presupposed theory of personal identity that that which 
constitutes personal identity can neither be a matter of decision, indeterminate or 
settled by appeal to criteria of connectedness or continuity between mental and 
physical events. 
The demand made by the idea of the person as potentially autonomous of a 
theory of personal identity is, therefore, that the unity and separateness of the 
person is assured. The question to be addressed here is, what type of demand is 
this? The most plausible interpretation is that the demand is a response to a 
metaphysical realism concerning persons. In other words, the unproblematic 
status of the unity and separateness of persons in discussing the aims of PSE is 
a reflection of the idea that persons are ontological particulars. In order to see 
the plausibility of this suggestion it is necessary to see why the unity and 
separateness of the person is a problem in the context of the aims of PSE, 
particularly since the unity of the person operates as an unproblematic given. 
In advocating autonomy as an aim of PSE, White and Pring reject the 
abstract individualism best exemplified by a Hobbesian picture of persons as 
mushrooms, "come to full maturity, without all kind of engagement to each 
other" (Hobbes, 1966:109). Rather the conceptions of autonomy are 
intertwined with a recognition of the importance of social context in determining 
what it means to live a life as a person. The aims of PSE that have been 
considered therefore recognise the social construction of beliefs and other 
mental content, whilst retaining for normative reasons a conception of the self 
with the capacity for reasoned autonomous choice. The problem is to retain a 
socially significant concept of the individual, of significant agency, in light of 
the recognition of the plasticity of persons. This justifies the emphasis in the 
aims of PSE on the concept of person rather than on related concepts but raises 
the question of how persons in this context are to be defined. 
If the concept of the person is taken as central because of its connection to 
agency, then what properties of the person are taken as definitive? The person, 
as so far conceptualised, is understood as that which chooses. While this is 
hardly sufficient, leaving the question of the criteria by which choices are to be 
made, and the question of individuation in the case of particular persons, 
unanswered, it provides a useful starting point, providing at least one negative 
condition that must be met in answer to the question of 'what is a person?': This 
question cannot be answered by specifying what the person is in terms of 
occupation of any particular social role. Persons, on this view, are not 
distinguished from entities which are not persons in virtue of being, say, a 
teacher, or even by the character the person has. To answer the question 'what 
is a person?' it is neither necessary or sufficient to mention these aspects of 
being a person. They do not provide the answer to what is definitive of a 
person. It is 'person' in the sense of 'that which chooses' which it must be 
possible to identify, and reidentify through time. 
Influential though this account of the person has been, it is flawed. Under 
increasing criticism from a post-Cartesian perspective the idea of the person 
essentially characterised as the location of the capacity for choice seems both too 
empty and too full to meet the requirements made of it. This is the picture of the 
self as unencumbered, disengaged, self-fashioning, essentially nothing other 
than a capacity to fix and objectify with the aim of reworking or refashioning 
herself according to some standard of rational procedure, with the subject 
conceived as the premise rather than the product of its agency. It is thus 
recognisable as one aspect of what Rorty (1979:5) refers to as the "Cartesian-
Lockean-Kantian tradition" in philosophy. While the need for the capacity for 
autonomous thought and action, requires that the person is the capacity for 
choice and action, recognition of the necessity of social context to being a 
person demands more than a self defined in abstraction from any constitutive 
concerns. In demands more that a "'punctual' or 'neutral' self', as Taylor 
(1989:49, Ch 9) refers to this conception of the person. 
It is too full for the present purposes given the rejection of abstract 
individualism. This point can be illustrated by reference to the connection 
between the theory of the person or self as implied by the idea of autonomy and 
a theory of rationality.2 An autonomous thought or action is characterised by its 
relation to the rationality of the goals pursued through the action. One means of 
specifying what constitutes the rationality of the ends of action is blocked with 
the rejection of abstract individualism, and therein lies a source of the 
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requirement for strict identity for persons. On a view such as Hobbes', for 
example, the rationality of the goals of action does not arise since it is presumed 
to be settled by the connection between the determination of a good reason for 
action, as opposed to a rational action, and a theory of what is essential to 
persons. The former is dependent on the latter, as part of a philosophical 
method which accepts a hierarchical view of philosophical disciplines. From 
what is essential to persons, on this view, a theory of ultimate interests is 
derived: the ultimate determinant of action is a question of human nature, human 
conduct being explained by the sorts of entities persons are. 
This view unfashionably gives primacy to metaphysical questions arguing, 
at least, that what something is supplies grounds for determining the rationality 
of actions in its respect. It implies that the promotion of autonomy as a valued 
characteristic of persons accepts that what constitutes persons, what persons 
essentially are, is something there is good reason to take note of, preserve or 
foster. 
This is not an approach taken by either Pring or White, relying as it does on 
arguments from, as Hollis (ibid:101) says "what is, no less than of what ought 
to be." However, it is not obvious that the implied connection between a 
metaphysical conception of what persons are, and what we have reason to do 
can be avoided. This is because although abstract individualism is rejected, 
acceptance by Pring and White that individuals are the location of choice and 
action implies acceptance of a form of ontological individualism. This implies a 
move analogous to that described above from the nature of persons to the 
autonomous person. 
This gives grounds for supposing at least partial acceptance of the root idea 
that a person's ultimate interests derive from what a person essentially is, both 
as a person and as the particular person she is. Thus, although giving primacy 
to the question of what a person is, smacks of an old-fashioned philosophical 
method unlikely to attract many adherents in this bold form, it is not clear that 
something very like it is not accepted in the general acceptance of ontological 
individualism. 
Following Watt (1989:30) ontological individualism can be defined as 
involving "thinking of individual people as having a more fundamental type of 
reality, as being the primary entities, while groups, societies, collective 
phenomena generally, have a derivative existence." This form of individualism, 
that the person is a fundamentally more real entity than any social organisation 
underlies individualism in general, as Watt (loc.cit.) points out. It is not the 
contents of consciousness, on this view, which are considered in an 
individualistic fashion, and thus it not part of this view that these are or could be 
generated by an individual person. Ontological individualism rather relies for its 
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persuasive force on the experience of consciousness. Persons, rather than any 
social entities, are centres of thoughts and feelings. Consciousness, Watt 
(ibid:189) says "is escapably experienced as an individual phenomenon." This 
gives support to the view that persons are more natural and fundamental entities 
than groups or social institutions. With the further assumption that the paradigm 
of choice and agency is the person,3 the conclusion is that the conception of the 
person must have criteria for the individuation and reidentification of persons, 
such that the separateness and unity of persons is assured. 
The unity of a person, as essential to being a person, as opposed to the 
value given to the unification or integrity of a person's life, is therefore taken to 
be of some importance for the rationality of the goals of our action, including 
such things as self-concern. The separateness and continuity, and thus the unity 
of the person is taken to be a fundamental feature of our experience, supported 
by its general importance to our lives. 
The motivation for requiring strict identity for persons thus stems from the 
tension caused by the rejection of an abstract individualism, while retaining an 
ontological individualism. Whereas abstract individualism would provide the 
rationality of goals by reference to what it is rational for an agent to do in virtue 
of being an agent, once this is rejected, some thesis of the strict identity of 
persons is required for freedom of choice and action in the case of individuals. 
If the autonomous person acts freely by definition, where freely refers to 
actions performed according to good reasons as determined by the person (a 
Platonic authority being denied on this modernist conception of the person), 
these good reasons will be determined by two factors: what a person is, in the 
sense of what is essential to her as a person, and by what is essential to her 
being the person she is. Though it is important to distinguish questions of 
individuation, individual identification, and reidentification, they are connected 
in that the criteria supplied for one will undoubtedly influence or be influenced 
by the other, and that the criteria for individuation involve specification of 
essential properties, which in this case reinforces the connection between 
conceptions of rationality and the concept of the person. 
If this argument is sufficient to show that a theory of strict identity in the 
case of person is required by acceptance of the idea of the person as 
autonomous, why should it not be accepted, and let this background 
assumption continue to pass unremarked upon in discussions of personal 
autonomy in education in general and PSE in particular? 
There are several reasons why it is important to challenge the strict identity, 
or non-reductionist thesis. Those concerning its internal coherence will be 
explored in some detail in following sections. First, some of the consequences 
of accepting the general strict identity thesis should be noted. The most 
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troubling of these from the perspective of the aims of PSE concerns the status 
of judgments of personal identity, and the status of different senses of identity. 
The strict identity theory, as a theory of personal identity, is a theory about the 
strength of the boundaries between persons and what constitutes the persistence 
of persons. Views on the boundaries of persons are relevant to how experience 
is interpreted. Unlike continuity theories, the strict identity theory holds that the 
importance of the unity of the person is a function of its fundamental nature, a 
response to an essential irreducible feature of persons. Persons are taken to be 
real entities which are not reducible to more particular facts. In other words a 
complete description of the world would need to mention persons. On this 
realist view, persons as discrete entities are a feature of reality and have some 
importance in virtue of this status. The unity and separateness of persons is 
therefore taken to be a fact of some importance. This is not to deny that the aims 
of PSE reflect values and ideals and therefore need not be unduly concerned that 
the values promoted do not reflect everyone's values or experiences. The point 
is rather a reminder of the point of something that it is taken as a given in the 
aims of PSE: that students' experiences and its expression are given respect and 
taken seriously. 
The existence or value of experiences of identification  and non-
identification with one's self and others, need not be denied on a strict identity 
thesis. The question, when thinking about the aims of PSE, is the status of 
these experiences relative to the status of experiences of separateness and unity, 
and even continuity. If the latter experiences are taken to reflect the underlying 
reality of persons, the implication is that they have a different value and will be 
considered more important given their more fundamental nature. Thus, one may 
educate with the aim of enhancing connections between persons, but this will be 
construed differently depending on whether persons are seen as fundamentally 
separate or not. 
The issue concerns the effect of the privileging of some experiences on the 
basis of their more fundamental nature. In this form the question of the role 
played by ordinary experience in the construction and solution of the problem of 
personal identity is raised, allowing the role of ordinary experience to be 
scrutinized and the basis for privileging certain experiences to be questioned. 
Persons' lives admit of experiences of inner conflict and dialogue as well as 
identification with others. Neither these experiences, nor the more unusual but 
still common experiences of akrasia and self-deception raise questions of 
personal identity. It is only unusual and interpretatively problematic cases such 
as splitting consciousness which are considered to raise questions about our 
concept of the person and the justification of the importance given to unity. 
Nagel (1979a) provides a good example of this in his discussion of 
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commissurotomy, which appears to call into question the requirement for the 
existence of a single mental subject of conscious mental activity.4 Splitting 
consciousness, if it exists, is highly unusual and is not part of our normal 
experience as persons. Common experiences does not raise the question of the 
extent to which we are both unified and in control only if our seemingly natural 
belief in the unity and indivisibility of the person is presupposed.Thus, normal 
experience does not raise the question of the extent to which the belief in the 
unity and discreteness of persons is justified and the importance it is given 
because normal experiences of disunity are not taken to be evidence of actual 
disunity. 
Yet, experiences of disunity and identification may be of equal importance 
and have ethical significance corresponding to the separateness of persons. As 
Midgley (1990:14) points out, even if we ignore pregnancy and identification 
with one's child, persons' lives admit of many experiences of co-operation, 
such as playing in an orchestra. While co-operation can only give a qualitative 
sense of identity, and for most constitute relatively short-lived experiences 
compared with the experience of being a single entity, what Midgley and others 
draw attention to is that the experience of separateness and unity is not the only 
significant experience we have of ourselves. That questions of identification and 
of being other than a discrete centre of experience are not given much attention 
in discussions of personal identity may be a function of the traditional form in 
which the issue is raised, which, it can be argued, presupposes an individualist 
stance. Whether this type of criticism can be upheld or not, there can be little 
doubt that the form in which the question of personal identity is posed 
encourages the downplaying of the extent to which we do not consider 
ourselves unified discrete entities.5 This is not to deny that most of us, most of 
the time do not have a problem with our unity both at a time or over time. We 
remember many of our past actions and intend to do things in the future, and 
have no problem distinguishing our own occurrent experiences from those of 
the person sitting next to us who may be having similar experiences. This is the 
case even when we are co-operating, or identifying with another person, and 
when we are engaged in inner dialogue or conflict. That these cases do not raise 
the question of whether I am more or less one person raises the question of the 
justification of the seemingly natural belief in our separate and indivisible unity 
and the justification for the presumption in favour of the unity of the person. 
This line of argument, which argues from features of lived experience, is 
similar in form to feminist critiques which stress the gendered nature of 
experience in that it draws attention to experiences which do not conform to the 
dominant conception, and asks why these experiences have not received the 
status given to those that conform, and for the justification for the privileging of 
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some experience. This form of argument naturally leads to consideration of the 
influences on the construction of the problem, suggesting that interpretation of 
the experience of personal identity is not unlike other experiences in that it is not 
unaffected by the social nature of our experience.6 Although these issues will be 
of concern in a moment, the argument from ordinary experience gives some 
plausibility to the idea that there may be different experiences of what it means 
to be a person, as opposed to various senses of self,7 and that these are socially 
rather than metaphysically derived and justified. 
The most obvious influences upon a sense of identity are gender, culture, 
ethnic and religious experiences and linguistic environment. If these more 
particular influences, as opposed to a universalistic metaphysical realism are 
accepted then this supplies an argument against accepting the latter as 
underpinning the conception of the unity of the person as presupposed in the 
aims of PSE. This would not have the consequence that for as many identifiable 
groups as there are in a classroom, there will be a corresponding number of 
views on what constitute the criteria of personhood, who constitutes a person, 
or on the distinctness and unity of persons. Rather, it is an argument for 
recognising that the presupposition of a certain view on persons involved in the 
promotion of autonomy as a valued attribute of persons should not accept a 
presupposition which has the consequence that one conception is favoured on 
the basis of being a 'more correct' view of the underlying reality, with less 
prominence being given to familiar equally valuable experiences. What is clear, 
is that a source of the importance given to the unity of the person is beliefs 
about persons, and the constraints these impose on our use of the concept of 
person. This will be the subject of the next chapter where it will be approached 
through the general question of the effect of constraints such as beliefs on the 
acceptability of any analysis of personal identity. What is important to note at 
this juncture is that to recognise the validity of experiences not based on the 
distinctness of persons is not at the same time to exclude autonomy as an aim of 
PSE. The argument is not essentially against autonomy as an aim of PSE, but 
rather is designed to raise the fundamental issue of the relation between what a 
person is, and the valued attributes of persons, the development of which it is 
the aim of PSE to facilitate. The argument to this point has suggested that what 
needs to be stressed is the importance of the unity of the person for social 
practices and many conceptions of the self, but which does not depend on a 
understanding of the significance of the identity of persons as lying in the 
special identity conditions for persons as opposed to other entities. 
It may be objected at this juncture, that such an argument is not necessary 
since arguments for autonomy do not rely for either coherence or support on the 
availability of particular criteria of personal identity because autonomy is seen as 
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a value, not as definitive of, or derived from a concept of person. Thus while a 
conception of the person is required, there is no implication that this need be 
other than normative. There is no need, therefore, to deny the point made by 
Nagel (1970) that such a conception ultimately relies on a metaphysics of the 
person, but there is no need in accepting this position to also accept a hierarchy 
of philosophical disciplines. This latter position can be avoided by drawing 
attention to the interdependence of the notion of an autonomous person and the 
complex of social conditions and conceptions of the person which support the 
development of autonomous thought and action. These, it could be argued, are 
a more appropriate object of concern given that there are several plausible 
understandings of the relation between a metaphysics of the person and the 
development of autonomy, and the possibility of rejection of the primacy of the 
former in relation to autonomy. 
Moreover, it could be argued that incompatibility of non-reductionism with 
the general ideal that PSE should be available to all students on the basis of 
differing senses of identity is spurious at best. The fact is, it could be argued, 
that non-reductionism or a strict identity theory, while a background assumption 
about what persons are, is more importantly an articulation of what we believe 
about persons. It articulates common-sense. This argument addresses the 
relation between certain sorts of 'facts' about persons, and our requirements 
and beliefs about persons, in short, the constraints on our use of the term 
'person' both from what we discover, for example about the functional 
integration that typifies a single person and analysis of the concept, and our 
practices as persons. One way in which this argument may be pursued is to 
argue that pragmatic, psychological or social constraints are more important 
than the metaphysical. Evaluation of this argument must wait until what is 
meant by a 'metaphysical constraint' is considered. But given the connection 
between personal identity, our understanding of moral agency and our moral 
and social practices, the suggestion that metaphysical considerations are not the 
most relevant has prima facie plausibility. In its general form this argument 
from the constraints on the concept of person has the effect of denying the 
independence of metaphysical questions. However, if the argument given so far 
has any cogency, it seems that the theory of personal identity plays a more 
robust role than allowed for on this interpretation, even if this is rarely explicitly 
stated. How we conceive of ourselves and others, as well as the rationality of 
actions concerning ourselves and others, are among those beliefs that are 
influenced by what we believe persons to be. 
The relevance of a metaphysical view of the person could, however still be 
challenged by rejecting the philosophical tradition of which it forms part. This 
leaves the theoretical status of our beliefs about what constitutes persons in 
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some doubt. It can be held, as MacIntyre (1990b: Ch 9) argues, that ordinary 
usage reflects a complex metaphysical conception which was embodied in 
practice long before it was articulated in theory, or that our ordinary usage 
reflects pre-theoretic intuitions. If this option is interpreted as positing identity 
as a function of social practices and institutions, then it appears the fundamental 
motivation behind the requirement for strict identity in the case of persons is lost 
in that the implication is that not only what I am but who I am is socially 
constructed leaving no space for autonomous action. The fundamental problem 
is to retain a significant concept of the person, as not totally passive and 
determined by social or psychological factors, in light of the recognition of the 
determination of many of our actions. If the conception of the person as 
potentially autonomous is not to be rejected then it seems that the only feasible 
option is that the unity of person, or what a person is, stands aside or apart 
from the social construction to the extent necessary for self-determination. 
Given this, some theory of strict identity seems necessary. 
This line of argument is strengthened by seeing the connection between the 
notion of the autonomous person and strict identity of persons as a response to 
Cartesian intuitions concerning the subject of thought. The self-consciousness 
which is a mark of personhood, and one of the conditions of autonomy, seems 
to require a unity of the inner life which can only be supplied by a notion of 
strict identity. The alternative, that personal identity is constituted by relations of 
continuity and connectedness allows for an indeterminacy in the concept of the 
person, and thus the assurance of numerical identity of the subject of thought, 
of the subject of inner life is lost. A major objection to reductionism with 
respect to persons is that it cannot account for the natural assumption that our 
inner lives have an assured unity. On these grounds, clearly connected to the 
issue of ontological individualism, the strict identity of persons is a necessary 
requirement of the conception of persons as subjects. 
Notwithstanding these arguments for the necessity for a theory of strict 
identity in the case of person, would it matter if such arguments were rejected 
on the grounds, for example of the irrelevancy of metaphysical questions? 
Would not, in other words, a qualitative sense of identity be sufficient? The 
concentration on the concept of the person in the aims of PSE has been 
defended on the grounds of the perspective it affords on agency. Thus the idea 
of 'character' has been rejected as not supplying the conditions for identity 
across characters necessary for autonomous thought and action. It may be 
thought, however, that the debate has been unnecessarily circumscribed by 
uncritical acceptance of the view that the alternatives are exhausted by non-
reductionism and reductionism. The possibility of a third option will be 
explored subsequent to consideration of the two major alternatives. 
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The discussion to this point has shown that the major issue is the 
importance of the idea of the unity of the person. This is illustrated by Rorty 
(1986:121) in a discussion of some of the problems associated with self-
deception and akrasia. She notes that for "someone to be capable of agency in 
the strong sense, to hold himself responsible for avoiding self-deception and 
akrasia, requires that he - or at any rate some relatively central set of his habits -
reflexively underwrite his integrative processes. He must declare his various 
friendly neighbourhood habits to be one city, the 1". This suggests that neither 
qualitative nor numerical identity is the issue, but the importance of unity. 
With the idea that it is the importance given to the idea of unity which is 
pivotal in the discussion, it is now possible to turn to more detailed 
consideration of the alternative interpretations of what constitutes the identity of 
persons over time. It has been shown so far that identity through time and at a 
time is necessary for the unity of the person, necessary for the possibility of the 
strong form of agency implied by autonomous thought and action. The question 
is the status and importance of this requirement, and thus the nature of the 




In this section, following a short discussion of the relevance of the question 
of personal identity and brief outline of the main positions, it will be argued that 
the strongest argument for non-reductionism is from the importance of the first-
person point of view on experience. The non-reductionist claim that personal 
identity is determinate and unanalysable requires a different sense or standards 
for the identity of persons as opposed to physical objects or artifacts. The 
argument for this different sense of identity relies on the importance of the idea 
of persons as subjects of experience. This argument does not, however, 
provide a means of deciding between reductionism and non-reductionism since 
the distinction between senses of identity cannot be unproblematically upheld. 
Furthermore, the non-reductionist use of the subject of experience is dependent 
on the use of subjective facts to determine diachronic identity in order to uphold 
a strict identity thesis is problematic. 
Although the argument to this point has been that the issue which is of most 
concern is the question of personal identity, could it not be argued that the issue 
is what constitutes the unity of the person?? Issues of identity and unity while 
closely related need to be distinguished since it is not clear that the criteria for 
one will suffice for both. The question of personal identity asks for the logically 
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necessary and sufficient conditions for a person identified at one time being the 
same person as a person identified at another time What is required are criteria 
in the sense of constitutive of, rather than evidence for the identity of persons. 
Thus, while in the ordinary course of events, evidential criteria are used in the 
reidentification of persons, the philosophical interest is in the meaning of claims 
of personal identity. The interest is in what is essential to a person, the identity 
conditions seen as a means to determining what is constitutive of persons. If we 
wish to understand the concept of person, it is essential to grasp those 
conditions under which an individual x at ti would be the same individual as y at 
t2, and under what conditions they would be different individuals, where x and 
y refer to any person, including myself. 
This question is distinguishable from the question of what constitutes the 
unity of the person, which asks what makes a number of simultaneous diverse 
physical and psychological experiences all belong to one person, and discrete 
bundles of such experiences belong to one person. What makes the occurrent 
experiences of feeling slightly hungry, hearing the noise of the traffic outside 
the window and a number of other feelings, emotions and other psychological 
experiences all mine, and other 'bundles' of similar experiences not mine? The 
problem of the unity of the person was put most memorably by Hume (1739: I. 
iv. 6): 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call 
myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, 
of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I 
never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe anything but the perception. 
A Humean bundle of perceptions has multiple relations with other such 
bundles in the past. The problem is to give some explanation of how some of 
these bundles, which have been very different, are mine, and how some of 
these bundles, which have been extremely similar are not mine. 
Questions about personal identity and the unity of the person involve several 
issues. In both cases questions arise in first and third person forms and concern 
both synchronic and diachronic unity. Although frequently not distinguished, in 
that the criteria supplied in response to one issue are considered sufficient to 
answer the others, since it will be argued here that the strength of non-
reductionism lies in its response to the first-person question, it is important to 
make the point that the problem of personal identity arises in different forms. 
The question of synchronic unity is expressed in the first-person in the form 
'What makes all these occurrent experiences mine?' As it arises in the third 
person it usually concerns the interpretation of controversial psychiatric and 
neurological cases where the question is whether there is more than one person 
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simultaneously 'occupying' one body. In these cases it is arguably not clear 
how to describe a person who seems to have several separate personalities or 
more than one separate centre of consciousness. Questions of diachronic unity 
arise in practice in the first person in a variety of situations, when concern is 
with liability or present feelings for some past action acknowledged to be one's 
own, such as continuing to feel guilty for some childhood act which one would 
no longer perform. It can arise when considering actions which will affect the 
future where it is important to determine as far as possible whether the person 
affected will be you. 
This raises the question of the priority or precedence of diachronic to 
synchronic unity, and the extent to which they can be considered in isolation 
from each other. Since it can be argued that conditions for unity of 
consciousness are dependent upon forward relations between consciousness 
stages.10 Thus synchronic identity is not necessarily prior to the question of 
diachronic unity." 
This leaves the question of whether the problem of the unity of a person, 
which asks for a unifying principle, or the problem of personal identity, which 
asks for the criteria for reidentification, is prior. It cannot be straightforwardly 
assumed that the provision of criteria for the identity of persons over time will 
automatically supply an answer to the question of what unifies a person. In fact, 
it is often argued that answering the question of personal identity presupposes 
an answer to the question of the unity of the person.12 This objection is 
addressed to accounts of personal identity in terms of psychological continuity 
which hold that the unity of a person's life can be answered by personal 
identity. The objection is commonly formulated as a version of Butler's 
(1736/1975:100) criticism of Locke that these accounts are viciously circular in 
that "consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot 
constitute, personal identity."13 In order to answer the question of personal 
identity in terms of psychological states, an answer to the question of what 
unifies a person is presupposed in that psychological continuity can only exist 
whenever the conditions, yet to be specified, of the unity of experiences are 
fulfilled. 
This objection holds with respect to specific psychological states, drawing 
on the assumption that an experience in one mind cannot be psychologically 
continuous with an experience in another mind (i.e., one that is non-identical). 
The most plausible interpretation of this objection is that it is part of the meaning 
of words such as 'remember', and 'memory' that a person can only remember 
that person's experiences. Since Shoemaker's (1970/1984:24) introduction of 
the concept of quasi-psychological states, which have all the requirements of 
psychological terms such as 'memory' except the requirement of sameness of 
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person,14 it has been possible to circumvent the charge of circularity, as 
experiences of one person need not be defined by reference to that person. We 
shall address the adequacy of this argument later, it is only necessary now to 
note that the objection that the unity of the person is prior in this sense does not 
obviously hold. Since this is the strongest argument for the position that the 
question of the unity of the person answers the question of identity, it is 
plausible to proceed on the assumption that the identity question will supply the 
conditions for the unity of the person, and that there are no impediments to 
considering the question of personal identity. 
The problem, to reiterate, is to give an account of the person as the unified 
location of thought and action. The question of what constitutes this unifying 
function is prior to the identity question, but answered by it. Both the concept 
of the person, and the conditions for the unity of the person are conceptually 
prior to the question of identity, but the solution to the question of identity 
answers the question of unity, and clarifies the meaning of the concept of 
person.15 
Various solutions have been suggested to the problem of personal identity, 
as set out at the beginning of this section. The most basic dispute is between 
reductionism and non-reductionism,16 the feasible choices seen as exhausted by 
these two possibilities. The account under primary consideration in this section 
is non-reductionism, which has previously also been referred to as the strict 
identity theory. This is the view that personal identity is an ultimate 
unanalysable fact which cannot be defined in other terms. There are facts of 
personal identity over and above impersonal facts. Personal identity is a 'further 
fact" irreducible to other facts. It is essentially unanalysable, indefinable in 
other terms, cannot admit of degrees and cannot be decided by convention. The 
notion of 'same person' is taken as conceptually primitive in the sense given by 
Ishiguro (1980:62-75),18 that the concept is not so much simple as 
indispensable. The possibility of an informative synchronic or diachronic 
criterion of personhood is denied, in that it is denied that specification of a set of 
relations to be satisfied could give the identity conditions of any person, or be 
necessary or sufficient for the reidentification of any person. 
On this account personal identity cannot be secured by the continuity of any 
event or state. Such continuities are criteria only in the sense that they reveal 
personal identity, they do not constitute it and therefore are not analyses of it. 
That which constitutes personal identity, on this view, is distinct from physical 
and psychological continuities and cannot be reduced to them, or any other 
observable relations or connections. The identity conditions for persons are 
therefore different from the identity conditions of physical objects. Personal 
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identity is, on this account, "something ultimate" (Swinburne, 1974.:240): our 
concept of personal identity is more absolute than continuity theories can allow. 
Continuities and connectedness provide evidence for personal identity, but 
this evidence is fallible. It is explicitly claimed that personal identity is one thing 
and continuities and connectedness are another. Given this distinction there is 
no contradiction in claiming that one can exist without the other, or in accepting 
that analysis alone is insufficient to determine which experiences will be mine. 
A reductionist account of personal identity does not make use of the concept 
of sameness of person in the specification of the criteria for identity, but makes 
use of a different set of concepts, such as psychological and/or physical 
concepts. Personal identity is analysable in terms of continuities and 
connections between mental and/or physical events and states. Where no other 
considerations are thought to be either necessary or sufficient for the holding of 
personal identity, the view is reductionist. Hence, the first claim of Parfit's 
(1984:210) Reductionist View: "the fact of a person's identity over time just 
consists in the holding of certain more particular facts", these more particular 
facts concern psychological and/or physical continuity. These facts can be 
described without either presupposing the identity of this person, or explicitly 
claiming that the experiences of this person's life are had by this person, or that 
this person exists. These facts can be described in an impersonal way. Thus the 
second claim of the Reductionist View: "Though persons exist, we could give a 
complete description of the world without claiming that persons exist" (Parfit, 
ibid:212). Persons exist and have experiences, but are not separately existing 
entities, in that a person's existence consists merely in the existence of a brain 
and a body, and the occurrence of an interrelated set of mental and physical 
states. 
The distinction between reductionist and non-reductionist views of identity 
with respect to persons can be seen, following Brennan (1988:255-6) by 
consideration of the question of how much information we would need to tell us 
all that matters in an identity question. For a reductionist there comes a point 
when we know all that matters, even when we don't know what to say about 
identity in that situation. At the same point a non-reductionist would maintain 
that there is still some further fact to be ascertained, the fact of identity. For the 
reductionist there are situations where there is no answer to the question of 
identity. For the non-reductionist there are no such situations. 
Both views have a long history. Butler and Reid are clear sources in modem 
philosophy of the idea that persons are entio per se, that persons must be more 
than a succession of mental and physical events or states. This view has 
recently been defended by Chisholm (1976), Madell (1981), and Swinburne 
(1984). The reductionist view was held by Locke and Hume, and is defended 
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by Mackie (1976), Perry (1975), D. Lewis (1976) and Parfit (1984) among 
others. In this discussion Parfit's Reductionist View will be taken as 
representative of the latter position, not only because of its influence on the 
debate, but for the explicit connections he makes between our beliefs about the 
nature of persons and the implications he draws for certain other beliefs. This 
sophisticated and persuasive modern account is a version of the psychological 
criterion of person identity. It thus is within the Lockean tradition, although the 
conclusions are more Humean than Lockean. 
Consideration of our use of the concept of the person suggests acceptance 
of a non-reductionist or strict identity view. Whereas with entities other than 
persons it is possible and acceptable not to be able to answer questions such as 
"Is this ship the same ship that set sail last month?" with a simple yes or no 
answer, this is not acceptable in the case of persons. Thus while there can 
legitimately be no answer to the question "Is it the same car?" after a new engine 
has been put and/or the transmission changed, or "Is the Philosophy of 
Education Department the same department as it was in 1975?", we do not 
believe there can similarly be no answer to the question of our identity. When 
confronted with the question of whether or not some person in the future will be 
me, we believe that there must always be a determinate answer. Either it will be 
me or it will not. While we may reductionists with respect to cars and 
philosophy departments, we are non-reductionists when it comes to persons. 
We therefore believe that the identity conditions for persons are unlike the 
identity conditions for artifacts and other physical entities. 
The strongest arguments for non-reductionism lie in its relation to our 
common-sense beliefs about persons, the importance of the first-person point of 
view, with additional support gained from the relation between our social and 
moral practices and a strict identity theory. It is frequently held that a non-
reductionist thesis is required by both our use of the concept of person, our 
experience and our practices as persons. On these grounds it is held that a 
different sense of identity is required for persons as opposed to physical 
objects. 
To uphold the belief, in what Parfit (1971:3) calls "the special nature" of 
personal identity, it is necessary to make a distinction between the 
reidentification conditions for persons and those for physical objects and 
artifacts, such that the transtemporal identity conditions of persons are 
essentially unlike those for physical objects. There are several ways in which 
this distinction has been made. Chisholm (1976:Ch.3) for example, 
distinguishes between "ontologically basic" and "ontologically parasitic" 
objects, with persons being the former and physical objects the latter. This is 
essentially a defence of Butler's distinction between "strict and philosophical" 
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and "loose and popular" senses of identity, with the former applying to persons 
and the latter to physical objects. The distinction is illustrated by Chisholm's 
example of the difference between the identity of a table through time and the 
identity of persons. 
The theory relies on a distinction between mereologically variable objects, 
which are capable of surviving changes in their parts, and mereologically 
constant objects upon which mereologically variable objects are ontologically 
parasitic. Thus a table can be spoken of using both senses of identity. In the 
ordinary course of events we talk of the identity of the table using identity in the 
loose and popular sense, speaking of the table as a mereologically variable 
object. When we use identity in the strict and philosophical sense we refer to 
mereologically constant entities, that which constitutes the table. Thus we can 
speak of a table being the same even if it has changed colour because the colour 
of the table is ontologically parasitic on its constituents. In the case of persons it 
is not possible to use identity in the loose and popular sense since the 
mereologically variable properties of persons cannot, as with tables, be 
borrowed from mereologically constant objects. This can be seen in Chisholm's 
(ibid.:104) example of hoping for rain. If persons were entio per alio, or 
mereologically variable objects, this psychological property could only be had 
in virtue of some numerically distinct mereologically constant object which 
hopes for rain. There would have to be a stand-in reference for the person 
hoping for rain, and, he argues: 
There is no reason whatever for supposing that I hope for rain 
only in virtue of the fact that some other thing hopes for rain -
some stand-in that, strictly and philosophically, is not identical 
with me but happens to be doing duty for me at this particular 
moment. (loc.cit.) 
This thesis depends on a theory of ontological particulars and a theory of 
metaphysical primitiveness or basicness, with some objects being more basic or 
fundamental than others, and on the holding of a disanalogy between tables and 
persons. It is not clear that either need be accepted. The reductionist view that 
persons are constituted by experiences and psychological states or, more 
properly perhaps, events, does not lead to the conclusion that my hoping for 
rain, is equivalent to something else hoping for rain in virtue of the fact the 
'hoping for rain' is a psychological event rooted in time. 
The first objection, concerning the primitiveness or basicness of some 
objects relative to others, concerns the difference in identity conditions for 
persons and physical objects. When considering trans-temporal identity 
conditions there are several views on the relative fundamentalnesss of personal 
and physical identity, as Sprigge (1988:29), for example, notes. Either, the 
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strongest examples of the trans-temporal identity of persons are considered to 
be at least as full and genuine cases of identity as the strongest cases of trans-
temporal identity of physical things; or they are considered to be less full or 
genuine cases of identity, or, fmally, personal identity is considered to be a 
more full or genuine case of identity than the identity of physical objects. The 
first claim is consistent with a reductionist account and the final claim is 
consistent with non-reductionism, at least as propounded by Chisholm. 
3 
First-Person Reference and the Unity of Consciousness 
As shown by Chisholm's example of 'hoping for rain', the strength of the 
non-reductionist position for a different sense of identity in the case of persons 
lies in the nature of first-person reference. There are various positions which 
can be taken on this question, but they have in common the negative 
consequence that continuities of mental or physical events are neither necessary 
nor sufficient for personal identity. 
Underlying non-reductionism are intuitions about subjective facts. Thus 
Nagel (1979b:200-1) argues that the problem of personal identity arises because 
of the internal idea of the self. When we ask ourselves whether some past or 
future experience was or will be ours, we have the sensation of "picking out 
something whose identity over time is well-defined" (ibid:200). This is 
achieved by concentrating on the subject of our present experience and 
temporally extending it. The general point being made by Nagel is that whether 
or not the identity of the self is an illusion, it is not something which can be 
captured by any external or objective account of personal identity in terms of 
psychological or physical continuity. The identity of the self seems separate 
from all objective accompaniments and even psychological attachments, even if 
in fact this is not the case. 
The strength of this view, the idea of the self as detachable in this sense, 
and the idea that it is this which should be the concern in discussions of 
personal identity, lies in the plausibility of the suggestion that the question 
asked of an experience "Will it be mine?" is not only sensible but in answering 
it the subject of experience is presupposed. In addressing the question of the 
extent to which the problem of personal identity is the problem of the first 
person perspective on experience, it is important to distinguish the various 
senses in which this necessary unity of the self or person is to be understood. 
There is the sense of unity in that the self is something known, and there is the 
sense in which the unity of the self or person is something which is necessary 
for the possibility of experience. This can be interpreted as a requirement for a 
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sense of self, or of a substantial self, in order for there to be personal identity. 
A third option is that the possibility of experience presupposes the necessary 
unity of the self. The possibility of such various interpretations is partially due 
to the ambiguity in reference of unity of consciousness. It can take as its 
reference either the unity of conscious states, or consciousness of such a unity. 
In the second sense of unity of consciousness, the consciousness is of a variety 
of mental states as unified into a single consciousness, this consciousness being 
one's own. 
That the two senses of the unity of consciousness are connected is 
associated with Kant's argument in the First and Second Paralogisms in the first 
edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, where it is argued that the first sense of 
unity of consciousness involves the second sense, self-consciousness. The 
focus in this argument is on the necessity of a knower, as a presupposition of 
apparently indispensable features of our experience, rather than on something 
which is known. Thus, without specifying the criteria for unity it can be argued 
that the positing of such a unity is required by the very possibility of 
experience. It is the potential confusion between the epistemological question, 
the knowledge we have of our own states, and the metaphysical question, of the 
constitution of these states and their identity, suggested by the special access we 
have to our own states which raises the question of the ownership of experience 
in a form which leads to the positing of a separate self. 
The idea of persons as capable of a special form of consciousness, an 
awareness of themselves which we can call self-consciousness, leads to the 
view that there is a subject of thought which is not itself an object of 
consciousness. When I think 'I am aware that I am aware, that I am aware', this 
chain of thought seems to conclude in the idea that there is a subject of thought, 
in the Kantian sense of a subject which is antecedent to any particular 
experience and serves to unify our diverse perceptions. It provides the principle 
of unity by holding together the Humean bundles of diverse perceptions: 
The thought that the representations given in intuition one and all 
belong to me, is therefore equivalent to the thought that I unite 
them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them; 
and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the 
synthesis of the representations, it presupposes the possibility of 
that synthesis. In other words, only in so far as I can grasp the 
manifold of the representations in one consciousness, do I call 
them one and all mine. For otherwise I should have as many-
coloured and diverse a self as I have representations of which I 
am conscious to myself." (Kant, B134) 
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Thus, the unity of the self which requires a subject, is not something which 
itself can be known or grasped through experience. It cannot be grasped 
empirically through introspection which is necessarily limited and can only give 
knowledge of myself as object of experience. Not being able to gain empirical 
knowledge of the subject of thought, but at the same time requiring such a 
subject for the possibility of experience, we left in the position of presuming 
that there is such a subject. 
The necessity of the transcendental unity of consciousness, or, in Kant's 
terms, the transcendental unity of apperception is illustrated the example, given 
by Paton (1951:315), of hearing a clock strike twelve. In order for someone to 
hear this as a clock striking twelve, for the possibility of knowledge of a series 
of appearances in time there must be: "(a) one consciousness, and (b) a concept 
under which the various appearances are united". It is only when these two 
conditions hold that there is more than a "string of subjective sensations", when 
there is an object: "The object in this sense is dependent on the unity itself'. 
The necessary identity of the self as knowing is separate and different from 
the question of the identity of the self as something known. Nothing about the 
identity of a subject can be inferred from the logical identity of 'I'. The 
synthesis of data requires the identity of that which does the synthesising, but 
from the existence of the transcendental unity of apperception, as Kant (A349) 
states: "that I, as a thinking being, persist for myself ... can by no means be 
deduced from it". The argument does not specify, or go any way towards 
specification of the criteria for unity of consciousness: "empirical 
consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is itself diverse, 
and without relation to the subject" (13133). Rather the argument concerns the 
possibility of constructing ourselves in the sense of isolating those features of 
our experience which make it possible for the concept of the self to be coherent. 
These features exist independent of our knowledge or articulation of them, and 
thus the argument concerns the necessity of the presupposition of the subject as 
a condition of knowing anything at all: the unity of the self as a precondition of 
the kind of knowledge and experience we have. Without the subject our 
perceptions would be nothing other than a stream of disconnected 
representations and would be the perceptions of no one. My ability to recognise 
my word processor and apply the appropriate concepts to it, shows that there is 
one centre of consciousness, constituted by the various strands of a Humean 
bundle. 
The transcendental argument for the unity of consciousness concerns the 
relation between knowledge and existence: the existence of one sort of thing as 
necessary as a precondition for another sort of thing. My awareness of objects 
around me persisting over time grounds my own identity over time, and hence 
84 
the existence of other bodies with stable and structured features, is necessary 
grounding for my own identity. Hence, the interest is more in the roles played 
by objects and selves, than in furnishing criteria in the sense of constitutive of 
something, or with the question of the criteria for the empirical unity of 
consciousness, which are not supplied by the kind of connectedness of inner 
experiences provided by the transcendental unity of apperception. The concern 
is with the grounds for the use of the empirical concept of a subject of 
experience. These are supplied by the necessary unity of consciousness which 
while supplying the grounds for its use, is not designed to give the full 
conditions for its use. Thus Kant's argument is more about the question of how 
unity of consciousness is possible, than about what such unity is. 
It is however possible to say more about this unity than that it is a necessary 
precondition for experience, and that it is possible only given the persistence of 
stable and structured objects. Kant's transcendental argument shows the 
necessity of the subject, not the special or inside knowledge we have of our 
own unity. The necessity of the subject does not privilege the first-person 
perspective, or the epistemological conditions with which it is easily confused. 
A person as subject of experience is formally required by the possibility of 
experience from which it does not follow that a metaphysical self is 
presupposed. This thought is brought about to a large extent by the role of the 
idea of consciousness in the idea of being a person, a point we shall turn to after 
consideration of the argument from the importance of the first-person point of 
view on experience. 
The non-reductionist position on the importance of the subjective 
perspective provided by the first-person viewpoint, cannot therefore make 
reference to the transcendental unity of apperception as support for its position, 
since it does not deny the necessity for empirical criteria of identity, or 
necessitate the existence of a substantial separate self. The non-reductionist 
argument rather concerns the nature of subjective facts and their role in 
determining personal identity. The argument is, as mentioned above, that the 
subjective character of experience is not a fact about an entity, it is not, in other 
words translatable into objective facts. In addition, the relevant facts about 
subjective experience and the subject are only accessible from the point of view 
of the subject in question. Thus the subjective character of experience is defined 
in contrast to the objective, and is characterised by its particular form of access. 
Both these features are drawn on in the non-reductionist argument against 
continuity theories and for the thesis that personal identity, unlike the identity of 
other entities, is absolute and unanalysable. 
If subjective facts are to have an irreducible place in judgments of personal 
identity these must be assumed to be third person incorrigible. They are not 
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correctable even in principle from a third person point of view. I may be wrong 
in my judgment of personal identity but this error is only correctable by me. If 
subjective judgments about personal identity do not admit of this special access, 
then it is difficult to know what marks off subjective facts about identity from 
objective, third-person judgments in a way which could be relevant to questions 
of personal identity. This position is relatively easily challenged by showing 
that third-person judgments can be relevant. Stephen White (1989:300) 
provides the example of a person who has been duplicated, but the duplicate has 
not been told she is not the original person. In such a case she may well 
mistakenly believe herself to be someone else (the original person). In this case 
another person, say the person who performed the duplication procedure would 
be in a position to correct the mistaken personal identity judgment. 
The third-person incorrigibility thesis with respect to first-person judgments 
of personal identity draws on the special access persons have to the content of 
present states of awareness. This cannot, however, be unproblematically 
extended to cover diachronic personal identity since judgments of personal 
identity involve an account of the relation between states. Awareness of present 
tense states provides no argument for the relation between these states. The 
third person incorrigibility thesis cannot be extended without argument to 
account for the relations between states. 
These problems with giving an account of subjective facts sufficient to 
provide an account of personal identity suggest that a more profitable area of 
investigation is the subject as 'owner' of experiences rather than the subjectivity 
of the subject. This draws on the idea that experiences are not something which 
can in some way become detached from their 'owners' and, as Frege (1956) 
memorably wrote "rove about the world without a bearer, independently". This 
thought is developed by non-reductionists such as Madell (1991:128) in a 
distinction between the content of experience and its ownership. The argument 
depends on the possibility that the content of our experience could have been 
different's' If we can imagine this, then, according to Madell we have made a 
distinction between the content and the ownership of experience. Again this 
argument trades on the character of first-person present states, Madell extending 
this to cover personal identity: "what goes for any individual experience also 
goes for series of experiences" (loc.cit.). 
This argument from the ownership of experience to a non-reductionist 
position is addressed to continuity theorists, since it holds continuity is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for personal identity. This view not only takes the 
synchronic unity of the person as more basic than personal identity, personal 
identity being derived from it, but 'I' to be unanalysable. This accounts for 
unity at a time and over time." On this view, to ask if some past experience 
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satisfies a criterion, either physical or psychological, of identity only makes 
sense if I already know that the experience is mine. Such a position follows 
from the unanalysability of 'I' and accounts for the extreme rarity of 
misidentification of the subject of a fast-person assertion. 
Non-reductionism thus draws attention to an important feature of first-
person access and knowledge of our own presently occurring states and of our 
own identity, to which, as Brennan (op.cit.:279) writes, we have "a kind of 
criterionless access". A similar point is made by G. Evans (1982) in his 
argument that some judgments are "identification-free". Knowledge of the truth 
of these judgments is not dependent on an identification component. With first 
person judgments about memory, for example, we do not go through a series of 
thoughts, included among which is the thought "somebody felt embarrassed" 
and concluding "that somebody was me". This appears to be a strong argument 
in favour of non-reductionism. It supports the view that there must be a subject 
of experience which is identified by neither convention nor stipulation and 
which stands outside any construction, serving as the basis for further 
construction supporting the fundamentalness of personal identity relative to 
other objects. 
This argument raises the question of the ownership of experience as the 
problem of the subject of experience, and in solving it denies the second claim 
of Parfit's Reductionist View, that a complete description of the world could be 
given without mentioning persons. In contradistinction to this view, non-
reductionism maintains, from an inside perspective, we are not just that which 
thinks, feels and so on. This view gains plausibility from consideration of what 
is involved in the unity of consciousness. On the Reductionist View the unity of 
consciousness or mental states involves the integration, or at least the possibility 
of integration, where the effects produced by various mental states cohere. 
What is apparently required by this idea of functionally integrated states is not a 
substantial self, or a separate self, but self-consciousness.21 The changing 
nature of experience, the addition of new experiences and the conflict between 
mental states such as desires and beliefs, need to be integrated, and for this to 
be accomplished, self-consciousness is required. Consciousness in this sense 
means knowledge of one's own states, desires and beliefs. This type of self-
knowledge is required for integration, particularly in the avoidance or resolution 
of potential and actual conflicts, as far as this is possible and when it is 
desirable. 
This appears to undermine the impersonal account of personal identity, 
because persons, in virtue of their capacity for self-consciousness, have a 
special point of view on experiences, on psychological phenomena. This inside 
view on experience, encourages the view that we are possessors of these 
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thoughts and feelings. This is much the point made by Nagel (op.cit.) that 
questions of personal identity posed by ourselves of ourselves, give rise to the 
philosophical idea that we have a subjective essence. Accounts of persons given 
by external analysis as merely and only a kind of object in the world lose this 
idea of the self as subject. 
Despite its apparent plausibility, the appeal to that feature of experience 
referred to by Shoemaker (1984:8) as the immunity to mar through 
misidentification relative to 'I', is not decisive against the 'no-ownership' view 
of Parfit's reductionism. In fact, we can make use of the access we have to our 
own states to support the no ownership view of personal experiences. 
The strength of the non-reductionist appeal to the person as subject of 
experience lies in the apparent failure of continuity or reductionist theories to 
account for personal identity as it appears to the subject. Useful here is the 
distinction between the use of 'I' as object and its use as subject. It has been 
pointed out by Wittgenstein (1969:66-7) that the use of T in first person 
ascriptions does not involve the identification of a person. When 'I' is used as a 
subject as in 'I think it will rain', as opposed to when 'I' is used as an object as 
in 'I have a bump on my forehead', it is not possible to make an error: "it is as 
impossible that in making the statement "I have a toothache" I should have 
mistaken another person for myself, as it is to moan with pain by mistake, 
having mistaken someone else for me" (ibid:67). 
Strawson (1966:163) in commenting on Kant, argues that Kant exposes "a 
natural and powerful illusion" by which "we mistake the necessary unity of 
consciousness for ... an awareness of a unitary subject". A certain character of 
connectedness and unity in a temporally extended series of experiences "makes 
room for the idea of one subjective or experiential route through the world" but 
it does not necessitate such. It provides grounds for the empirical use of the 
concept of subject, but this does not support the view that there is a purely 
inner, and yet subject-referring use for the first-person pronoun. For Strawson, 
unlike Anscombe (1975), for instance, the possibility of a non-referential use of 
T is not central given that in practice empirical criteria for 'criterionless self-
ascription' are available (a human being). This allows for the subject, but does 
not support a non-reductionist position. 
Although the strongest argument for non-reductionism lies in the nature of 
the first-person perspective, this is neither sufficient to show that the trans-
temporal identity of persons is not accounted for by a reductionist account, or 
that it establishes a difference between the trans-temporal identity conditions for 
persons and other entities. 
This is not sufficient to discount non-reductionism. The argument to this 
point has concentrated on the theoretical adequacy of the analysis of personal 
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identity in isolation from reductionism and with little attention being paid to the 
motivation in asking the question of personal identity. These two points are 
extremely important, as shall be shown. We now turn to a fuller explication of 




In this section the objection that rejection of strict identity for persons results 
in the denial of the capacity for persons to be agents, and therefore potentially 
autonomous will be addressed. It has been argued that a Non-Reductionist 
account of personal identity is necessarily presupposed by the concept of person 
as agent. In order to assess this argument it is necessary to look in more detail at 
the major claims of the Reductionist View. Parfit makes two claims, as outlined 
above (p. 15) A major claim of the Reductionist View is the denial that the 
subject of experiences is a separately existing entity, distinct from a brain and a 
body, and a series of mental and physical events (ibid:221).22 This is the 
version of the Reductionist View which Parfit accepts, seeing it as using our 
actual concept of a person. A person's identity over time just consists in: 
Relation R - psychological connectedness and/or psychological 
continuity, with the right kind of cause, provided that there is no 
different person who is R-related to us as we once were (ibid: 
216). 
The concepts of psychological continuity and connectedness are logically 
related in that the former is defined in terms of the latter. Parfit defines 
psychological continuity as "the holding of overlapping chains of strong 
connectedness" (ibid:206). Psychological connectedness is the holding of 
particular direct psychological connections, a psychological connection existing 
when a psychological state is causally related, in an appropriate way, to another 
psychological state at an earlier time. The remembering of an experience had by 
some person at an earlier time, having numerically the same beliefs, desires or 
character traits as an earlier existing person, are examples of psychological 
connections. Strong psychological connectedness is stipulated by Parfit 
(ibid:206) to hold if the number of such particular direct connections is at least 
half the number that hold over every day in the lives of most actual persons. 
In the normal course of time the number of direct psychological connections 
decrease with the effect that I may not remember any experiences I had twenty 
years ago, or identify with desires I had at that time. There will, however, be 
overlapping chains of strong connectedness which link me with that person 
89 
since I am strongly connected with myself yesterday, that person is strongly 
connected with a person two days ago and so on. In this way I may be 
psychologically continuous with myself twenty years ago although there are no 
direct connections between myself now and then. 
Thus, Parfit's argument is addressed to two beliefs: that identity in the case 
of persons has a special nature, and the importance of the belief in personal 
identity (1971:3). Recognising that certain questions do presuppose a question 
about personal identity, Parfit argues that they can be freed of this 
presupposition and when they are "the question of identity has no importance" 
(ibid:4). The argument for the Reductionist View extends beyond the question 
of what personal identity consists in, to include the question of its significance 
and thereby analysis of the nature of our special concern with our own survival 
and well-being. 
From the analysis of personal identity in terms of the more particular facts 
of psychological continuity and connectedness, Parfit concludes that when we 
consider our future it is not identity which matters, but survival. Parfit gives 
two central arguments for the thesis that identity is not what matters: the 
Argument from Division (1984: 261-266) and the Argument from 
Extrinsicness. 
The Argument from Division is based on the intuition that the prospect of 
division is not equivalent to death. There is a difference between there being an 
end to my consciousness, as when I die, and having two streams of 
consciousness. If we agree that the prospect of division is as good as survival, 
then we cannot think that it is identity which matters when we consider our 
future since identity does not hold. The relations which do hold are other than 
identity, and it is the holding of these relations which is seen to be what is 
important when we consider our future. The resultant persons will be as closely 
connected to me as if identity had been secured. Thus, what was originally seen 
as an objection to continuity theories, that on this view there is no obstacle to 
there being two people in the future who quasi-remember my experiences, has 
been turned by neo-Lockeans such as Parfit to their advantage. Although in 
such a case there would not be identity, I have all that matters to my survival in 
both resultant persons. 
The Argument from Extrinsicness concerns the non-branching component 
of continuity theories.23 This component is held to be necessary in light of the 
Reduplication Argument given by Williams (1973:77-8) against psychological 
continuity theories.24 The principle on which the Reduplication Objection relies 
is the Only x and y principle. As formulated by Noonan (1989:152) this 
principle holds that "whether a later individual y is identical with an earlier 
individual x can only depend upon facts about x and y and the relationships 
between them: it cannot depend upon facts about other individuals". Thus the 
identity between individuals cannot be determined extrinsically, it must be 
determined intrinsically. Whether or not I continue to exist cannot depend on the 
existence or non-existence of a rival candidate. Neglect of this principle has the 
effect that whether A is identical with B depends on the non-existence of C. As 
Swinburne (1974:236) puts it, this would have the effect that "who I am 
depends on whether you exist". Yet identity will sometimes depend on the non-
existence of a third person, as in fission cases. Parfit claims that the 'only x and 
y' principle, and the claim that what matters cannot depend on a trivial 
circumstance, cannot both be maintained on any reasonable criterion of identity. 
Since identity will sometimes depend on the holding of either of these two 
claims, Parfit is able to conclude that identity is not the thing that matters. 
We have seen above that the non-reductionist takes personal identity to have 
a special nature. Knowing all there is to know about relations of continuity and 
connectedness between physical and psychological states and events is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for personal identity, the identity of persons being a 
further fact, not determinable by observation, discovery, convention, or 
stipulation. 
We are inclined to believe that what matters when we consider our future is 
that essential to our desire to survive is that this very person who has this desire 
is the very one who survives. The natural assumption is that it is identity itself 
which matters in questions of survival. This is the view defended by non-
reductionists. On Parfit's view our concern with identity is derivative from our 
concern with survival. This view has implications for the issues of rationality 
and morality. Parfit argues that these implications hold in virtue of the fact that 
what matters in contemplating one's future, if one is ideally rational, is not 
identity but the holding of relations of continuity and connectedness which are 
not one-one but which hold in varying degrees. On this argument it is irrational 
to have self-interested concern for one's own future if this is just based on the 
grounds that the future person will me. The implications for morality concern 
the scope and weight to be assigned to personal commitments, punishment and 
the scope of distributive principles. 
Traditionally continuity theorists have been seen as open to two major 
objections. The first is the circularity objection mentioned above in 
distinguishing the unity from the identity question, and the second is the 
reduplication objection. As we have seen Parfit is able to answer both. The first 
by reference to quasi-psychological states and the second by reference to his 
theory that identity is not the relation which matters. The objection which has 
been of primary concern here, however, has been the dissolution of the subject. 
As shown above, the nature of the subject of experience does not necessarily 
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imply a non-reductionist view of personal identity. This brief sketch of the 
Reductionist View, has shown that the continuity theory itself does not pose an 
obstacle to the unity of experience, it merely denies its fundamentalness. In the 
next chapter the reductionist aspect of the Reductionist View will be considered, 
but for the moment it is possible to conclude that continuity theories do not 
constitute an obstacle to conceiving of the person as an agent and thus as 
potentially autonomous. What has been shown, is that this need not be based on 
the primitiveness and unanalysability of the concept of person and personal 
identity. 
Conclusion 
The main reason for requiring strict identity in the case of persons, is that 
our use of the concept of person demands it. If there is not strict identity of 
persons then the indeterminacy of the concept of person must be admitted. This 
seems to have implausible implications. In particular that there could be 
situations where the question 'Will it be me?' could not be answered. In the 
following chapter the extent to which Parfit's Reductionist View can be upheld 
in the face of the objection that its conception of the person conflicts with 
common sense and with our demands on the concept of the person will be 
considered. In this chapter it has been argued that strict identity or non-
reductionism is only seemingly required for the conception of the person as 
autonomous. Investigation of the grounds of the claim have shown that it rests 
on arguments from the significance of the first person point of view of 
experience problematically extended to cover identity over time. In addition, 
there are serious objections to the positive non-reductionist thesis, that a 
different sense of identity is required for persons. The principal objection was 
to the central claim, that personal identity holds in virtue of some fact other than 
impersonal facts of psychological and/or physical continuity and connectedness. 
It was argued that the most plausible interpretation of this "further fact" is that it 
is subjective, but that this type of fact cannot provide an answer to the problem 
of personal identity. 
If the further fact which the reductionist holds to be constitutive of personal 
identity cannot be satisfactorily explained, then it seems that some form of 
reductionism must be accepted. The potential autonomy of persons has not been 
undermined, except to the extent that this has been shown not to reside in the 
nature of persons. 
Notes 
1. See the Introduction and Chapter 1. 
2. The connection between autonomy and rationality is familiar from Dearden's 
(1972) work. While the nature of this connection and its implications for 
education is a matter of some dispute, the point in the text is not directly 
addressed to these issues but concerns the relation between conceptions of 
rationality and conceptions of the self. On the existence of such a connection see 
Parfit (1982, and 1984, Part 1) 
3. The concept of legal personality and its relation to individual human beings 
provides an interesting illustration of this point. There are connections between 
this idea of the person and the legal personality. The concept of legal personality 
is, as Tur (1987) points out, a "cluster concept" which can be extended or 
revoked depending on concrete laws of particular legal systems. The crucial 
relation is not between individual human beings and legal persons, but rather 
between any entity and agency: Legal persons are distinguished in that they can 
have actions attributed to them. Entities can be legal persons and not human 
beings, for example, universities and corporations, and human beings need not 
be legal persons, for example young people in our society. It can even be the 
case that an individual human being could be more than one legal person (as for 
example in Roman law). Thus, the relation between an individual human being 
and that human being's legal life or lives is only contingently one-to-one. The 
class of biological individual human beings would only coincide with the class 
of persons, where agency was attributed only to individuals. 
4. In discussing the implications of commissurotomy, Nagel (1971:147) 
isolates the problem posed by brain bisection as being its implications for "the 
idea of a single person, a single subject of experience and action". He 
concludes, from consideration of commissurotomy patients, "the attribution of 
conscious, significant mental activity does not require the existence of a single 
mental subject" (ibid:163). Commissurotomy is, although a favourite example 
of philosophers of mind, interpretatively problematic. Part of its fascination in 
discussions of philosophy of mind, which has recently to some extent been 
superseded by the problem of multiple personality syndrome, is that, unlike the 
puzzle cases, raise 'real' questions of personal identity for 'real' people. The 
problem with both commissurotomy and multiple personality syndrome is the 
general lack of an adequate theory of consciousness, and, perhaps from the 
point of view of the argument here, the influence of our views of what persons 
should be like in the interpretation of the evidence of disunity and discrete 
centres of consciousness. 
5. This line of argument is reminiscent of Scheman (1983), in so far as aspects 
of philosophy of mind are linked with individualism. The thesis here differs in 
that emphasis is not placed on abstract individualism, and her positive 
argument, for the essential indistinctness of persons following from a rejection 
of individualism in philosophy of mind is not accepted. Some of the reasons for 
not accepting the indistinctness of persons will be explored in the next chapter. 
6. An implication of this general line of argument is, of course, that the 
universal applicability of the question of personal identity is undermined. This 
issue will be returned in the next chapter. 
7. The concern here is not with the overtly psychological 'sense of self 
frequently used in discussions of the intricate connections between people's 
ideas of self, their ethical ideas and their relations with others, or with the 
philosophical connections between the idea of self and the good. The later thesis 
has recently been defended by Taylor (1989), for example. On the existence and 
importance of connections between ideas of the self and ethical ideas, Gilligan 
(1982) and Lyons (1983) provide prominent examples in their work on the 
relation between gender and ethical thinking. 
8. The non-reductionist view has its roots in Butler's distinction between two 
senses of identity. The idea of there being two 'senses' of identity is not clear. 
It has been suggested by Baxter (1988) that Butler can be interpreted as holding 
the belief that there are two kinds of identity (strict or loose) and that there is 
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one kind of identity which holds to different standards (strict or loose). Given 
this both sense and standard are used in the text. 
9. It could also be argued that it is neither unity nor identity of the person which 
is the central issue, rather it is the identity of self. Clearly these questions are 
connected in that the criteria of personal identity end up to some extent 
clarifying what we mean by the self. It has, however, been argued that identity 
of the self, or self-identity is the more basic relation. Self-identity is concerned 
with, in H. D. Lewis's (1969:234) words "one's own inner consciousness of 
the unique being one finds oneself to be in any experience". Personal identity is 
not so much concerned with our knowledge of ourselves in this sense, but with 
our knowledge of who we are in terms of descriptions of ourselves. Self-
identity is the identity of the self in the sense of knowing "myself to be myself' 
(ibid:244): I need not know who I am to know that I am. On Lewis's account 
this self-identity is more "basic" than personal identity. This argument with its 
Kantian echoes, will be returned to, as the strict identity thesis is explored. 
10. The argument for the connection between consciousness-stages, and that 
the relation between person-stages forms part of the condition for the unity of a 
stage is argued by McInerney (1985). This effectively precludes the priority of 
synchronic unity. This latter position has been argued by Perry (1975:9-10) and 
Vesey (1974:13). In Perry's case the argument is based on the idea of person-
stages, "the set of simultaneous experiences all of which belong to one person" 
(op.cit.:15). A person-stage is some type of unity of psychological factors at 
some given time, or some relatively short time. Thus, the answer to the 
question of what relation obtains between simultaneous person-stages that are 
events belonging to the same person is presupposed in answering the question 
of what relation obtains between person-stages that are stages of the same 
person (Perry, ibid:9). This only gives priority, however, if the unity of one 
person-stage is not dependent on the relation between stages, which, as 
McInerney, shows is not the most plausible interpretation. 
11. Clearly this does not negate the need for an account of synchronic identity. 
The point being made is simply that such an account is not prior in terms of 
analysis to the question of diachronic identity. It should also be pointed out here 
that taking this position does not imply that synchronic identity statements, 
either of the form A = A, or of the A = B form, are not genuine statements 
(compared with trans-temporal identity statements), or that while necessary are 
not informative. 
12. Vesey (op.cit.:13), for example, maintains this position. 
13. Although this objection to accounts of personal identity in terms of 
psychological continuity is often regarded as originating in Butler's criticism of 
Locke there is some doubt that the criticism attributed to Butler is the one he 
actually made (see, for example, Penelhum, 1985: 131-2), or that the criticism 
he did make is convincing. This will not be addressed in the main text but is 
nevertheless instructive to note what Butler's criticism was and the extent to 
which Locke's theory of personal identity is open to it. 
Butler's (1736/1975:100) criticism is that "consciousness of personal 
identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity." Butler 
gives as the reason why my consciousness of events in my past cannot be what 
makes them part of my past, that I cannot be conscious of something that is not 
independently so. Hence being conscious that something is part of my past 
cannot be what makes it that. In other.words, he argues that one cannot define 
what it is for it be to the case that p, in terms of what it is for it to be known that 
p. While there is the true claim that I have to know that I was the agent in order 
to remember doing the action, the claim Butler makes, that part of my 
experience of remembering doing something in the past is my remembering that 
I am the agent who did it, is implausible. While it may in fact be the case, 
consciousness of the fact that the remembered event belongs to my past need 
not, and often does not, accompany personal or experiential memory. Butler 
implies, contrary to this, that I cannot recall an event in my past without 
knowing that it is part of my past. 
Locke's theory of personal identity can answer this objection by reference to 
his distinction between persons, human beings and thinking substances, with 
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thinking substances being the possessors of personal identity. The relation of 
personal identity, as Locke defines it, is a relation not between persons but 
between thinking substances. He is therefore not vulnerable to the particular 
circularity objection raised by Butler, as can be clearly seen in the following 
formulation of Locke's criterion of personal identity as given by Noonan 
(1989:70): 
the person in which thinking substance a thinks at time t = the 
person in which thinking substance b thinks at time t' if thinking 
substance a is conscious of the same actions and experiences as 
thinking substance b. 
As Noonan notes, this stipulation is odd, but it is not circular. 
Since Butler's criticism can be answered, and since Locke's particular 
interpretation of the psychological criterion is not generally accepted, there is no 
need, in the present context, to give further consideration to this particular 
version of the circularity objection. 
14. Shoemaker (1970/1984:25) defines quasi-remembering as: 
a kind of knowledge of past events such that someone having 
this sort of knowledge of an event does involve there being a 
correspondence between his present cognitive state and a past 
cognitive or sensory state that was of the event, but such that 
this correspondence, although otherwise just like that which 
exists in memory, does not necessarily involve that past state's 
having been a state of the very same person who subsequently 
has the knowledge. 
Thus to quasi-remember an event is to be subject to a weaker awareness 
condition than if the event was remembered. Thus, to quasi-remember an event 
implies that someone was aware of it, not that the person who remembers it was 
the person who was aware of it. 
15. This is essentially a reiteration of the point made above that there is a close 
connection between the conditions of identification and the conditions for 
reidentification. It is also an endorsement of the approach adopted by Locke, 
that we need to start with what we mean by person. It is therefore not assumed 
that there is not an important sense in which the concept of the person is 
antecedent to the conditions for its identity. In order to determine what 
constitutes the identity of a person we must make use of our concept of the 
person which is judged to be the same: the concept of the person determining 
what sort of change a person can undergo and still remain the same. By asking 
the question of identity we are attempting to clarify the concept of person we 
already have by attempting to separate those features of it which are essential 
from the inessential, these features being exposed as we consider our judgments 
about the continued existence of persons under situations of actual and imagined 
change. Thus we must already have a concept of person which is to be clarified. 
As McGinn (1982:106) says, our way proceeding gives the issue of personal 
identity "a methodological, but not a conceptual, priority". The question being 
asked is 'what is a person?', where we are asking what about a person could 
change, and we still have a person, or under what conditions would a person 
remain the same person. It is reasonable to assume that what something is, 
determines the conditions for its identity over time. Thus, if we know what kind 
of changes something can undergo and still persist, then we shall know what it 
is to be a person, in the sense of what constitutes a person: A person will be that 
which cannot change in some respect without ceasing to exist. 
16. To phrase the most basic dispute as between reductionism and non- 
reductionism may be thought incorrect in that what is being referred to as 
reductionism is not a reductionist thesis, except as used by Parfit, but rather is 
reductive (see Noonan, 1989:118-122). On this view it would be more correct 
to use Parfit's (1971) earlier terminology, and refer to non-reductionism as the 
Simple View and reductionism as the Complex View. Other alternatives are to 
call the former, the strict identity theory and the latter continuity theories, or, in 
Swinburne's (1984:3) terminology call the latter empiricist theories. However, 
given that Parfit's Reductionist View is taken as representative of the continuity 
theory, and the continuity theory is taken to have reductive implications, 
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implications that are arguably the most problematic aspect of the theory, Parfit's 
later terminology, the Reductionist and the Non-Reductionist View, will be 
adopted until the reductionist nature of the thesis is given further consideration 
in Chapter 4. The main reason for adopting this terminology is to distinguish 
between theories of personal identity which hold that personal identity consists 
in a further fact (non-reductionist) and those that do not (reductionist). It is not 
necessary for our purposes to be explicit about, or to take a position on what 
this further fact involves. Thus, we can remain agnostic on the question of 
whether this fact is a substance, as the majority of non-reductionists maintain, 
or a property as Madell (1981) claims. 
17. There are several interpretations of what this 'further fact' may involve. 
Parfit claims that it is equivalent to the holding that persons are separately 
existing entities. However, this is not a necessary consequence of non-
reductionism. It is possible, for example, for a non-reductionist to be a 
functionalist, and therefore for the further fact not to involve the positing of 
'separately existing entity. The choice is not exclusive between reductionism 
and something like a Cartesian Ego. 
18. Ishiguro's explication of the primitiveness of the concept of the person 
concerns Strawson's use of this expression. However, the sense given to 
primitiveness is applicable here. 
19. The argument that the content of my experience could have different 
expresses a sense of contingency about being the particular individual one is. 
The idea is that I can imagine that I could have been born in different place or at 
a different time. This argument is used by Madell to support his position that 
there are asymmetries between a first and a third person perspective and that 
these are important in understanding personal identity in that .a person's 
understanding of her own identity will be irreducibly distinct from the 
understanding she can have of anyone else's. This argument relies on the 
possibility of imagining, for example, that my origin could have been different, 
while maintaining the necessity of origin thesis for other objects. 
Of the several problems associated with this view, the use of imagination as a 
method of inquiry to show what something is is clearly problematic (see 
Hertzberg (1991), Gaita (1991) and Wilkes (1988) for differing perspectives on 
this issue). Aspects of this question will be addressed in the next chapter. 
20. This view is more fully developed in Madell's earlier work (1981), where 
Madell takes McTaggart's (1927) position that 'I' is a logically proper name 
known by acquaintance. 
21. Although the Non-Reductionist View is associated with a substance view of 
the self, identity holding in virtue of sameness of substance, a substance view 
of the self is not necessarily implied. Madell (1981:137-38), for example, 
following McTaggart (op.cit.) holds that the self is a property. On this view 
experiences are the basic particulars, and all my experiences have the simple 
unanalysable property of being mine. This view is open to a number of 
objections, one of the most persuasive is given by Unger (1986:99): the view 
that "an experience is one that I have because it has the property of being mine" 
is not the view we ordinarily employ. 
22. In a postscript to a reprinting of 'Personal Identity' in Honderich and 
Burnyeat (1976:211) Parfit writes that his main claim is the denial that personal 
identity consists in a further fact. 
23.Parfit argues that what normally counts as persisting identity is continuity 
and uniqueness (i.e., non:branching continuity, or being the only formal 
continuer of a past self), with continuity being what really matters. The 
continuity which constitutes personal identity is, as Korsgaard (1989:106) has 
argued, formal in the Aristotelian sense, and thus it is in principle possible that 
copies could be made of a whole person, the copies being formally continuous 
with the original person. Parfit's point is that in such a situation what we ought 
to say about personal identity may not matter, or may depend on the particular 
circumstances. Personal identity is not what matters in such a situation, rather it 
is the holding of the R-relation which can hold between myself and several 
other people. Thus, what matters to me in my survival is not that there is a later 
person who is identical with me, but that there is in the future someone 
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sufficiently R-related to me: someone, that is, who is related to me by certain 
links of psychological continuity and connectedness. In the actual world, of 
course, the only way to assure that there is such a survivor is to ensure that I 
continue to exist. In the actual world, then, what is required is that tomorrow 
there is someone who is identical with me. Parfit's claim is that the fact there is 
a survivor R-related to me does not entail that I will be numerically identical 
with that survivor. 
24. It is frequently pointed out that the Reduplication Argument is an objection 
to all continuity theories, including the physical criterion. 
Chapter 4 
Reductionism and the Constraints of Common Usage 
Since Butler and Reid's criticism of Locke, it has been argued that 
reductionist views are untenable because it is not possible to consistently believe 
and act on the thesis. This objection is one instance of a class of arguments 
which hold that we are constrained by factors other than logical considerations 
in the analysis of personal identity to accept our ordinary concept of personal 
identity. Since this is non-reductionist, reductionism can be at most, as Hirsch 
(1982:311) argues, "an occasional and sophisticated modulation of the more 
basic identity-related orientation." 
The objection is that Parfit and others who talk of what matters in identity 
"are not sufficiently alive to the possibility that the way we are able to think and 
feel about identity, at least at the most primary and spontaneous level, may be 
severely restricted by psychological constraints quite unrelated to the terms of 
philosophical justification" (loc.cit.). Thus the Partition attitude, where 
judgments of concern are couched in terms of continuity relations rather than in 
terms of identity, while theoretically interesting cannot disturb our ordinary 
conception. 
This issue will be approached through the root idea that the analysis of 
personal identity is essentially an attempt to understand personhood. This is 
based on the idea mentioned in the second chapter that there is an intimate 
connection between the identity conditions of something and what that 
something essentially is. Thus, the issue of constraints on the analysis of 
personal identity is connected to the wider issue of what is and should be 
involved in such an analysis. 
The methodology of discussions of personal identity involve either the 
construction of puzzle cases or the interpretation of actual problematic cases. 
The analysis of personal identity proceeds on the assumption that it is possible 
to clarify ordinary usage by revealing what is essential to the concept. Thus the 
intention is to describe rather than prescribe the concept of personal identity. 
Since Locke's appreciation of the relevance of 'puzzle cases' this has primarily 
been achieved through the description of cases and situations which of necessity 
do not hold. The purpose of these puzzles is to elicit responses which either 
enable a definition, or explain why the questions raised by the puzzles cannot be 
definitively answered. The puzzles are therefore designed either to give the 
conditions for the correct ascription of the expression 'the same person' or give 
some indication of the type of fact or information needed to give such a 
definition, or some indication of why such a definition is not possible. The 
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importance of these cases is therefore in the responses they elicit. Among the 
conditions that must be met by puzzle cases is that they do elicit a response, and 
this response reveals something about our concept of personal identity, and thus 
about our concept of the person. 
These intuitions must therefore be clear and generally held. In this way the 
issue of constraints on the use of the concept of person and the wider issue of 
what is involved in the analysis of personal identity are seen to be connected to 
the stability and status of our intuitions about persons. It will be argued here 
that problems with the analysis of the concept of personal identity arise in large 
measure because many of our intuitions about persons are unstable or conflict. 
Insufficient recognition of this obscures the fact that our concept of the person 
is, in essential respects, indeterminate. Thus, discussions of personal identity 
often proceed on the assumption that intuitions in puzzle cases are sufficiently 
univocal to reveal what is essential to our concept of the person, and that these 
intuitions can be relied upon in making judgments of personal identity. This, in 
turn, is based on the assumption that the nature of the concept of the person is 
determinate and has a relatively unambiguous reference in all contexts of its use. 
This problem is not restricted to puzzle cases, which clearly illustrate this 
problem through the explicit reference made to both imagination and intuition, 
the interpretation of actual problematic cases raises the same problem where the 
issue arises in a more subtle form. Several of the issues raised by the 
indeterminate nature of the concept of the person are discussed here foremost 
among which is the extent to which any analysis of personal identity can be 
descriptive in light of this feature of the concept of person. This in turn raises 
the interesting issue of the extent to which the concept of the person is open to 
revision and development, which naturally again raises the issue of the 
constraints operating on the analysis of personal identity. 
It is argued that the structures which support the lives of persons, such as 
social and moral concerns, cannot in themselves be seen as a constraint on the 
use of the concept of the person operating in favour of non-reductionism since 
this implies a conventionalism rejected on the non-reductionist understanding of 
persons. Rather, pragmatic constraints, mentioned by non-reductionists either 
in support of their position or against reductionism, is argued to be an 
implication of the metaphysical realism of the non-reductionist position. As 
such it does not form an additional claim, but is essentially a re-statement of the 
non-reductionist position that personal identity involves a further fact. It is not, 
therefore, an additional condition on the acceptability of the analysis. A realist 
view of the person is argued to be a constraint only if the person as subject 
necessarily implies a realist position. Since the unity of the person can be 
understood in terms of relations of continuity and connectedness there is no 
reason to hold that there is such a necessary relation. 
It is suggested that a form of conventionalism, not withstanding non-
reductionist objections, with respect to personal identity is admissible, and 
useful in that it points to the importance of social context in determining the 
boundaries of persons. Acceptance of a degree of conventionalism is warranted 
on the argument that the concept of person is in important respects 
indeterminate. This form of argument permits further investigation of what was 
seen in the last chapter to be a strength of the non-reductionist position, the 
irreducible nature of the first-person point of view on experience. In this chapter 
this is looked at from the perspective of a psychological continuity theory. From 
this vantage point it is possible to show that one of the arguments on which the 
unanalysability of personal identity draws, the univocal reference of the first-
person pronoun across time, can be challenged with the effect that the first-
person reference can support a continuity theory of personal identity. 
The focus on relations between mental events occasioned by a continuity 
theory reveals that in virtue of the influence on connections by the content of 
certain, i.e., first-person states, it is necessary to take into account constraints 
of an epistemological nature in the analysis of personal identity. This constraint 
concerns our knowledge of persons. With this constraint in mind it is possible 
to clarify some of the problems associated with the method of puzzle cases in 
discussions of personal identity, particularly those which involve persons 
behaving in radically unperson-like ways, such as when fusion and fission are 
involved. The intuitions elicited in response to these cases are based on our 
knowledge of persons in the attempt to determine what is essential to our 
concept. It is therefore necessary to recognise the role that our knowledge plays 
in interpreting these cases. This does not have the consequence that puzzle cases 
are automatically ruled out when they involve persons duplicating or changing 
into Greta Garbo, but draws attention to some of the complexities involved in 
using these cases as a means of determining what is important in questions of 
personal identity. 
The epistemic constraint on the use of the concept of person is interpreted as 
a version of the argument from the irreducibility of the first-person point of 
view. It will be argued that the Cartesian insight into the necessity of the unity 
of inner life can be accommodated within reductionism. Thus the root insight 
that the analysis of personal identity reveals important aspects of personhood, 
and what is important about that attribution is preserved. This is essentially a 
response to what is seen to be a strong objection to the second claim of Parties 
(1984:212) Reductionist View, that "though persons exist, we could give a 
complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist". 
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This impersonality thesis appears to be open to the objection that in reducing 
persons, as Scheffler (1982:238) asserts, to "atoms or events", our ordinary 
conception of ourselves is undermined to the extent that it is not clear how we 
should think of ourselves. This atomistic conception of persons only holds, 
however, if the atomistic conception of mental states on which it is predicated 
also holds. It will be argued that the character of mental states precludes 
specification in atomistic terms, and thus it is possible to meet Scheffler's 
objection. Obviously, though this also means that the impersonality thesis 
cannot be accepted if it implies a complete reduction of persons to events. This 
does not however affect the first claim of Parfit's Reductionist View which it 
will be recalled, is that personal identity just consists in relations between 
events. It affects neither the main claim of Parfit's argument that personal 
identity does not involve anything in addition to these relations, nor his claim 
about the importance of identity. 
This conclusion is significant in that it has been held, as was argued in the 
last chapter, that strict identity or a non-reductionist theory was required for the 
notion of the autonomous person in virtue of the need for a discrete self and for 
an account of self-concern, particularly forward-looking self-concern. The 
objection commonly raised to continuity theories is that in not conforming with 
common-sense views it invites skepticism about morality, and fails to account 
for self-concern. If the arguments given in this chapter are successful, both 
these objections can be met without at the same time accepting a non-
reductionist theory of personal identity. The Reductionist View need not 
therefore be considered incompatible with the conception of the person as 
potentially autonomous. 
The argument does not, therefore, have the implication that autonomy 
should be rejected as an aim of PSE. What is given up is the primitiveness of 
the concept of personal identity. The educational implications of this move lie in 
the basis of the promotion of autonomy and other attributes of persons which 
implicitly rely on a theory of what constitutes persons. If persons are conceived 
of as fundamentally separate and continuous, the nature of the problems to be 
faced in areas of education such as PSE will be seen as importantly different 
from an education of and for persons where the separateness and continuity of 
persons are seen as important values derived from what is important to us as 
persons. In the latter case, the focus is on the values and importance of unity, 
personal, inter-personal and intra-personal, and the weight assigned to these 
values relative to other concerns. While this interpretation allows autonomy to 
retain a place as an aim of PSE it significantly alters the perception of its basis 
and importance relative to other beliefs about persons. The unity and integrity of 
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the person is seen as an important value to be promoted through social and 
educational practices, not as following from the nature of persons. 
This discussion of the relevance of questions of personal identity to the aims 
of PSE does not seem to further the debate on what these aims should be. Few 
have claimed a metaphysical basis for autonomy, which is recognised as a 
normative concept. However, whether the metaphysical presuppositions of the 
nature of persons are explicitly acknowledged or not, it is argued here that such 
presuppositions are made and their examination has important implications for 
how the aims of PSE are stated and translated into practice. Thus whether 
persons are conceptualised as fundamentally separate, as on a non-reductionist 
view, or as relations between events but not reducible to them, as on a 
continuity view, will affect other of our beliefs about persons, and although not 
defmitive in any argument between values, will be a factor in discussions 
between points of view. In particular it encourages or even necessitates the 
making explicit of the perspective taken on persons when discussing the aims of 
PSE. Thus, for example, whether one is privileging a view which gives 
prominence to the irreducibility of the first-person point of view, or whether the 
concern is rather with an account which stresses the importance of forging 
connections with ones self and/or others. The fact that metaphysical 
assumptions are not acknowledged is not sufficient to show that they are not 
effective in shaping argument. Thus although the argument presented here 
endorses aspects of a common-sense form of personal agency, if successful, its 
effects are not negligible. 
1 
Analysis and Its Relation to the Concept of Person: An 
Argument for the Existence of Constraints 
The argument so far has favoured a reductionist account over the alternative, 
non-reductionism, on the grounds of the analyses provided of the conditions for 
personal identity. It can be argued, however, that these grounds are insufficient 
in that the analysis has inappropriately concentrated on what Wiggins (1967) 
refers to as the "logically constitutive" criteria for personal identity. Wiggins 
takes the determination of such criteria to be the aim of the analysis, by 
providing a logical guarantee that in its application it will not violate the laws of 
identity. The objection to be considered here is that this is insufficient. It is 
insufficient because it ignores the reason why questions of personal identity are 
of interest, the connection between personal identity and moral, legal and 
practical issues.' The question to be addressed in this section, therefore, is 
whether there are constraints other than logical considerations on the analysis of 
102 
personal identity. The existence of constraints implies that for the correct use of 
expressions which contain or imply personal identity, conditions of logical 
adequacy are insufficient because of the connection between these statements 
and our emotional and other attitudes as well as other factors. 
The general connection between some attitudes, including moral ones, and 
statements containing personal identity expressions is shown by reflection on 
the question: Why is it important to determine the identity of a given person 
correctly? This shows not only the immense importance of the concept of 
personal identity but its intimate connection to moral and other attitudes. For 
example, if I assent to the proposition "Jones is not the person who promised to 
lend the book", then I do not think that Jones should be held responsible for the 
promise. 
What role do concerns such as these have in the analysis of personal 
identity, and what role should they have? Is the connection between moral 
issues for example, and personal identity such that the moral issues are integral 
to the analysis itself, or is the role limited to that of supplying an additional 
criterion which must be satisfied in addition to the logical analysis of the 
meaning of personal identity expressions such as 'x at t1 is the same person as y 
at t2'? In short, the issue is what is or should be involved in the analysis of 
personal identity: What conditions need to be satisfied in order for an analysis 
of personal identity to be acceptable?2 
Since our ordinary concept is non-reductionist, if there is a constraint other 
than the use of appropriate logical tools on the analysis of personal identity, a 
reductionist concept of the person is effectively precluded from being anything 
other than of theoretical interest. If, for example persons were constrained by 
psychological or pragmatic concerns to accept the ordinary concept with which 
we operate, it would not be possible to change our beliefs in line with the 
reductionist account of the importance of personal identity. 
Recognition of the importance of personal identity in structuring an 
individual's relationship to herself and to others and to persons' lives in 
general, is clearly insufficient to determine the nature of the connection between 
the two, and the influence of the latter on the analysis of personal identity. This 
is illustrated by Locke's account a strength of which, as Flew (1968:155) for 
example notes, is its recognition of the importance of personal identity: "In this 
personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment" 
(Locke, Essay, II, xxvii, 18). However, analysis of personal identity as 
constituted by consciousness, is accused of manifest absurdity by Butler (1736) 
and Reid (1985). Its absurdity lies in its effects on our concern for our own 
future. Reid argues that those who challenge the idea that identity in the case of 
persons is strict, cannot live in a manner consistent with their scepticism. Both 
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Reid and Butler cite in opposition to the psychological criterion of personal 
identity its failure to make sense of many of our ordinary moral attitudes. The 
objection appears to be that the role of personal identity is such that, as a 
practical matter, it would be unthinkable to dispense with attitudes, beliefs and 
practices which presuppose personal identity. This seems to demand that our 
conception of the self and theory of personal identity could not be other than it 
is. 
Locke, as Alston and Bennett point out (1988: 43 ff), is a conceptual 
pragmatist. The concepts we have and use are chosen from the wide array of 
possible classifications provided by nature. We chose our concepts on the basis 
of their suitability to our needs and purposes. Thus, in the case of persons, the 
reason we employ the particular concept we do is that our interests in employing 
the concept of person are those of morality and law. For Locke the reason our 
interests lie in this direction is that I cannot be unconcerned or indifferent about 
punishment and reward which is to be meted out to actions which I 
acknowledge as mine. There is a difference in concern between actions which I 
consider mine and those I consider someone else's. There is therefore a clear 
connection between Locke's account of personal identity and his definition of 
the person as a "forensic term" (Locke, Essay II, xxvii. 26). He does not 
neglect the connection between personal identity and other attitudes. Indeed, as 
Noonan (1989:43-45) suggests, the motivation for Locke's conviction that 
personal identity is constituted by sameness of consciousness is to be found in 
his reasons for addressing the problem of personal identity, and what he thus 
hoped to achieve. Locke wished to give an account which made sense of the 
possibility of resurrection and immortality in a way that was neutral between 
dualism and materialism; that conformed to the facts of self-knowledge; and that 
makes sense of the importance personal identity has in our lives, including the 
special concern we have for our own past and future. 
Locke's account therefore meets a condition which, it was implied above, 
must be met for an analysis of personal identity to be acceptable: discussions of 
personal identity cannot be conducted without regard to the importance of 
personal identity to our actual lives. Yet it is precisely this account which Reid 
and Butler find objectionable on the grounds, among others, that it is 
impossible to live consistently holding this view. One suggestion worth 
pursuing, therefore, is Locke is not analysing our ordinary concept of the 
person and of personal identity, but is engaged in conceptual innovation 
prompted by his several interests in the question of personal identity and his 
definition of the person. The implication, of course, is that this holds for all 
continuity theories. 
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Thus, it is widely recognised that the Lockean condition that personal 
identity is constituted by consciousness is not acceptable as it stands. Co-
consciousness is neither necessary or sufficient for responsibility.4 Moreover, 
not only is Locke's use of the term 'consciousness' notoriously ambiguous,5 it 
is in general not clear how consciousness is to be defined. As Wilkes 
(1988:100) says, consciousness is a notion which covers a "diverse 
heterogeneity of disparate phenomena". Recent defences of a Lockean 
approach, as was shown in the last chapter, use a notion of wide psychological 
continuity and connectedness to cover psychological events other than 
consciousness. While this avoids some of the problems with Locke's account, 
it leaves the principal objection to be considered here untouched: that all 
continuity accounts, no matter how inclusive the psychological criterion is of 
psychological phenomena, do not correspond to our ordinary notion of the 
person, or account for our concern with our own future. 
This can be seen most clearly in Locke. Locke's theory emphasises the co-
consciousness of experiences and events. It is this which constitutes personal 
identity. Persons do not have complete recall, or complete memories, thus at 
any point in time, t2, only some of the experiences and actions which were co-
conscious at 0 will be remembered. From this it follows that there is no person 
at t2 who can be identified as the same person at t'. What we have is a theory 
which includes two persons, one at 0 and one at t2, who have some items in 
common. The person at t2 has, in other words, appropriated some of the items 
belonging to the person at t', but the two persons are not identical. As Mackie 
(1976:183) says: "It is therefore hardly a theory of personal identity at all, but 
might be better described as a theory of action appropriation." 
Revised Lockean accounts which retain the fundamental importance of a 
special form of consciousness and of psychology as crucial to our 
understanding of persons, may be thought not to be open to this objection by 
using the more complex relations of continuity and connectedness between 
mental events. However, although relying neither on an exclusive concern with 
co-consciousness, or with continuity, accounts such as Parfit's Reductionist 
View are, of course, consistent with the first claim of reductionism that, "the 
fact of a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more 
particular facts" (Parfet, 1984:210). It is the relation between events which is 
important, not the relation between persons, which on the Reductionist View 
are not fundamental entities. 
In order to explore the plausibility of this suggestion, as a necessary 
preliminary to discussion of whether it is possible to change our beliefs about 
personal identity and accept this first claim of reductionism, it is useful to 
consider Locke's analysis in more detail, given its continuing influence on the 
105 
form of the problem and the methodology employed. Locke's argument, in his 
chapter 'Identity and Diversity' in the Essay on Human Understanding, is the 
first statement of the problem of personal identity in its recognisably modern 
formulation. As Noonan (1989:30) says, on the topic of personal identity "it 
can be truly said that all subsequent writing has consisted merely of footnotes to 
Locke". In addition, Locke's solution of the problem, in terms of 
consciousness, articulates some important aspects of conception of the self, and 
it can be seen as a source, of a prominent aspect of the thinking about persons 
discernable in writing on the aims of PSE. 
Locke defines a person as: 
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different 
times and places; which it does only by that consciousness 
which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it: it being impossible for anyone to perceive without 
perceiving that he does perceive. (Essay II, xxvii. 9) 
In accordance with his acceptance of the principle of the relativity of 
identity6 Locke's account of personal identity begins with this definition of 
person: what "person stands for" (Locke:II. xxvii.9). Locke famously found 
the criteria of personal identity in consciousness: "And as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person: it is the same self now it was then, and it is 
by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action 
was done" (Locke, ibid: II xxvii.9). Consciousness is the basis of personhood, 
it is this which gives our lives unity. We know that we are perceiving or willing 
when we do so, and it is by this reflective consciousness that we consider 
ourselves one persisting thinking thing. Consciousness constitutes both the 
synchronic and diachronic unity of the person. 
Locke is able to maintain that consciousness is constitutive of personal 
identity in the face of obvious counterexamples in virtue in part of his adherence 
to a tripartite ontology. Thus he is able to uphold the idea that consciousness 
constitutes personal identity by distinguishing between 'man', or human being, 
'person' and between these two concepts and 'soul-substances', with 'person' 
being defined as a "forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit." 
(Locke, II. xxvii. 15). It is therefore possible that the same human being over 
time will be different people, there being different criteria for identification in 
accordance with the principle of the relativity of identity. In addition, Locke 
makes the assumption that each concept, or sort of being only has one criterion 
of identity. He is therefore able to reject the idea that bodily continuity, the 
persistence of the human organism, constitutes personal identity, and the idea 
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that the identity of a soul-substance is in any way relevant to the question of 
personal identity? 
Although Locke did not originate the distinction between persons and 
human beings, it is clearly an influential distinction which captures an important 
sense of the term person, as someone responsible for their actions. It does not, 
however, capture probably the most common of the several interconnected 
senses in which the term is used. As Teichman (1985:184) for example, points 
out in discussing the notion of person in general, this is the sense in which 
person is used to refer to human beings. It can be argued, as Teichman does, 
that it is this sense which has moral import on the grounds that if morality exists 
for the sake for anything "it exists for the sake of human beings, not for the 
sake of a philosophically defined set of rational substances".8 
Thus although Locke is concerned with person as a forensic notion our 
ordinary usage does not make a radical distinction between 'persons' and 
'human beings'. Nevertheless, there is an intuitive plausibility in requiring that 
a person be conscious of actions for which she is held responsible, even if this 
is undermined by the strength of Locke's condition that sameness of person 
resides only in sameness of consciousness, or co-consciousness. The idea of 
consciousness clearly figures centrally in our idea of persons, supplying a 
criterion of our use of the term person and for the identity of persons. 
The problem, therefore, which Locke's account graphically illustrates, and 
which all continuity or reductionist theories share, is that the concept they are 
describing is not our ordinary concept. It is not sufficient to overcome this 
objection to add recognition of the importance of physical or bodily continuity. 
It is not, in other words, sufficient to note that in the ordinary course of events 
consciousness alone is not sufficient for personal identity, that in our normal 
way of identifying and reidentifying ourselves and others evidence of 
'sameness of person' is frequently given by physical characteristics. The 
problem concerns the wider issue of whether any continuity theory, whether it 
emphasises psychological or physical continuity or both, describes our ordinary 
concept. 
2 
Pragmatic, Psychological and Metaphysical constraints 
Reid's objection to Locke that it is impossible to consistently act on and 
believe reductionism, suggests that there is either a pragmatic or psychological 
constraint on our use of the concept of person which precludes anything other 
than a theoretical acceptance of reductionism: our practices and conceptions of 
ourselves are such that we are constrained to accept our ordinary conception. A 
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pragmatic constraint looks to the relation between theories of personal identity 
and social practices, and principally concerns the nature of the connection 
between attitudes and statements involving personal identity. 
Although according it different weight in the argument, all proponents of the 
strict identity or non-reductionist thesis, take the concurrence of non-
reductionism with ordinary moral and other attitudes as relevant to its defense. 
One of the strongest statements is found in Madell (1981:125-6) who takes it as 
support for the view that personal identity is strict and unanalysable that "[i]t, 
and it alone, can make sense of a range of attitudes which are essential to being 
a human being at all." 
If pragmatic considerations, such as the essential role of personal identity in 
structuring our relation to ourselves and others, are to be considered constraints 
on the analysis of personal identity, then the argument must show that particular 
attitudes or practices that imply a non-reductionist theory of personal identity are 
necessary and not contingent. An argument for a pragmatic constraint would 
have to show that central attitudes and practices presuppose a non-reductionist 
account of the person. Perhaps more importantly, a particular theory of personal 
identity is not something that can be chosen on the basis of its effects on our 
lives. Rather, it must be shown that there is a central coherence of attitudes 
which are non-reductionist, and that without these we could not make sense of 
our lives. 
Unless the social practices and attitudes are taken as prior to the theory of 
personal identity, which is clearly unacceptable to a non-reductionist,9 what this 
objection comes to is a. reminder that the concept of the person is prior to the 
concept of personal identity, and the former is non-reductionist. This does not 
advance the argument. Coherence with social and moral attitudes is too weak a 
relation in this context, and one that is explicitly rejected by non-reductionists in 
the general rejection of conventionalism with respect to personal identity. 
Moreover, Parfit (1971:3), for example, fully recognises that our ordinary 
beliefs are non-reductionist. This is one of the two 'targets' of his analysis. His 
aim is to show that we are mistaken about the nature of personal identity and its 
importance. The implication is that this is significant, thus the assumption is that 
it is possible to change our beliefs. The difficulties of changing our beliefs, 
which Parfit also recognises, may point to pragmatic and psychological 
considerations which may be difficult to overcome, but, again, the implication 
is that it is possible. The non-reductionist is denying that it is possible to change 
our beliefs even if we thought that it would have overall beneficial effects. The 
argument against reductionism must show more than that it is not consistent 
with some beliefs. It must show that those beliefs, attitudes or practices prevent 
acceptance of reductionism. The possibility of believing a continuity view of 
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persons rests on the supposition that moral and social beliefs are not all of a 
piece. In other words, they do not univocally support either a reductionist or a 
non-reductionist view of persons. The non-reductionist position gains 
plausibility by adopting one perspective of persons, namely a subjective, first-
person view. From this perspective the a reductionist view does indeed seem 
unbelievable. Nothing is more certain from this perspective than that I am not 
you and you are not me. The reductionist, on the other hand, gains plausibility 
for the suggestion that it is possible to change our beliefs by focusing on a 
third-person account, and arguing that the subjective point of view on persons 
cannot account for diachronic personal identity. 
Thus, if Parfit is considered overly optimistic in his assessment of the 
possibility of changing our beliefs, disagreement can take place at this level, but 
the argument that the concept of the person itself precludes reductionism cannot 
rest on our non-reductionist beliefs, unless it can be shown that these are 
necessary, and thus acts as a constraint on our forming a different concept. 
This line of argument suggests, however, that the constraint appealed to is 
more correctly characterised as metaphysical rather than pragmatic, in that it 
draws attention not to the connection between practices and attitudes and 
theories of personal identity, but to ideas on the nature of the person. It is not 
the impossibility of consistently acting or believing reductionism which is the 
objection, but that reductionism misunderstands the ultimate nature of the 
person. This is suggested by Chisholm's (1970:188) defence of a non-
reductionist interpretation of a case of fission in a reply to Strawson's 
(1970:183-186) comments on his distinction between different uses of the 
expression 'is identical' with respect to persons and nonpersons. In this 
example there are two emergent persons, Lefty and Righty, who go off in 
different directions. By the principle of the transitivity of identity, both cannot 
be identical with the original person, yet Chisholm maintains Lefty or Righty 
might be identical with the original person. The identity relation which might 
hold does not do so in virtue of any psychological connection or continuity, this 
being inconsistent with the strict identity thesis, but on the presumption of 
something like the theory of criterionless access to first-person ascriptions of 
psychological states extended to cover diachronic personal identity. That such 
an argument does not hold was argued in the last chapter. In the absence of any 
further argument this leaves the presupposition of strict identity without any 
visible, or at least argumentative, means of support. Chisholm's (loc.cit.) 
response is that reflection on puzzle cases such as fission reveals certain general 
principles which are seen on reflection to be true. Principal among these is that 
if Lefty and Righty are imagined to be persons, there will be definite answers to 
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the questions posed by the original person, "Will I be Lefty?" and "Will I be 
Righty?". 
Thus, it is not argument that is needed to reveal the truth of this view, 
rather, Chisholm claims, the truth of the strict identity theory can be seen 
through contemplation of cases such as fission, so long as this contemplation is 
of the cases themselves, uncontaminated by the importation of what he refers to 
as "certain related" philosophical theses into discussions of personal identity. 
To not see that the concept of person is determinate is a result of not 
contemplating the case itself. This implies that discussions of personal identity 
are independent of some philosophical theses, the importation of which distorts 
our reflection, but it cannot be independent of others. The source it is legitimate 
to draw on is, presumably, our ordinary concept and in particular the nature of 
first-person experience. It can be left open whether our deeply held moral 
intuitions such as that it is wrong to punish someone for something that she did 
not do, are legitimate influences in this context. The point is that one must 
assume that at least our ordinary concept is not included among the related 
theses which are not to be drawn on, since where else is the idea that persons 
are determinate to come from? Chisholm's demand that questions posed by 
puzzle cases should themselves be contemplated, and that reflection should not 
merely be of related philosophical theses suggests that he is drawing exclusively 
on the first-person perspective, and that the inadmissibility of other perspectives 
is required in order to appreciate the strength of the irreducibility of the former 
to the latter. 
Chisholm's position can therefore be interpreted as implying a metaphysical 
constraint on the analysis of personal identity. On this view, the analysis of 
personal identity is constrained by the ultimate nature of the self. Puzzle cases 
which involve fission do not show that the concept of personal identity is either 
unimportant or indeterminate, to think that such conclusions. follow is to 
misunderstand the nature of the person. The concept of person is determinate 
and unanlysable into more particular facts, and thus arguments based on puzzle 
cases which purport to show that persons are indeterminate cannot be correct 
because they depend on our prior use of the ordinary concept which precludes 
such an understanding. The non-reductionist view is that it follows from the 
determinate nature of our concept of the person that if puzzle cases involve 
persons, then there must be determinate answers to the question of personal 
identity posed of or by any person in the puzzle. If the concept of the person is 
determinate, then there can be no borderline cases of personal identity. This 
does not seem to further the argument since what is in question is presupposed. 
The argument relies on the further position that our ordinary concept of a 
persisting person necessarily precedes any concept we form of person-stages 
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and their interrelationship, or of any deviant concept of personal identity, and 
this ordinary concept is non-reductionist. As has been acknowledged, the 
concept of the person has conceptual priority, but analysis of synchronic unity 
does not necessarily have precedence over analysis of diachronic unity. The 
assessment of this constraint therefore depends on whether the claim of 
precedence of our ordinary concept is considered as an additional claim, or is 
part of the argument for non-reductionism. 
Thus, while something like a pragmatic constraint may initially be used to 
argue against reductionism, its importance on this view lies in what it reveals 
about the nature of the person. It thereby raises the question of the extent to 
which our ordinary concept of the person informs the analysis of personal 
identity and to what extent the analysis of personal identity can clarify the use of 
the concept of person. The significance of the Reductionist View is called into 
question by its failure to concur with our common-sense beliefs about persons 
since an argument which purports to show that we are not what we thought we 
were, raises questions about the nature of the concept of person and the type of 
analysis and justification to which it is open. 
3 
Realism, ascriptivism and common-sense 
As argued in the previous section, the metaphysical constraint, is essentially 
a realist claim about the nature of persons. A realist position on persons is 
implied by non-reductionism: 'person' refers to some definite entity in the 
world. In line with this realist position, ordinary attitudes and practices are 
denied a role in determining either wholly or in part an acceptable theory of 
personal identity. 
An argument frequently made against reductionism is that it allows 
decisions and not discovery to determine whether personal identity holds: that in 
certain situations personal identity is a matter of decision.'° Thus, there are 
situations where whether someone will be me or not is a decision to be made on 
the basis on the amount of connection between psychological events, for 
instance. This conventionalism is held to be inappropriate in cases of personal 
identity. The intention behind drawing attention to constraints is the denial that 
our ordinary concept of the self or person is an arbitrary convention which 
could be replaced. Reductionism accepts a weaker position. Because the 
concept of personal identity is indeterminate, there are describable cases where 
philosophical analysis of the concept of personal identity is insufficient to 
inform a person whether some or any experiences will be hers tomorrow. In 
such cases whether some person tomorrow will be me or not is not a matter of 
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discovery, but a matter of decision. It is by constructing cases where identity 
does not hold, as in branching teletransportation, that Parfit is able to show that 
it is not, contrary to our beliefs, identity which matters when we consider our 
future, but the holding of certain relations. Since these relations, unlike identity, 
hold to a greater or lesser extent, it is permissible to conclude not only that it is 
not identity which matters, but that in virtue of this, personal identity can be 
indeterminate. In some situations we may not know what to answer to the 
question 'Will it be me?' 
There can be little doubt that our ordinary understanding of personal identity 
is not like this. Ordinary beliefs show that we are realists about personal 
identity. In contrast to the Reductionist View, we believe that the language of 
persons is not eliminable, or merely pragmatically useful. We do not believe 
that 'person' is in principle redundant. It functions to explain both agency and 
our unity at a time and over time, but more importantly seems to be an 
irreducible feature of the world. On this view, while difficult puzzle cases and 
actual problems such as multiple personality syndrome may seem 
unanswerable, in that we do not know what to say about personal identity in 
these cases, it does not follow that there is no answer. There is a truth to the 
matter, however difficult it may be to reach. There are no borderline situations 
where it is in principle a matter of decision or where there is legitimately more 
than one answer to the question asked of some future set of experiences "Will it 
be me?" The argument against conventionalism from the non-reductionist 
position thus relies for its positing of a realist position on our ordinary 
conception of the person as determinate and privileges aspects of our ordinary 
concept of the person over an analysis of the concept of personal identity which 
claims that there are describable situations revealing our concept of person to be 
indeterminate. 
This is to be contrasted with reductionism which, in accepting that personal 
identity is indeterminate, also seems to accept conventionalism. This easy 
equation can be forestalled by the introduction or stipulation of a criterion which 
judgments of personal identity must satisfy. Shoemaker (1969) for example, 
argues that judgments of personal identity should match the special concern we 
have for our own future. The adoption of a such a criterion means that 
judgments of personal identity are not purely conventional, and effectively 
meets requirements that such judgments should be in line with relevant 
attitudes. Such a criterion does not, however, correspond to our common-sense 
realist views on personal identity which take the relevant attitudes and emotions 
to be based on beliefs about personal identity, not the other way round. My 
guilt over an act performed in childhoOd does not make that act mine. I feel the 
guilt because I believe that it was me who performed the action. It is not the 
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attitude I take towards some action or experience that makes it mine. On these 
grounds the introduction of additional criteria which must be satisfied does not 
address the root problem. 
In this form ascriptivism seems clearly wrong. However, individual 
ascriptivism is not the only possible form. If social rather than individual 
attitudes are taken as the reference, it seems less open to objection. Such a view 
is defended for example by Wilkes (1984: Ch 4) and Shoemaker (1984:109-
110). On this view society's attitude forms an important determinant of the 
meaning of personal identity expressions. Although Haksar (1991:14-16) for 
example, claims that both social and individual versions of ascriptivism are 
counter-intuitive and run counter to common-sense, the argument for 
ascriptivism deserves further consideration since it avoids crude 
conventionalism, and allows for the possibility of change in our beliefs, unlike 
arguments from the nature of persons. 
If a form of social ascriptivism is acceptable then it negates the need to 
introduce an additional criterion in order to make reductionism acceptable. It 
also has the interesting effect of suggesting that the constraint on our concept of 
the person is not metaphysical or pragmatic but epistemological. 
Shoemaker (op.cit.) gives the example of a society where persons regularly 
have their total brain-states transferred to the brains of their duplicated bodies 
(this being necessary because of the deterioration of their bodies due to an 
increase in the level of some sort of radiation). In this imagined society "all of 
the social practices presuppose that the procedure is person-preserving" 
(ibid:109). Although persons in this society operate with a different sense of 
person, there seems good reason to assume that the procedure is person-
preserving. That it is, and that the persons in this society take it as such, 
depends in large part on the knowledge they have of the procedure and the 
supporting social structures which influences their knowledge of what 
constitutes a person. 
The 'persons' in this example act and believe as if they are persons. They 
are presumably educated and brought up to consider the brain-state transfer 
(BST)-procedure not as if it involved their death but as a part of life. Moral 
practices such as promising, responsibility for action as well as attitudes which 
presuppose personal identity such as concern with one's future are preserved. 
Persons in this example cannot be considered to be irrational for acting on these 
beliefs. 
The situation would be different if the BST-procedure was not presupposed 
by social structures to be person-preserving. This is analogous in a suggestive 
way to the position we are in. The contingent coincidence of various features of 
human beings is reflected in our understanding of personal identity. Thus, the 
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fact that human beings enjoy the uninterrupted continuous existence of human 
bodies from birth to death, have a memory which is relatively continuous and 
reliable, that they have some character traits which are relatively stable and 
endure, as well the endurance and stability of recognition abilities are all aspects 
of being a person which are contingent facts of the matter supported by 
communal understandings and beliefs. What is important to note is that we 
know that persons are like this. Persons do not branch, they undergo neither 
fission nor fusion. It is not part of our concept of the person that they could. 
This knowledge we have of persons affects our responses to puzzle cases and 
thought experiments, as well having an important influence on our ordinary 
lives. The concept of person, not unlike many other concepts, is not as Shorter 
(1971:167-8) says, quoting Martin (1959) "ready-made for application in any 
situation". This raises the question of the extent to which puzzle cases where 
'persons' engage in radically unperson-like behaviour are intelligible, and what 
these cases can show about our ordinary concept. However, unless a non-
reductionist definition of person is stipulated, it seems that, although there are 
constraints on the use of puzzle cases, cases such as that described by 
Shoemaker are useful in that they suggest plausible influences on our 
conception of person. 
Shoemaker's example suggests that an important constraint on the analysis 
of personal identity is epistemological. The example is significant because the 
persons who undergo the BST-procedure have fore-knowledge of the event as 
well as the support of institutions and structures which presuppose personal 
identity. They engage in 'person-like' activities, have a point of view on their 
world, and in significant respects are not unlike persons as we know them. The 
use of the BST-procedure preserves what is important in personhood. Although 
the account of persons in this case would be non-reductionist, this does not 
seem sufficient ground to deny personhood. Shoemaker's example can 
therefore be interpreted as placing an epistemic condition on the acceptability of 
a theory of personal identity. 
The relevance of this condition is seen by reflecting on the role our 
knowledge of persons plays in our lives, in particular our knowledge that we do 
not branch. As has been mentioned before, personal identity is not merely 
backward looking, it is also presupposed in our concern for our future. 
Important plans and intentions are formed on the basis that no-one else will act 
on these plans and intentions in the same way as I will, just as no-one 
remembers events and certain experiences which happened to me in the same 
way as I do. Personal intentions and memories implicitly trade on our 
knowledge that we have not branched and will not do so. Our concern for our 
future implicitly takes this knowledge into account, and clearly influences the 
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formation of our expectations. Therefore, when we are confronted with puzzle 
situations or thought experiments where fission or duplication takes place, as in 
the branching case of teletransportation described by Parfit (op.cit.:200-1), one 
of the problems is that we do not know how to react to the future of our 
duplicate. Our intentions, plans and expectations have been formed on the basis 
that in the future there either will or will not be a person who is me. We are not 
prepared for a situation where there could be two or more of each of us: we are 
not sure how to form intentions for a branching replica and what this would 
mean for the two resultant persons. This suggests that the non-branching nature 
of our lives supports the belief that it is identity, rather than the holding of 
certain relations, which is important, or what matters to us. 
In a case of branching the non-reductionist will hold that only one of the 
resulting persons can be me since only one person can be identical with me, and 
that this will be the one with the reliable or normal causal connections. 
Branching appears to support the non-reductionist point of view, as it supports 
the claim that it is identity itself which is important. The importance of this 
example is that the psychological connectedness which persons ordinarily 
exhibit (i.e., non-branching) is deeply influenced by the knowledge that we do 
not branch. It is feasible to assume that the knowledge that we are non-
branching affects our reaction to puzzle cases describing branching. This 
reaction, which is likely to be equivocal and unstable, can be explained by the 
influence of our knowledge that we are non-branching on the formation of 
intentions and other beliefs and attitudes which presuppose personal identity. 
On this view psychological connectedness is influenced by what we know 
about persons. This makes no reference to what persons are, but rather 
concerns what we learn and know about persons. In other words, forward-
looking mental events such as intending are constitutive of personal identity as 
well as presupposing it. 
What effect does this epistemic condition have, and what happens when it is 
built into the puzzle cases involving fission? Clearly it raises a problem for the 
view that the reference for T is univocal over time. It was argued in the last 
chapter that the strongest argument for non-reductionism comes from the first-
person perspective. From this perspective we believe the non-reductionist view 
for we think of survival as all or nothing. As was argued, this is most plausibly 
interpreted as the requirement that the further facts to which the non-reductionist 
is committed are subjective in nature, and thus persons have incorrigible access 
to their own diachronic personal identity. This relies on an extension of the 
access we have to present-tense mental states, and thus trades on the 
epistemology of present-tense first-person reference. 
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The assumption is that the first-person pronoun refers univocally over time 
to an inner life in virtue of its use with verbs such as 'to remember', 'to intend' 
and so forth. However, the connection between psychological connectedness, 
between two tokens of T , as in "I remember finishing this before I went to 
work", and identity is only contingent on the Reductionist View. Any necessary 
connection that might be thought to be exist, for example linguistic necessity, 
can be circumvented by the use of 'quasi-psychological states' introduced by 
Shoemaker (1970), as mentioned in the last chapter. This has the consequence 
that 'I' can have a variable reference. Following Rovane (1990:368), the 
pronoun 'I*' can be introduced to express psychological connectedness without 
identity. The corresponds to the use of 'I' where there is identity, and thus 'I*' 
allows variable first-person reference in cases which involve branching. This 
enables a branching person to refer to a common ancestor to form forward-
looking intentions and to remember. Since the branching person would have 
knowledge of past and future branching there would be no problem 
distinguishing whose experiences are quasi-remembered and whose are quasi-
intended. 
On this account the concern persons have with their own future can be 
accounted for on a reductionist or continuity theory of personal identity. 
Contrary to what Butler and Reid supposed, no special problem is raised for 
reductionism by forward-looking mental events since the concern with the 
personal future can be accounted for in terms of the connections between 
events. The objection that a continuity account of personal identity fails to make 
sense of our lives is primarily interpreted as the effect of such a view has on our 
concern with our own future. However, as Whiting (1986) has cogently 
argued, long term psychological connectedness can provide reasons for 
embracing long-term projects and these can give rise to a general concern with 
one's own well-being. Thus the objection from future concern can be 
accommodated within the first claim of the Reductionist View. There is also no 
problem, for the unity of the person, although the non-reductionist position that 
this is some further fact is not accepted, the unity of the person is intact, 
although the reference of T is recognised to be variable. The non-reductionist 
position relies on the argument that the present-tense univocal reference of T 
can be temporally extended unproblematically. On Rovane's view, this is not 
necessary or even warranted. Thus it is possible to have the unity of the person 
without strict identity. This account does, however, raise problems for the 
second claim of the reductionist thesis. 
The objection that still remains arises from Cartesian intuitions concerning 
the subject of thought: the requirement for an inner unity. This addresses the 
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second claim of the Reductionist View: that a complete description of the world 
could be impersonal. 
4 
Reductionist Persons 
It was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that with the introduction 
of the idea of constraints on the use of the concept of person the Reductionist 
View results in a skepticism about persons with the effect that the concept of 
moral agency can not be sustained. This objection, due to Scheffler (1982), is 
concerned with the idea of persons as the subject of moral demands. If persons 
are just series of events, then it seems there is no subject of which moral 
demands can be made. As Scheffler (ibid:237) says, he has "no idea what moral 
demands can most plausibly be made of atoms or events". This objection to the 
Reductionist View holds because reductionism is a thesis about personhood as 
well as personal identity. Reductionism with respect to personal identity holds 
because a reductionist view of persons is accepted. Thus, personal identity is 
not ontologically basic on the Reductionist View because a "person's existence 
just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the occurrences of a 
series of interrelated physical and mental events" (Parfit, 1984:211). 
This does not constitute an objection to persons being the object of moral 
concern. Indeed, the fact that persons are the locus of experience events, which 
may be either pleasurable or painful has claim to be that feature of persons 
which makes it appropriate for persons to be the object of moral concern. 
Certainly utilitarians take this claim seriously. The problem is with moral 
agency, with persons as the subjects of experience, as the possessors of 
attributes. For persons to act morally, or in any kind of purposive way, persons 
cannot be conceived of as merely atoms or events. As Scheffler (op.cit.:238) 
points out, if the Reductionist View does undermine our ordinary conception of 
persons, "then it is unclear how we are even to think of ourselves, let alone 
how we are to think of morality". Clearly if this objection holds, and it seems 
that Parfit (1973:159) at times accepts an atomistic account of persons, then it 
would form a strong argument against the acceptance of reductionism. The 
situation is not, however, so clear cut. Parfit does not favour an extreme 
atomistic reductionism, and it may be possible to admit some primitive form of 
agency to the Reductionist View. The question is whether the limited form of 
agency that is admitted can generate those qualities, such as autonomy and 
integrity which make persons morally valuable. 
It will be recalled that Parfit makes two claims: that persons are not 
separately existing entities over and above mental and physical events which 
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stand in appropriate relations; and that these facts, of a person's identity over 
time 
can be described without presupposing the identity of this 
person, or explicitly claiming that the experiences in this 
person's life are had by this person, or even explicitly claiming 
that this person exists. These facts can be described in an 
impersonal way (1984:210). 
This second claim is arguably the most problematic aspect of the 
Reductionist View, calling into question as it does the idea of the self as the 
possessor of psychological attributes, as the subject of experience. It raises 
questions about how the experiences of persons are to be individuated if not by 
reference to their subjects and thereby raises the question of whether the idea of 
the person as the subject of moral demands and considerations is even 
intelligible on the Reductionist View." 
The complete reduction of persons to related events depends on the 
plausibility of the atomistic theory of mental events on which it relies. In order 
for Scheffler's particular objection to hold, mental events must be capable of 
being understood in the required atomistic fashion. In this connection Rovane's 
(1990:388-90) argument that there are holistic constraints on the psychological 
reduction of persons is relevant. Rovane argues that the events and relations to 
which persons are to be reduced cannot be specified atomistically. The attempt 
to do so faces the obstacle the specification of other mental states is always 
involved. Thus, for example, a behaviouristic reduction of mental types to pairs 
of stimulus and response is thwarted by the need to specifying other mental 
states in the attempt to specify the sort of stimulus which produces a given 
response. The interdependence of mental states thus essentially forms a 
constraint on a completely impersonal account of personal identity. As Rovane 
(ibid:390) points out this is in line with the continuity theory's claim that 
persons are relations of psychological continuity and connectedness. In 
specifying these relations the Reductionist View precludes the use of anything 
other than the way in which successive mental events are related. This 
dependence of relations on relata is consistent with Parfit's Reductionist View 
only if mental events can be specified independently of the psychological 
relations in which they stand. Therefore, if the relation of dependence is 
reciprocal in that the contents of mental events are dependent on the 
psychological connections between them it would not be possible to give a 
completely impersonal description of persons. 
That such a reciprocal relation does exist is suggested by the argument given 
above concerning the influence of the knowledge that persons are non-
branching on the formation of psychological connectedness with future 
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persons. Not all psychological connections are influenced by this knowledge, 
of course. However, crucially, those events which do exert such an influence 
are those with first-person content. The hope for world peace does not 
intrinsically make use of first-person content. The hope that I will help bring 
about peace does. This latter intention influences the formation of other mental 
states and thus is instrumental in forming psychological connections. Some 
psychological relations are therefore dependent on mental events which have 
first-person content. The relations which constitute personal identity are 
therefore dependent on content of the related events, which are also reciprocally 
dependent. 
Thus, the epistemic constraint, my knowledge that I will not branch, is 
instrumental in the formation of the content of first-personal mental events as 
well as being influenced by the relation between these events. If this argument 
is sound, if my relatedness to future persons is indeed something not only 
implicitly taken into account in forming forward-looking mental events but 
influences the formation of connections between such events, then a completely 
impersonal account of persons cannot be successful. The argument is, of 
course, importantly different from the non-reductionist point about the 
irreducibility of the first-person point of view, and does not lead to acceptance 
of a non-reductionist position. On this view the reductionist claim that 
branching could be regarded as about as good as ordinary survival would not be 
denied so long as the appropriate epistemological conditions are satisfied. The 
non-reductionist, on the other hand would deny that in the absence of identity 
branching could be considered as survival. 
The constraint which is placed on our understanding of personal identity is 
therefore our knowledge of our uniqueness. The influence of this knowledge, 
beyond its effect on the content of first-personal mental states is that it inclines 
us towards the belief that it is identity which matters when we consider our 
future. It does not show that identity is what matters. 
This interpretation may, however, be thought to miss the point of non-
reductionist arguments, such as that advanced by Madell (1991:129), that "we 
do not have a notion of persons at all until we recognize that crucial respect in 
which persons differ from objects - in their subjectivity, their first-person 
perspective." There are several ways this call to account for the first-person 
point of view can be interpreted. On the one hand it can be seen as a Nagelian 
challenge to capture what it is like to be a person, since this is arguably what is 
important and distinctive about persons. There is a point, as was mentioned in 
the last chapter to the charge that reductionist theories are theories of persons as 
objects. The question is whether reductionism can also account for the subject 
of experience. What is interesting about Madell's position is that while Butler 
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based his opposition to Locke on a defense of the immortal soul, and both 
Butler and Reid argued for and saw a need to assert the existence of an ego, 
Madell's defense of strict and unanalysable identity for persons denies such a 
need on the basis of arguments which not only show that the notion of a 
continuing ego is likely to be incoherent but that it also tends to treat persons as 
though they were another kind of object, something which Madell, in common 
with all strict identity theorists wish to deny. 
If the requirement is for a theory of the person as subject, then it is not clear 
that it is the Nagelian challenge which needs to be answered. As was argued in 
the last chapter this view depends on a theory of third-person incorrigibility for 
first-person access to subjective facts over time. Thus it is not clear that the 
answer to the question 'what is it like to be an X?' can furnish the type of 
knowledge required, i.e., knowledge that is significantly different to third-
person knowledge. If I ask myself what it is like to be me, my answer will be a 
description which, it seems, will not reveal anything which can be counted as a 
different sort of knowledge to that which is in principle available to someone 
else. To hold that there is such 'private' knowledge would involve showing, 
inter alia, that knowledge by acquaintance is not knowledge under some 
description. Being a person may put me a privileged epistemological position 
with respect to many mental phenomena, but 'having personhood', does not 
entail 'knowing (about) personhood'. In general the subjectivity of persons, 
even if it furnishes subjective facts, does not seem adequate to answer the 
question of personal identity. 
This, of course, neglects the phenomenological aspect of being a person, 
but again it is difficult to see how this aspect of personhood could furnish the 
requisite type of fact needed for personal identity. The motivation for 
advocating non-reductionism could perhaps be more profitably be interpreted as 
an implication of the necessity for the unity of the inner life of a person. A 
persistent criticism of views such as Parfit's is that it fails to account for the 
synchronic unity of the person. What seems to be left out of Parfit's 
reductionism is an account of direct self-reference grounded in self-awareness, 
and thus a recognition of the importance of the first-person perspective. The 
question is not the phenomenological question of personhood, but the question 
posed by the person considered as subject as well as an object. 
As has been shown the non-reductionist position relies heavily on the 
priority of the synchronic unity of the person, using the incorrigibility of 
present-tense first-person access to mental states as the basis for the diachronic 
unity. As was argued in the last chapter, the continuity theorist need face no 
special problem with synchronic unity in virtue of connections which hold 
between mental states and their implication in synchronic unity. The relation 
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between events is not an identity relation. The deprivation of assured unity 
which this entails does not entail that synchronic unity cannot be accounted for. 
The basis for synchronic unity may, however, through the less foundational 
basis thus provided, seem less secure in virtue of not being secured through a 
substantial self which possesses or otherwise secures this relatedness. This is a 
separate question, and not one which influences the cogency of the argument 
for synchronic unity provided by a reductionist view. 
In this section it has been argued that a completely impersonal description of 
persons is not possible because of the reciprocal dependence of the content of 
some mental events on the relations between such events. This was argued not 
to be decisive against reductionism since it was not an admission that personal 
identity is some further fact, but that persons, in virtue of the character of their 
mental events cannot be atomistically described, and that our knowledge of 
persons influences the formation of relations between first-person mental 
events, leading to rejection of the view that an account of the world could be 
completely impersonal. 
The rejection of reductionism with respect to persons can be strengthened 
through consideration of the reductionist character of the argument. This 
argument addresses the reductionism of Parfit's Reductionist View, but shows 
that although reductionism is not plausible, the central claim of continuity 
theorists stands. In showing that a reductive analysis is not necessary it is also 
shown that claims about the nature of personal identity can evaluated separately 
from claims about its importance. In this way the consequences of holding 
either a continuity theory or a strict identity theory for ethics and rationality still 
hold, since they do not depend on the coherence of a reductive analysis. 
All reductionists and continuity theorists accept that 
[1] a person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain 
and body, and the occurrence of a series of interrelated physical 
and mental events (Parfit, 1984:211). 
The impersonality claim is that "though persons exist, we could give a 
complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist" (ibid:212). 
This holds on the claim that the following two claims are equivalent: 
[2] there exists a particular brain and body, and a particular 
series of interrelated mental and physical events 
[and] 
[3] there exists a particular person (ibid:212) 
The reductionist or impersonality thesis does not necessarily follow from 
acceptance of [1]. The two claims are distinct. The claim for the reductionist 
thesis lies in the equivalency of [2] and [3]. Thus, on Parfit's view either [2] or 
[3] could be used, it is not necessary to use both: they are "two ways of 
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describing the same fact" (ibid:212). While a complete description of reality 
would mention [2] or [3], both need not be mentioned and therefore a complete 
description could be impersonal. 
The relation of logical equivalence between [2] and [3] is a symmetric 
relation. [2] may be equivalent to [3] in that [2] may be substituted for [3] and 
this may be informative. It is not, however, a necessarily reductive relation. 
While the relation of logical equivalence is symmetric, a reductionist relation is 
asymmetric, in that the two claims are not mutually reductive, rather one claim 
is reducible to another. The relation between [2] and [3] could be made 
asymmetric, if the two statements were logically equivalent and if there were a 
relation of entailment from [2] to [3]. This would mean that the statement "there 
is a particular person" is entailed by the statement "there exists a particular brain 
and body, and a particular series of interrelated mental and physical events". 
That such a relation does not hold is shown by a possible world example used 
by Garrett (1991:367-8). In worlds 1 and 2 A undergoes fission into B and C. 
While in world 1 both B and C survive, so A is identical with neither, in world 
2 C does not survive and so there is no branching (A is identical to B'). The 
two persons B (in world 1) and B' (in world 2) are distinct persons since A is 
B' in world 2 and A is not B in world 1. Yet both B and B' have the same 
psychological connectedness and continuity with A, from which it follows that 
the specification of particular interrelated mental events does not entail that a 
particular person exists. 
This argument is about the nature of personal identity, whether or not it can 
be characterised in a reductionist way. If the argument given above is successful 
then it appears that a reductionist thesis can be rejected. This does not, 
however, affect the thesis that persons are nothing over and above the 
occurrence of certain physical and psychological events, which still holds. It 
will be recalled that Parfit's thesis is about the importance of personal identity. 
If the main claim is that personal identity does not involve a further fact, then 
we have yet to fmd an argument against this. The claim about the nature of 
personal identity and the importance of identity can thus be seen as separate 
claims: it is possible to reject Parfit's arguments for the former and accept his 
arguments for the latter. Thus, arguments against the reductionist nature of 
personal identity do not at the same time support the non-reductionist view that 
identity is what matters when we consider our future. 
If continuity theories are not reductionist, does this not mean that the 
account is circular in that the analysis of same person need make reference to 
persons? This does not follow if the analysans contains concepts other than 
person. In such a case the account need not be viciously circular, and may 
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reveal informative interrelationships between the concepts. As Wiggins 
(1980:4) points out, much may be achieved in philosophy 
by means of elucidations which use a concept without attempting 
to reduce it, and in using the concept, exhibit the connexions of 
the concept with other concepts that are established, genuinely 
collateral and independently intelligible. 
5 
Beliefs and the concept of the person 
It has so far been argued that there are legitimate constraints on the analysis 
of personal identity. These have been shown to be epistemic rather than 
pragmatic, psychological or metaphysical. In the course of the argument it has 
been shown that Parfit's main claim, that personal identity is not a further fact 
can be upheld. In the course of the discussion several problems were left 
unresolved. A recurring problem is the concept of the person itself, to which we 
now turn. 
The argument has been an attempt to uphold the view that our belief in the 
indivisible unity of the person, and what our unity consists in are mistaken. If 
the argument presented is valid, it does not straightforwardly follow that we 
should change our beliefs, or that our beliefs are unfounded, as we have seen 
from the discussion above on possible constraints on the use of the concept of 
person. Thus, from the proposition that our belief in the indivisible unity is 
unjustified, it follows that there are only two alternatives: our beliefs must be 
defended, or they must be revised. These two options, suggested by Glover 
(1988:14), are only alternatives, however, given certain interpretations of what 
it means to defend beliefs about ourselves, and what would be involved in a 
revision of the beliefs about persons. A third option would naturally be 
suggested by a non-reductionist: if the analysis of the concept of person shows 
our beliefs to be unjustified, it is not our beliefs, but the analysis which needs to 
be revised. This type of response is, however, not available to the non-
reductionist as it implies conventionalism in questions of personal identity. A 
more profitable line of objection to pursue is that if an analysis of personal 
identity does not concur with or match our beliefs and practices, this in itself 
does not provide a good reason to reject or revise those beliefs. In this section, 
therefore, the question to be addressed is whether it is possible to adopt beliefs 
other than the ones we have. Is it possible, in other words, to choose to become 
reductionists? 
The significance of our belief in the unity of the person is such that it seems 
unassailable. Or, more precisely, unassailable merely by analysis of the concept 
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itself. Some of the many beliefs we have about persons operate at the level of 
common-sense, and take the form of implicit assumptions deeply embedded in 
our thinking about persons. Among these seemingly natural and indispensable 
ways of seeing ourselves and others concern beliefs about the unity and 
separateness of persons. We believe that we are each one person, and that each 
person is distinct from other people. Ways of speaking such as "she is not the 
person she was", where what is meant is that there have been significant 
changes in attitude or beliefs do not imply doubt over whether there is an 
important sense in which this person is the same person as the one before the 
changes took place. 
This suggests that our beliefs about persons are not something which are 
open to change on the basis of philosophical argument. This appears to endorse 
Wilkes' claim (op.cit.:228) that the everyday understanding of real people "is 
only marginally contaminated (temporarily, or perhaps to some slight extent 
permanently) by scientific and philosophical theories". Our conceptions of 
ourselves and of other persons is not, on this view a theoretical position open to 
change on the basis of a more complete or realistic or even beneficial theory. 
The reason for this, according to Wilkes, is the reality of people's lives. 
This does not fundamentally change: People have to survive, live with others 
and cope with changing environments. These 'facts of life' are relatively 
unaffected, or have the potential for being affected or not by philosophical 
theories, because, according to Wilkes (ibid.:229) the everyday understanding 
of real people neither explicit not realistically construed. It does not form a 
paradigm, and thus is not open to being overturned by a new model. Our 
ordinary concept of person is not rigid, it is, on the contrary, as Wilkes 
(loc.cit.) points out "far too tolerant of, and welcoming towards, the grossest 
apparent inconsistencies: everything is grist to its mill". 
Wilkes' argument is essentially an appeal to what may be called our pre-
theoretic intuitions. She (ibid.:228) explicitly gives this understanding wider 
currency than any particular theory, arguing that a present day person "would 
be more at home with his fellow layman 2,400 years" ago, than Aristotle would 
be with Descartes or Locke with Skinner. In this at least her argument is similar 
to Maclntyre's (1990b:197-8) claim for a "complex and metaphysical account of 
the identity and continuity of human beings", a conception "embodied in 
practice long before it was articulated as theory". 
These arguments draw attention to a conception of the person which is 
shared by, according to Maclntyre (loc.cit.), "a great many, ... perhaps all 
traditional societies" and later in "urban political societies with a shared 
religion", and according to Wilkes (op.cit.) by laymen throughout time. This 
conception is contrasted to the beliefs about persons held by those such as Parfit 
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which Maclntyre suspects, being held on the basis of puzzle cases and such 
forms of argument, is a function of an ability limited to "inhabitants of one 
particular type of culture or subculture" (op.cit:199). This is clearly not a claim 
Parfit (op.cit.:273) would accept, given that he sees his argument as applying to 
"all people, at all times". Parfit's argument is that the question of personal 
identity is fundamentally a choice between two views: reductionist and non-
reductionist, a choice that is not culturally specific.12  
The argument that our ordinary conception is pre-theoretic in a significant 
sense, or maybe even 'atheoretic' in that it is relatively unaffected by the 
plausibility of arguments adduced for or against the theory embedded in the 
practice raises an interesting problem. If the argument of this thesis is 
successful then the most adequate theory of personal identity presupposed by 
moral and/or personal autonomy is a continuity theory. This alters significantly 
the understanding of the person and the basis for autonomy. It does not 
demand, however, 'learning' a new theory of self which is contrary to the 
theory of self and person we operate with, even though it does have 
consequences for morality and rationality, and for central attitudes and beliefs 
which presuppose personal identity. As pointed out above, our concept of the 
person is tolerant, many of the changes consequent on acceptance of a 
continuity theory are consistent with intuitions concerning persons and their 
persistence through time, though they conflict with other intuitions. It is 
therefore important to remind ourselves that the central idea is the importance 
we give to identity and its justification. It is what matters to us which is of 
concern here, what matters to us as persons, when we consider such things as 
our concern with our own future and past. 
The seemingly rather paradoxical implication of the argument so far, is that 
identity is not what matters, but that we believe it does. It is not the subculture 
of analytical philosophers who argue for a continuity theory in the Lockean 
tradition who are arguing for the importance of a metaphysical conception. It is 
to the relative irrelevancy of such considerations which Parfit's account, for 
example, points. What has been shown is that appeals to ordinary experience 
and our sense of ourselves presuppose a metaphysical realism. The point is that 
our ordinary concept contains the sediments of philosophical as well as other 
debates, including religious and scientific ones. A notable effect is that we have 
a concept of the person which does not produce a consistent picture when 
viewed from the variety of perspectives to which it is open. The Cartesian 
sediments and influences on which perspective should be considered crucial 
should come as no surprise. 
An interesting parallel with our beliefs about persons is the status of 
individualist modes of thought. This mode of thought, distinctive of modem 
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Western cultures, is inescapable even when being criticised. As Lukes 
(1985:298-300) writes: "it indelibly marks every interpretation we give of other 
modes of thought and every attempt we make to revise our own. ...[w]e may 
reject individualistic ways of conceiving the person ... but these are the ways by 
which we are culturally formed and they inevitably colour our every attempt to 
interpret the world of others or to seek to change our own." Our conceptions of 
ourselves as discrete entities, or as Midgley (1990) says, as "billiard-ball-like 
atoms", can similarly be seen as a deeply imbibed cultural response, which 
while seeming self-evident and unassailable, colours responses to questions of 
personal identity. 
These objections or obstacles to accepting a continuity theory of persons in 
a way that influences our actual lives and attitudes, suggests that the objection 
underlying Wilkes' and Maclntyre's comments above, is that the method used 
by Parfit and others, namely the use of "bizarre counterfactuals" is so divorced 
from the considerations of our ordinary lives that they are irrelevant to any 
actual concerns. This objection is only relevant if the aim of using carefully 
constructed of counterfactual situations was unobtainable because of certain 
features of the concept of the person. The point of constructing puzzle cases or 
situations is to remove or radically change features of personal identity which 
have been considered essential are removed or radically changed, with the aims 
of thereby revealing what is essential or important in our actual lives. Maclntyre 
can be interpreted as raising an objection to the whole methodology in his 
reference to the importance of communities and, by implication, communal 
beliefs. In forming his objection in terms of the practices, beliefs and 
understandings of a culture, Maclntyre draws attention to what may be an effect 
of the use of the methodology implied by the attempt to determine the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept in all contexts of its 
use: the divorce from the considerations which actually affect us when we think 
about persons. This objection relies on showing that our concept of person is 
bound up with moral and other concepts which influence our conceptions of 
ourselves such that imaginary cases cannot be instructed which elicit intuitions 
with the aim of revealing that we have certain opinions. It is not clear that 
objections which appeal to the contextualisation of the concept of person can 
succeed in showing this. 
It is possible to appreciate the point that the concept of the person cannot or 
should not be abstracted from the context which gives it meaning, and that any 
attempt to do so risks resulting in conclusions which are not useful to our 
ordinary lives, while at the same time preserving the usefulness of puzzle cases 
in the analysis of personal identity. The aim is to determine what is important 
about the concept we actually have. If constraints of intelligibility and logical 
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coherence are adhered to, there is no reason to assume that wondering whether 
if I teletransported to Mars all that mattered to my survival would be 
preserved.13 
6 
Intuitions and decisions about personal identity 
In dealing with the problem of personal identity the aim is to reveal what is 
essential to the concept of person and personal identity. Central to method used 
is the eliciting of intuitions in response to puzzle cases designed to reveal what 
is involved in judgments of personal identity. The method therefore relies on the 
readers of the puzzle cases having similar intuitions in similar situations. 
Intuitions about persons therefore play an important role in the analysis of 
personal identity. The assumption is made, as Collins (1982:3), notes that: 
'the intuitions of the native English thinker' should be the arbiter 
of philosophical correctness, and that it is the conceptual and 
linguistic habits of 'common-sense' to which we should look for 
enlightenment on philosophical issues. 
Collins approach is to take these intuitions and the common-sense 
constructed out of them as "mere problematic data". In this section the status of 
the intuitions brought to bear in discussions of personal identity will be 
addressed as a means of addressing one of the issues implicit in the objection 
that personal identity is deeply embedded in our practical lives and not open to 
change on the basis of theoretic arguments. 
Reductionism and non-reductionism rely on a certain stability in our 
intuitions about persons, both in puzzle cases and in problematic actual cases. 
The importance of intuitions in this context lies in what they are thought to 
reveal about our concept of the person. Thus Parfit argues that our belief that 
personal identity involves a 'further fact' is mistaken, by appeal to our reactions 
to puzzle cases. These responses centrally take the form of intuitions about what 
is important to our survival. These intuitions challenge other intuitions, 
principally those concerning subjective facts. Parfit's position relies on there 
only being two feasible options in personal identity, thus once it is recognised 
that these latter intuitions should be abandoned, reductionism, as the only 
alternative should be accepted. This use of proof by disjunctive syllogism 
clearly raises questions concerning the feasibility of the proposition that the 
choice is exhausted by reductionism and non-reductionism in personal identity, 
but what is more to the point here is the question posed by Collins' challenge: 
the status of the intuitions brought to bear in reflecting on what we believe in 
puzzle cases. 
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Puzzle cases are constructed to elicit particular responses, either in support 
or against reductionism or non-reductionism. Reactions are in the form of 
intuitions, and by submitting these to analysis, seeing the extent to which they 
conform with other intuitions and principles, we come to see what we believe 
about persons. The argument therefore to an important extent relies on the 
ability to elicit clear univocal intuitions in response to puzzle cases. It is 
permissible that this may take the form of not knowing what to say about 
personal identity in any particular situation, as long as this is not the reaction to 
all the puzzle cases and all actual problematic situations.14 This means that 
intuitions about persons must be presumed to be fairly universal and fairly 
stable. As Stephen White (1989:301-3) has shown it is possible to construct 
puzzle cases where the degree of continuity between persons is the same in each 
case, but where our intuitions differ. This suggests that solutions to the problem 
of personal identity may include more than reductionism and non-reductionism, 
in that if these were the only choices are intuitions concerning cases of 
continuity would be similar. The problem is the existence of conflicting 
intuitions to superficially identical puzzle cases. 
A further suggestion is that the problem lies not with intuitions per se, but 
with the assumption that the object of intuitions is determinate, i.e., the concept 
of the person. This returns us to the conception of the person which has been 
the focus of this discussion is a neo-Lockean one which accepts the intuition 
behind the distinction between persons and human beings, that persons are 
essentially self-conscious. For Locke (1694/1975:27, Sections 8-28) this meant 
consciousness of self, from which he claimed that a person's identity ought not 
to be different from what she takes it to be. This strong and deniable claim need 
not be accepted in order to recognise that a person's identity must be accessible 
to that person in a sense stronger than that this must be knowable. As well as 
this claim, the negative claim that a person's identity should not be understood 
in physical terms or in terms of a Cartesian ego, form the basis of the 
psychological connectedness theory we have been considering. As has been 
shown above, the claim is not so much one about the metaphysical issues but 
about the importance of personal identity. 
The argument from constraints is a response, in part, to the Lockean idea 
that person is a forensic term of moral, social and practical significance. This 
explains a condition of personhood, that a certain stance or attitude must be 
taken to towards persons, which includes, inter alia, the idea of persons as 
moral subjects15 which holds even where there is only the potential for other 
conditions being met, such as very young children and severely incapacitated 
adults. 
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A problem which has recurred throughout this chapter is that the Lockean 
conception does not reflect our ordinary notion, which although always 
concerned with the forensic notion, gives more weight to the physical based 
accounts of identity. Thus while we can entertain thought experiments involving 
the migration of psychological states from one body to another, we also 
consider bodily continuity important. This is clear in cases such as amnesia. 
However, while the revised Lockean notion does not capture our ordinary 
concept, it is not clear that any of the alternatives do either. The question is 
whether we are operating with more than one concept, or whether the concept 
of person itself is indeterminate. The ability to move from bodily-based to 
psychological-based accounts of identity, suggests a general indeterminacy in 
the way persons are spoken and thought about. But this is not to say that our 
concept of personal identity is indeterminate. As has been pointed out, our 
ordinary concept is non-reductionist. We believe that our identity is all-or-
nothing, and that it is not a matter of decision. Neither psychological nor 
physical continuity and connectedness seems sufficient. As Mackie 
(op.cit.:191) points out, our ordinary concept is "plainly, a concept of identity 
obeying the logic of identity, and of identity between complete persons". 
Conclusion 
Developments and revisions of the concept of the person 
It has already been noted that the concept of the person is not ready-made 
for application in any context, but is it such that what is constitutive of persons 
is discoverable? To what extent is the concept of the person determinate, and 
how is this to discovered? 
Although the aim of analysis of personal identity is to describe rather than 
prescribe, and clarify our concept of the person, what has been revealed is that 
there is a central indeterminacy in our concept. Locke's concept, as has been 
mentioned, although reflecting an important aspect of what is meant by the 
concept of person, does not take sufficiently seriously the importance of 
physical connectedness. Should Locke therefore be seen as developing our 
concept rather than reflecting or clarifying its use? 
Our ordinary concept seems to include the following features: persons are 
unitary subjects of consciousness with a single point of view. This is why the 
prospect of splitting consciousness is such an important and controversial 
example, as it appears to undermine the concept of the person: our concept is 
tolerant enough to include Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde as the same person, with 
the implication that discontinuous alternating consciousness is permissible, but 
not co-consciousness in different bodies. 
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The difficulty we are now faced with is how decisions between theories of 
personal identity are to be made. Brennan (1988:354) points out that the 
problem with deciding between theories of personal identity is that there is no 
clear way of determining what the body of testing data is to be against which a 
theory can be tested. Pre-theoretic intuitions seem to be the most obvious 
candidates, but in the absence of any principled way of choosing between 
conflicting intuitions they cannot provide the requisite fixed body of data against 
which rival theories can be tested. One way of solving this problem is to 
stipulate those intuitions which are central, and in this way fulfill the 
requirement. In a sense that has been done here by focusing on the moral 
concept as central to the particular problem under consideration. 
Focusing on this conception of the person is legitimate in the context of the 
conceptualisation of the person in the aims of PSE given the interest in persons, 
and provided that it is not assumed that this conception is adequate to all 
situations. The existence of differing perspectives is not therefore excluded. 
This, of course, raises the problem of the extent to which other perspectives are 
commensurate and, again, how disagreements are to be resolved. Clearly there 
will be some compatibility between any two theories on the person, given that 
they are both recognised to be theories of the same entity. In such a case the 
rival theories will be checked for coherence with other bodies of theory. In PSE 
this will centrally include moral theory. Arguments for coherence, however, are 
unlikely to be decisive given the interdependence of theories of the person and 
moral theory, and the conceptual indeterminacy surrounding the concept of the 
person. 
In this situation, where neither social institutions nor intuitions are decisive 
in their support of a theory of personal identity, how is a decision to be made? 
Brennan (op.cit.: 347-356) has suggested that it is a matter of philosophical 
style rather than a matter of determining the facts. However, the above 
discussion on the admissibility of a form of social conventionalism and rejection 
of the idea that the phenomenon of first-person reference requires the existence 
of a self, suggests a more positive solution. It was argued above that social 
ascriptivism has a role in the determination of issues of personal identity. This 
modified version of conventionalism was held to have the consequence that 
persons in a society the institutions of which supported certain procedures as 
person-preserving would not be acting irrationally if they acted on the 
supposition that the procedures were person-preserving. The rationality of their 
actions and beliefs concerning persons are unaffected by whether or not these 
procedures would be considered person-preserving in other societies, such as 
ours. This relativism on the question of persons fmds general support in 
Stephen White's (1989:322-3) argument that metapsychological facts, those 
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facts about personal identity, responsibility and the unity and character of the 
self which are presupposed rather than settled by empirical psychology, could 
be settled in radically different ways in different societies. The settling of 
metapsychological claims in these different ways would not be irrational or 
misinformed. On White's (ibid:323) argument we cannot decide for ourselves 
what counts as our continuation, any more than the kind of society we shall 
inhabit: "But as we determine collectively the form and shape of our society, we 
thereby also determine the boundaries of ourselves." 
This position does not have the consequence that personal identity is a.  
matter of individual legislation, that it is up to me to decide whether a past or 
future person was or will be me. This, which non-reductionists such as 
Swinburne see as a consequence of continuity theories does not follow. As 
mentioned above there is a distinction to be made between individual and social 
ascriptivism. What White's argument shows is that the social world plays an 
essential role in determining the whether personal identity holds, whether the 
criteria of personal identity are taken to refer to that which is constitutive of, or 
that which is taken as evidence for. Thus what it means to be a person is not 
something which can be determined solely by reference to the first-person point 
of view, but makes essential reference to the third person. On this view intrinsic 
or autonomous changes are less important than continuity of nonautonomous 
relations: "The perspective of others is a significant, if not the significant, 
component of our internalized self-image" (White, ibid: 321). Thus, the 
internalization of the views of others becomes a crucial factor in the alteration of 
social practices into personal facts which matter. 
This approach need not deny central claims of theorists such as Brennan 
(op.cit.:289), that "[t]here is ... no well-defined concept of a person which can 
be analysed and put forward as the concept with which we all operate." Nor is 
the argument at odds with the idea that the various ways in which we talk about 
persons, as self-conscious and as human beings need not be consistent. The 
argument advanced here takes these aspects of the concept of person as given. 
What is being attempted is the exploration of the importance of the perspective 
on the concept of person given the particular interest in it. 
The implication of the particular perspective that has been adopted, that has 
taken the idea of persons as a forensic notion as central, has interesting 
implications for how we understand the concept of the person in the context of 
PSE. This argument provides a means for the integration of the personal and the 
social, even when the personal is taken to involve the subjective point of view, 
in a way that avoids the question of psychological individualism in that the 
social is understood as an integral part of the personal even at the level of 
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questions of personal identity, which seemed at the outset to assume 
individualism.16 
Notes 
1. This line of argument seems to raise the important question of the relative 
priority of the concept of identity. As Quine (1972:489) says "When we do 
propound identity conditions for bodies, or persons, or classes, we are using 
the prior concept of identity in the special task of clarifying the term 'body' or 
'person' or 'class; for an essential part of the clarification of a term is 
clarification of the standard by which we individuate its denotata". This is not 
denied on this account since it is not the priority of the laws of identity which is 
the issue but the importance of identity when we consider our future. It is 
therefore the existence of constraints other than the laws of identity that are of 
concern here. 
2. If it is recognised that questions of personal identity are connected to issues 
of moral and practical concern, then a third option, that of proceeding on the 
assumption that the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity 
provide a complete answer to the question of personal identity, is ruled out, 
since this would mean that there was no connection. This option would hold 
that determination of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct 
ascription of personal identity is not only independent of moral and practical 
issues, but that these latter can be determined subsequent to the conditions for 
personal identity. 
3. Clearly these are not the only grounds on which Reid and Butler, or any 
other non-reductionist object to reductionism. As mentioned later, the objection 
from its effects on our lives is given different weight, with it generally being 
seen as supportive of non-reductionism. The arguments for non-reductionism 
and against reductionism are mainly conducted on the coherence of the criteria. 
4. Consciousness is not sufficient since there are, as Flew (1987:136) points 
out "an abundance of possible extenuations or even of complete excuses" which 
would justify refraining from punishing or rewarding a person for an action 
acknowledged to be theirs. Locke explicitly rejects this idea. Rather than 
accepting that there are situations where we acknowledge actions to be our own, 
but also deny responsibility, Locke takes such features of experience and 
understanding of our relation to our actions as an argument for the implicit 
understanding of the distinction between persons and human beings, as 
witnessed by ordinary locutions such as he is "not himself, or is besides 
himself' (Locke, Essay II, xxvii. 20) to justify not punishing a sane man for an 
action committed while insane, or an insane man for an action committed while 
sane. As Noonan (1989:50) points out, however, to say that different persons 
are involved is unnecessary to justify the practice of not holding the insane 
accountable for their actions. They are not held accountable because it is 
generally recognised that accountability involves the understanding of the 
significance of one's actions. 
Consciousness is also not necessary for responsibility. We admit that we 
must have done actions, and accept responsibility for them, in the absence of 
memory of these actions where there is sufficient other evidence. I am alone in 
the house, the ashtray is full but I don't remember smoking all those cigarettes, 
yet given the evidence and my knowledge of myself when lost in my work, I 
have no doubt that I have smoked all those cigarettes. 
5. Flew (1968:165) among others has pointed out, that Locke's use of the term 
"consciousness" in Essay, II, xxvii, 11, is ambiguous between consciousness 
of self (as in his definition of a person as "a thinking intelligent being, that ... 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and 
places"), consciousness as contrasted with complete unconsciousness ("that 
consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and it seems to me, essential 
to it"), and consciousness which is identified with memory ("as far as this 
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far 
reaches the identity of that person"). Since the last is the more critical in 
discussions of self-identity and diachronic identity, Locke is usually taken to be 
defming personal identity in terms of memory. 
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6. The principle of the relativity of identity holds that the notion of identity must 
be joined to some substantive concept in order to have any use. Thus, the 
identity of an entity depends on what kind of entity it is. An entity will remain 
the same over time if the changes it undergoes are characteristic of that entity. 
Locke's concern is to give the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
identity of persons over time, in accordance with this principle, thereby 
articulating what changes are allowed for in the use of this concept. 
7. Although Locke spends a great deal of time arguing against the view that 
persons are soul substances, it being one of his concerns in putting forward the 
idea that personal identity is constituted by consciousness to show that it is 
possible to give a theory of identity which is neutral between materialism and 
dualism, this is not necessary even on Locke's own argument. As Penelhum 
(1985:97) points out, the irrelevancy of soul substances to the issue of personal 
identity is implied by his own theory of the relativity of identity. It is not 
therefore necessary to retain it. If Locke had not done so he could have avoided 
some of the confusions which are contained in his account of personal identity. 
8. Teichman and others who argue that human beings are paradigm persons, 
take being a human animal as sufficient for being a person. 
9. Non-reductionism rejects conventionalism with respect to persons. See, for 
example, Swinburne (1984) and Haksar (1991). 
10. An example of this is Wittgenstein's claim that while in ordinary situations 
our ordinary determinate concept holds, in extraordinary situations we have a 
choice of descriptions: "Now were Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde two persons or 
were they the same person who merely changed? We can say whichever we 
like" (1969.:62). 
11. While Parfit's argument is not intended to establish any moral theory, he 
argues that the Reductionist View is relevant to the question of moral 
responsibility. Those moral theories which do not take the distinctness of 
persons as fundamental are more plausible on this view. In this way attachment 
to some moral theories is weakened and other moral theories are more plausible. 
12. Parfit argues that in analyzing personal identity, "when we ask what 
persons are, and how they continue to exist, the fundamental question is a 
choice between two views" (op.cit.:273). 
13. To show the irrelevance of such thought experiments in general would 
involve showing that they are not useful or that they are unintelligible in that 
they are either conceptually or logically impossible. It is not sufficient to point 
out that they are not realised in the real world. 
One reason why it may be conceptually impossible to isolate essential features 
of persons is suggested by Wilkes' (1988:6-12) criticism of the use of thought 
experiments in philosophy of mind. Using the analogy of thought experiments 
in science, which have the essential characteristic of specification of what 
remains constant as well as what is to change, she criticises superficially similar 
experiments in philosophy of mind for failing to supply the needed and relevant 
background information. Thought experiments are effective in science precisely 
because the fixed concepts are adequately specified. This is not, and cannot be, 
the case, Wilkes argues, in philosophy of mind. Thus it is impossible to draw 
any conclusions from them. A world in which persons were capable of amoeba-
like splits would be such a vastly different world that we could not draw any 
conclusions for our own world. The point made by Wilkes is that the 
specification of the background conditions is necessary, and not possible in the 
case of thought experiments with persons. 
Wilkes' objection concerning the indeterminacy frequently involved in 
philosophical thought experiments. It is notable that attention is often not paid to 
the mass of details which are likely to influence interpretation of the experiment. 
This objection is not, however, particular to thought experiments, it is also 
evident in interpretation of operations such as commissurotomy. Questions of 
imaginability and possibility are complex. However, it not clear that Parfit and 
other who use puzzle cases and thought experiments are guilty of violating 
logical or conceptual standards (see Snowdon (1991) and Hertzberg (1991) for 
further discussion of some of the issues involved). 
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A different sort of objection is made by Quine (1972) who has argued that the 
use of puzzle cases in the analysis of personal identity, by seeking "what is 
'logically required' for sameness of person under unprecedented circumstances 
is to suggest that words have some logical force beyond what our past needs 
have invested them with". This criticism is appropriate to the use of thought 
experiments designed to test the limits of concepts, as it is used in science, for 
example. Thought experiments central to Parfit's argument are dissimilar in an 
important respect. To take the thought experiment of teletransportation, it is not 
the limits of the concept of person which is the issue here, but the eliciting of 
reactions about what we believe is important about persons. The method is 
designed to isolate what we believe to be important about persons, such as the 
relation of the identity, and showing by means of thought experiments that in 
situations where this relation does not hold, as in the case of branching 
teletransportation, what matters is still preserved. The methodology of thought 
experiments is designed to clarify the use of the concept of the person by 
isolating what is essential to it, it is not designed to test the limits of the concept. 
Although this may be a consequence, it is not the aim of constructing such 
experiments. There is a distinction to be made between thought experiments 
designed to tease out what we actually believe, or care about, by submitting 
those aspects of the concept to scrutiny and those experiments which are 
designed to test the limits. 
14. If this was the reaction to all puzzle cases it would be an effective denial of 
the intelligibility and usefulness of these examples. If it was the reaction to all 
actual problematic situations then it would show a lack of understanding of the 
concept of personal identity and, by implication, of the concept of person. 
Intuitions about persons are therefore instrumental determining whether actual 
cases which raise the question of personal identity such as multiple personality 
cases, are taken to be problematic. If it only if intuitions conflict over whether 
such cases involve one or more persons that there is a problem. 
15. This is Dennett's (1978) third of six conditions of personhood. 
16. This type of solution while avoiding the positing of an ontological 
individualism in the form of the question of personal identity, avoids at the 
same time advocation of a thesis of the "essential indistinctness of persons" as 
advanced by Scheman (1983) in her argument against the prevalent assumption 
that psychological states can be assigned and theorised about on an 
individualistic basis. 
Chapter 5 
The Nature of the Autobiography and Its Use in PSE 
Autobiography is open to a variety of interpretations. The aim here is to 
show that the theory of person advanced in the last two chapters while at odds 
with the conception of the person associated the traditional conception of 
autobiography, as well as with its attendant epistemology and ontology, is 
consistent with some recent developments in thinking about autobiography. 
This is particularly clear in relation to recent discussions of a defining 
characteristic of autobiography, its ostensible referentiality. In addition, the 
effect of adopting a relational theory of the person is also evident in the post-
structuralist preoccupation with the relation between the subject and language. It 
will be argued that the conceptualisation of the person argued in the previous 
chapters to be the most defensible, is also more appropriate than the strict 
identity theory as the basis for using students' autobiographical writing, given 
the central reasons for its use in the PSE classroom. The approach suggested 
can also be seen as having a contribution to make to some of the problems 
associated with teaching and using students' autobiographical writing' in the 
classroom. This is not to suggest that it does not give rise to problems of its 
own, some of which will be addressed in the next chapter. 
The increasing prominence of autobiographical forms in education, from the 
use of students' autobiographies in the classroom, in teacher education and 
increasingly the use of autobiographical methods educational research, attests to 
increasing recognition of importance of autobiographical talking and writing as 
a way of knowing about the world. 
In the first section the place in PSE of autobiographical writing, as a 
particular form of self-representation, by students is discussed, with attention 
being paid to the specific educational advantages of this particular form of self-
presentation. In the second section the relation between the understanding of 
autobiography necessary to the achievement of these objectives and the 
theoretically problematic concept of autobiography is examined using recent 
work in literary theory. This leads to consideration of the place of narrative in 
what it means to live a life. It is shown that the narrative conception of the self 
complements a neo-Lockean conception of the person, although there are areas 
of disagreement. The most important of these is the contribution of communities 
or traditions of narrative to the conception and constitution of personhood. It is 
argued that although the conception of the person so far advocated does not take 
the contribution of narrative communities to be privileged to the extent the 
narrative conception does, this is neither because of the abstraction nor the 
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implicit individualism of discussions of personal identity, but rather is a result 
of starting with the person as self-conscious and capable of agency. The 
continuity theory is, however, seen to be strengthened by insights gained from 
the narrative account, particularly in the idea that the unity of a person is 
something to be achieved. When the essential role of narratives and narrative 
structures in making sense of experience and the world is combined with the 
theory of the connections between the content of first-person mental states 
advanced in the last chapter, a stronger and more plausible theory is generated. 
The narrative account of the self, and the psychological continuity theory of 
personal identity concur in denying the ontological priority of the self or person. 
The narrative account, by focusing on the importance of narrative structure in 
the construction of meaning strengthens the point made in the last chapter 
concerning the influence of the content of first-person mental states on the 
formation of personal identity. This enriched understanding strengthens the 
psychological continuity theory. The narrative conception, it is argued, admits 
of problems similar to reductionist theories of persons. Although not atomistic, 
the accent on the narrative structures which shape experience threatens the 
concept of person as a subject of experience. This conclusion has the advantage 
of avoiding the implication that all texts are extenuated autobiographies, or 
denying the importance of autobiography through the dissolution of the unitary 
subject. Whilst the existence of a unitary subject is not pre-given on this 
account, it remains as a value to be achieved, autobiography being one of those 
means. 
Section 1 
Autobiographical Writing in PSE 
The education system of which PSE is a part reflects characteristic debates 
and positions on epistemology and the place of the student in the learning 
process. PSE is part of a general educational move away from a teacher-centred 
approach to learning, away from what Britton (1970:6) calls, after John 
Newson, the "jug and mug" method of teaching, towards a student-centred 
approach with the idea that pupils should have a sense of ownership, of having 
an active role in the creation of knowledge in the classroom. This leads to more 
group work, co-operation and individual work based on high-interest 
assignments designed to assist in the individual appropriation of meaning. In 
such an environment pupils' experience, thinking, writing and talking are 
privileged. The specific context of PSE with its emphasis on educating students 
for an unpredictable future in a pluralist society leads to increased emphasis on 
the person, as opposed to the acquisition of an impersonal body of knowledge. 
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Thus, Pring's (1987:27) argument for "a deeper concern for the person - a 
respect for pupils or students as persons" which includes accepting "seriously 
the values and attitudes that they bring to school or college", can be seen as an 
extension of this approach, through making explicit the moral dimension of 
personhood in the student-centred model. 
The integrity of the student-centred approach depends on the interpretation 
of the students' experience. A person's experience can be understood as a 
purely personal phenomenon. Experience, as Allen (1980:10) writes, is "from 
one viewpoint wholly private and personal, concerned with self-expression for 
one's own private purposes". Experiences can also be seen as cultural: "as a 
result of our upbringing in a particular time and place through a particular 
mediating form of language and perception" (loc.cit.). Alternatively, the focus 
in the classroom on student experiences can be seen as providing a means of 
transforming the world of public and private experiences outside the classroom 
through the interaction of the pupils and texts within the institutional setting of 
the school. The school is then seen as encouraging self-expression as a means 
of making public the private explorations of the pupil. Both views clearly do not 
take the experiences of pupils outside the classroom and those within the 
classroom as separate, but rather what goes on in the classroom is a means of 
making sense of experiences inside and outside the classroom. 
While sharing a commitment to education as the individual appropriation of 
meaning, the emphasis on students' experience is interpreted differently 
according to whether it is seen as the site of therapeutic intervention or as 
integral to the idea of cognitive growth and maturity. Although this delineation 
of two prominent approaches is based on the teaching of English,2 they apply 
equally well to PSE.3 The therapeutic approach, exemplified in Holbrook's 
approach to English teaching, leads to attention being paid by the teacher and 
pupil to the construction of the pupil's self, to the effect of social and cultural 
influences on the development of the individual, and the development of insight 
into the ways in which this can be come to terms with. This can take an even 
more ambitious turn when the aim is to understand this construction with a view 
to making personal choices designed to alter the situation. The alternative 
focuses on experience in conjunction with a theory of personal development in 
terms of cognitive growth. Maturation through the interaction of language and 
experience leads to the view that the modes of expression are influenced by and 
influence the nature of expression which leads to emphasis on the pupils' mode 
of expressing their experiences as integral to cognitive maturity. 
This brief background on the importance of the pupils' experience in 
education enables us to see that it is almost inevitable that a student-centred 
approach will lead to a concern with some form of autobiographical expression. 
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This is not to neglect the influence of wider societal concern with the self and 
individualism on the growth of autobiographical writing in general, but to 
situate autobiographical writing within the context of an educational theory of 
which it is clearly a part. Thus, the use of autobiography in PSE can be seen as 
a natural extension of, if not integral to, the ideas underlying this theory with its 
concern with the role of students' experience in the learning process. Given the 
emphasis in PSE on the students' understanding of themselves, their actual and 
anticipated social and personal roles and responsibilities, the point is even 
stronger. It is almost to be expected that some form of autobiographical work 
will be part of the PSE syllabus, given that it is difficult to think of a more 
appropriate means of encouraging pupils to find their own voice and construct 
the meaning of their experience. The epistemological position which privileges 
students' experiences and its clarification focuses on the self as knower, placing 
the student at the centre of the educational process, rejecting the idea that 
education can be solely understood as the passing on of a body of knowledge, 
skills and techniques, thus provides the use of autobiography with its 
justification in an educational context.4 Moreover, in taking a person's own 
story of their life as integral to the appropriation of meaning, the use of 
autobiography is not only consistent with a certain epistemological position, it is 
consistent with the ethical demand to respect persons in so far as this involves 
respecting a person's own interpretation of their experiences. 
Given this background it is clear that autobiographical writing is a pliable 
tool in the hands of educators, and can be seen as a means of furthering diverse 
and not necessarily compatible aims. It can be seen as an important aid in the 
empowering of students in the illumination of radical possibilities embedded in 
their histories, along the lines of Giroux's (1983) theory of critical pedagogy. It 
can be seen as an important method in educational settings for marginalised 
groups to investigate how subjectivity is constructed along differential relations 
of power. Thus, it can be seen as part of the Freirean (1983) process of 
conscientization, and as a means of not only seeing how subjectivity is 
constructed but as a means of helping students position themselves through the 
self and group understanding facilitated and encouraged by autobiographical 
projects enabling them to envision or effect meaningful change in their lives. In 
contrast to this view of the social and personal value of autobiographical writing 
is the idea of autobiography as a kind of liberation from societal constraints, as 
a celebration of individuality or individualism. Thus, Weintraub (1978:1) 
argues that "the proper form of autobiography" is the search for the conditions 
of "self-conscious individuality". Or, again it can be seen as a display of the self 
in the expectation that this will aid in the liberation from some forms of 
repression, along the lines of Holbrook's approach. These various 
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interpretations of the importance of autobiographical tasks are consistent with 
the idea that it affords the possibility of giving or enhancing the subjective 
meaning of a life. As part of an education which is involved in enabling and 
facilitating self-understanding, elements of the Sartrian (Todd, 1957:915) 
autobiographical motive, the desire to rescue the significance of events from 
'dissolving' into objectivity, may well function in PSE as a motivation to use 
this form of self-representation. This draws on the importance of subjective 
meaning to conceptions of personal well-being, and the recognition that each 
person has a life which is not adequately described by the 'objective' facts of 
that life, or by others. If it is held to be important for each person to make sense 
of her life, study of its objective features is not considered sufficient. How 
these intertwine with the 'inner life' of the self, is revealed through 
autobiographical expression, which is then seen as an appropriate mediator 
between the objective circumstances, the setting of a life, and the personal life 
of the individuals Among the possibilities which this perspective on the 
importance of autobiography to determining the meaning of one's life affords, 
is the appreciation it can give of the freedoms and necessities of a life. 
Whatever the differences in the aims behind the use of autobiographical 
writing, it is clear that in all instances there is agreement that the educational 
benefit lies in increased self-awareness and self-understanding, with the 
differences lying in how self-understanding is to be understood. Thus the 
benefit of autobiographical writing for students in general is an extension and 
elaboration of the idea that writing an autobiography is, as Mandel (1980:64) 
observes "one of the strategies human beings have developed to make life 
matter." It is an expression of the importance of personal meaning to the idea of 
living a worthwhile life, premised on the idea that each person has a role in 
determining this meaning, and there is educational value in each person 
reflecting on the significance of events in her life as a means of making sense of 
that life. 
Armed with this understanding of the aims autobiographical writing is 
designed to achieve in PSE, we turn to the question of whether autobiography 
as a distinct form of self-presentation can sustain the various demands made on 




This brief sketch of the interest in autobiography in PSE suggests that the 
definition of autobiography in the educational context is to some extent 
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counts as autobiography will be responsive to these educational concerns. For 
example, its very use in schools involves rejection of the convention that 
autobiography is something to be accomplished, if at all, near the completion of 
a life. Even aspects of autobiography which may be considered definitive, such 
as the use of 'I' in the text, may not be considered mandatory.6 Admitting a 
latitude in what counts as an autobiographical text is not peculiar to the use of 
autobiography in the classroom. The problems with providing a generic 
definition of autobiography are frequently noted in literary theory,7 for example. 
In education what will and will not count as autobiography is a function of a 
complex interplay between commonsensical understandings of what 
autobiography is, and the reasons for its introduction into the classroom. Thus 
when we introduce autobiographical writing into the classroom we have in mind 
more or less clear ideas of what the educational aims are, and what would count 
as autobiographical writing. It is not only, therefore, the formal idea of 
autobiography which motivates its use in education, but something more 
informal and universal, the idea of an autobiographical impulse, the telling of 
stories about ourselves. As shown above, these aims centrally include respect 
for students' experience and their interpretation of their lives, and helping them 
to come to a greater self-understanding whether this is a reflection of the general 
importance given to self-expression for 'mental health', appreciation of one's 
uniqueness and individuality, whether it is understood as integral to personal 
development or whether it is understood more explicitly within a larger social 
and political framework. 
Putting on one side for the moment what the student learns from the respect 
given to her experience by having her interpretation of it considered a legitimate 
area of school work, the overt benefit stems from what the student will learn 
about herself and her situation from writing an autobiography. What is learnt by 
the autobiographical student must, therefore, to some extent be a result of 
something integral to, or an implication of the form of autobiography itself, 
otherwise other self-referential writing such as diaries could perform the same 
function, or the writing of biographies or the study of other people's lives could 
be substituted with no loss. In short, it is in the implications of the construction 
of personal meaning which is thought to be encouraged or facilitated by 
autobiographical writing that the educational benefits for the student lie. 
Given that the aim can generally be characterised as greater self-awareness 
or self-understanding, what enables autobiographical writing to be seen as 
contributing to this end is that one is writing or talking about one's self. It is, in 
other words, the relation between the author and the subject which is important. 
If diaries are not held to have the same educational function this suggests that 
the retrospective stance distinctive of autobiographies is also necessary. 
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Together these conditions give us a recognisable if not definitive account of 
autobiography consistent with its aims in education: the author is writing 
specifically about her life from a particular perspective, namely the present. For 
the moment we can leave on one side what is involved in this stance towards 
her life, leaving it open what is implied by the idea, often taken to be 
characteristic of, if not essential to the coherence of an autobiography that the 
stance is in part characterised by its consistency, except to note that the stance is 
of necessity selective and interpretative, executed from a particular point of 
view. In an autobiography, as distinct from a diary for example, events in the 
author's life are of necessity selected according to some criterion or criteria 
which give these events significance and relevance within the overall structure 
of the autobiography. This will at least involve the implicit judgement of 
experiences and memories. Unlike a diary where the diarist may mention what 
she had for breakfast, or faithfully record her dreams, these will only be 
mentioned in an autobiography if they are perceived to have some significance, 
fit into the overall pattern of her life as she is interpreting it.8 The student who 
starts her autobiography with what she had for breakfast that day would not 
have misunderstood the task if she, for example, used the routine or menu as a 
metaphor for her life. What is clear is that the aim of writing an autobiography 
is for the student to gain in self-understanding. This involves enhancing 
understanding of her present, which is not separate from the hope or 
expectation that this will have future beneficial effects in virtue of the meaning 
constructed and gained in the autobiographical task, or more generally from the 
demand for personal reflection and thoughtfulness the task occasions. 
Thus although the stance is primarily retrospective the meaning to be 
achieved through autobiographical writing is meaning for the autobiographer, as 
she is presently situated. Taking as the subject the past self, the focus is on the 
narrative situation, the present. Autobiographical writing, necessarily executed 
from the present, the period of the autobiographical act itself, accesses the past 
as a function of the autobiographer's present consciousness, as Eakin 
(1985:22), along with most commentators, reminds us. The idea, that 
autobiography is, as Renza (1980:271) writes, "the writer's de facto attempt to 
elucidate his present rather than his past," that autobiography can function as a 
means of understanding life now, and how to continue, is what gives 
autobiographical writing educational significance. Writing autobiographically 
obliges "me to situate what I am in the perspective of what I have been", as 
Gusdorf (1980:40) notes. Among the characteristics of autobiography are, 
therefore, the need for a standpoint, a retrospective stance and the selection of 
experiences according to a criterion of significance. The educational significance 
is not limited to the insight gained into the present life of the author, but 
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crucially includes in its future effects. Stories about the past, as Rosen 
(1988:86) says, are, in the end, also about the future. Thus, Abbs (1974:12), in 
discussing the use of autobiography in teacher education, gives this future-
looking aspect of autobiography the greatest significance. The "deepest 
achievement" of such writing is for students to be able to "seed" their 
experience "for a harvest that may be theirs tomorrow" (loc.cit.). 
This brief outline of the essential features of autobiography takes us to the 
heart of the problem of autobiography, for while this understanding of the 
significance of autobiography for the author as presently situated and for her 
future justifies its use in PSE, it raises questions about how this "deepest 
achievement" is even conceptually possible. As Barthes (1977:121) asks: "What 
right does my present have to speak of my past? Has my present some 
advantage over my past? What "grace" might have enlightened me?" 
(1977:121). On what basis does the author assume authority over the subject of 
the autobiography, and see this as a presumption for making sense of the 
present? 
The common-sense answer is that the achievement of meaning for the 
autobiographer is possible in virtue of the fact that my autobiography is about 
my life. It is possible for my present self to construct personal meaning for my 
life because my past self is just as much myself as my present self. The events 
which are recounted or recollected in an autobiography, have one property in 
common: they all belong to the life of the autobiographer. An autobiography 
takes as its principal subject matter, one life, the life of the author. It is about a 
self which, in some sense, is the same today as it was yesterday. The distinctive 
contribution of autobiography, which gives it relevance, is this relation between 
the author and the subject of the text: the positing of an existent identity as its 
locus, which survives any changes in the person. 
The value of autobiography in the classroom is therefore a function of the 
relation between the author and the protagonist, distinctive of autobiography as 
a literary form. What is learnt is learnt because of the identification of the past 
self as narrated in the autobiography and narrating present self. The principal 
reference of an autobiographical text, which distinguishes it from biography, 
for example, is the identity explicitly posited between the individual exemplified 
in the organisation of the text and the individual to whom reference is made 
through its subject matter.9 The identity of the author and the protagonist is a 
necessary condition for the insight or understanding gained by the author to be 
personally significant, at least on a common-sense understanding of 
autobiography. This relationship gives the author an epistemic authority over 
the protagonist denied to writer of a biography for example. As the author, 
protagonist and narrator, she takes responsibility for the creation and 
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arrangement of the text, and is the source of the text and its structure. It is the 
conjunction of the textually and logically distinct roles of author, narrator and 
protagonist in autobiography, "with the same individual occupying a position 
both in the context, the associated 'scene of writing,' and within the text itself' 
(Bruns, 1980:300), which, on at least one major interpretation, makes possible 
the aim of using autobiography in PSE, the achievement of personal meaning. 
This is not to say that third-person interpretations cannot be equally valid or 
more insightful, nor, of course, that the autobiographer is not free to recognise 
or incorporate these points of view. Third-person interpretations may indeed be 
more significant. The point is that the personal meaning given to a life by the 
person who is presumed to be the same throughout is valued and given a 
different value in virtue of the assumption that the person commenting is the 
same as that commented upon. It is in this sense that the author assumes 
epistemic authority and it is in virtue of this that personal meaning is acquired.10 
Thus, central to this form of self-representation, of the inquiry of the self into 
its own history, is the assumption that the person constructing the narrative is 
the same as that exemplified in it, this identification sanctioning the assigning of 
significance to events within constraints, the most notable being the verifiability 
of the events described in the autobiographical piece. This identification 
provides the warrant needed for my present interpretation of events in my past 
and for its special authority, giving my interpretation of those experiences, 
identified as mine, a significance not captured in any other account. 
The question is whether this assumption of identity is integral to the idea of 
autobiography, as it seems to be, and whether the educational benefits are 
dependent on this defining assumption, given that it has been argued in the 
previous chapters that the identity of persons through time is most plausibly 
understood as relations between events, and thus not as something assured 
through the necessary holding of an identity relation. If the identity value of an 
autobiography is predicated on the pre-given unity of the person, then in light of 
the discussion of personal identity it must be determined whether the 
educational benefits make essential reference to this central feature of 
autobiography, and if so, whether the educational aims, or the theory of the 
person are in need of revision. 
The main objection to the psychological criterion of personal identity came 
from the importance of the first-person perspective. Autobiography raises the 
same objection in a different form. As mentioned above, the value of 
autobiography is often seen as a consequence of the importance to persons of 
determining the subjective meaning of a life. In general terms the problem is 
how this fundamental presupposition of autobiography, which is arguably what 
makes it distinctive, is to be understood. Underlying this question is the 
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coherence of the autobiographical form and whether the educational aims 
thought to be furthered by its use are dependent on the identity relation between 
the narrator and the protagonist. Thus one of the questions which must be 
addressed is what effect different interpretations of this relation have on its 
perceived educational benefits. 
Clearly the view that autobiography reflects the unity of the person is the 
common-sense understanding. The legitimacy of the authoritative stance in 
autobiography lies in the prior identification of the narrator and protagonist, an 
identification which is perceived as precedent to, and independent of, the 
writing of the autobiography. The separation of roles in the text is merely 
implied if autobiography is to achieve the task of assigning unique significance 
to past events from the perspective of the present. The unity of the self thus 
occupies a central place in our understanding of autobiography, and constitutes 
a fundamental philosophical presupposition of its coherence, and its role as a 
means of achieving personal meaning. It provides a necessary condition for the 
recognition of a text as an autobiography, and functions as a criterion against 
which it can be judged in terms of consistency and coherence, no matter the 
disunity or the fragmentation of the life narrated.11 
This traditional understanding of autobiography, gains support from both 
philosophical positions on the nature of persons and from the contextual 
implications which accompany our use of language. The identification of the 
subject of the autobiography and its author, as a narrative by and about the same 
individual, mirrors the language practice that allows the same reference to the 
speaker and the subject of the speech. The implication of the possibility of 
simultaneous indication and designation of the subject of the act of speech and 
the subject of the proposition allowed by the English pronoun T, is reflected in 
autobiography, as Bruss (1980:301) points out. The influence of language on 
our understanding of the ontological status of the self is brought to the fore by 
consideration of the 'fit' between language and autobiography. Although 
interpretation and the assigning of significance to one's life is only possible 
through language, language itself, along with other factors, promotes the belief 
that the unity of self is assured prior to this construction in language. Thus, the 
assumption is that the self exists prior to the writing or formation of an 
autobiography and can be understood as being independent of it in some sense. 
We each live our lives and then, if we have the desire, we write or tell our 
autobiography. In short, life precedes the story of it, life in some sense 
precedes its articulation, and the content of a life shapes the form of its story. 
As Bruss (1980:298) says, the assumption is that: "First we have selfhood, a 
state of being with its own metaphysical necessity; and only then 
autobiography, a discourse that springs from that state of being and gives it 
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voice." The "ontological trick" of traditional autobiography, as Eakin 
(1985:181) calls it, is the belief it fosters in the existence of the self. The 
structure of language itself at least facilitates this belief, the particular demands 
of writing autobiographically promotes it. It is not only the structure of 
language, but the belief in the transparency of language which allows the fact 
that an individual is herself narrating the story of her life to be unproblematic. 
Thus, belief in the priority of the self, that life in some sense produces its 
autobiography, structures major interpretations of the autobiographical act and 
its significance. This understanding of the self and its relation to reality 
comprises a recognisable approach to autobiographical writing by both teachers 
and students. It is an approach which sees autobiography as a natural response 
to a natural phenomenon, the desire of a self which is in some sense pre-
existent, to express itself. This conception of the self encourages the view that 
the task of knowing oneself is achieved through expressing or realising the 
'true' or inner self, illustrative of the idea that whatever else an autobiography 
is, the presentation in autobiography has the potential for being an 'authentic' 
image of the author, whether this is understood as the self revealing or creating 
itself.12 This view of the self privileges autobiography based on its identity 
value. While we may lack the certainty of autobiographers such as Rousseau 
that there are any guarantees that our reflections will result in interpretations 
which are immune to error," we retain some confidence in the special status of 
autobiography, based on the proposition that autobiography can be 
distinguished by its, in De Man's phrase (1979:920) "simpler mode of 
referentiality,"14 which itself rests on the prior assumption of the unity of the 
self over time. 
This understanding of the self has the effect of directing attention to the 
truth-value of autobiography, as the main concern, rather than the status of the 
self presupposed by this model. Hence, attention is directed either to the 
confirmation of biographical facts, where what is of concern is the bios of 
autobiography, or the more complex issue of the truth of the autos, where 
attention is directed to the author's truthfulness in portraying historical facts. 
On this view, as Olney (op.cit.:20) points out, the autos is "taken to be 
perfectly neutral and adding it to "biography" change[s] nothing." 
As teachers our primary concern is not with the verification of the 
biographical details but with the attempt by the autobiographical student to be 
truthful, it is thus, with the problematic idea of the truthfulness of the self, 
rather than the verification of biographical details that educational attention is 
directed. The idea that there is a truth in the autos revealed or created in 
autobiography is clearly a source of its educational value. Once the focus moves 
from the bios to the autos, the autobiographical act is seen as creative and 
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interpretive. From this turn to the 'I' of autobiography we have the idea of 
autobiography as both self-creation and self-discovery, furnishing the idea that 
it has a role to play in resolving problems to do with the nature of the individual 
through self-analysis and self-evaluation. The assumption that there is, as Olney 
(ibid:22) notes, a "completed entity, a defined, known self or a history to be 
had for the taking" is not inconsistent with this approach. The emphasis is on 
the structure of the self to be created or discovered in autobiography and not on 
the self as constituted in language. Whether the content of an autobiography 
primarily reflects a concern with the inner life of the author or not, 
autobiographical writing is clearly an activity which concentrates on, and 
involves a pre-occupation with the self. A common expression of the value of 
autobiography is, therefore, in terms of a search for the self, particularly for a 
'real' or 'authentic' self. For Abbs (1974) at least, it is a concern with the true 
self which lies at the heart of its use in education. Hence, he talks of the reward 
of autobiography, if it can be reached, as an "enhanced affirmation of the self' 
(ibid:12) and of autobiography itself as "the search backwards in time to 
discover the evolution of the true self' (ibid:7). 
Thus the conception of the self as an enduring entity which can be 
discovered through reflection does not stand alone in the sense that it fosters, 
though it clearly does not imply, belief in a 'core' or 'real' self as the reference 
of the autobiography, as its essence, the truth of which is discovered or 
revealed through introspection or reflection. It is thus allied to the familiar 
philosophical view whereby the self is seen as the foundation of all knowledge. 
As such the self is required to be a substantial entity, if for no other reason than 
that as the bedrock of knowledge it is required to have the ability to support 
other less substantial aspects of reality. To be so viewed, the self must be seen 
as an unambiguous entity to which reference can be made. Substance theories 
of the self, where the self is seen as either a dependent or independent existent, 
have the consequent that the self is essentially private and best known to itself, 
again in line with, and providing a justification for the epistemic authority of the 
author of an autobiography, though this, of course, is a much stronger position 
than that outlined above. Although substantialist theories of the self are not 
referred to in its use in education, the epistemic privilege of the self in relation to 
itself over time, implies a philosophical position which grounds the epistemic 
certainty of awareness of the first-person present-tense mental states in a self as 
a dependent or independent existent. While it is not necessary for the coherence 
of the concept of autobiography that the self be an entity, nor, of course is the 
value of autobiography dependent on belief in the existence of the self, it is 
nonetheless the case that the self, as subject of the autobiography, is presumed 
to be something of which knowledge is possible, and that this knowledge is 
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available through the reflection on one's life required in constructing an 
autobiography. This conception of the person or self and thus the relation 
between the narrator and protagonist in an autobiography, is challenged by 
objections raised to its underlying epistemology as well as to its metaphysical 
stance, the conception of the person as a discrete completed entity in a particular 
relation to language and reality. The most obvious of these moves is to point to 
the historical and social genesis of autobiography as a distinctive genre at the 
same time as social, political and philosophical attention was directed to the 
person as a source of moral, religious and political authority. The effect of these 
inquiries into the origins of autobiography undermine the view that formal 
autobiographical expression is a natural or universal impulse on the part of 
persons but rather a result of the conjunction of a number of particular 
influences, and thus is best understood as a function of social context. This is 
not to deny the wider point that autobiographical narrative in general has wider 
significance in the explication of human intention in the context of action. This 
more informal and seemingly less culturally specific use of constructing 
meaning will be considered later. The point here is to raise the issue of the 
context which gave rise to autobiography as a genre, and which continues to 
give it importance in education. 
The 'common-sense' view, that every autobiography refers to a self, a pre-
given structure outside the text, either shaped in the process of writing an 
autobiography, or revealed by it, has its foundations as Sprinker notes 
(1980:326) in "the historical conditions which gave rise to the concepts of 
subject, self and author as independent sovereignties." The general historical 
and cultural phenomena which coalesced to supply the preconditions for 
autobiography as a distinct form are weighted differently by individual literary 
historians concerned with the origins of autobiography.15 There is, however, 
some agreement on the phenomena themselves. These include the recognition of 
identity as simultaneously unique and dependent on social reality and cultural 
conventions, with the understanding that rather than the self being an ascriptive 
natural donnee, it is self-fashioning. Along with the willingness to challenge 
social roles and the dominant forms of inquiry, the idea of the responsibility and 
authority of the speaking subject is promoted. Thus we have the idea of the self 
as a centre of meaning and form, as opposed to simply being an exemplar of 
traditional roles.116 Rooted in a specific cultural and philosophical history, 
autobiography can be seen as developing historically from a belief in the notion 
of individual identity, as Spengeman and Lundquist (op.cit.: 516) note. To 
deny the importance of individual identity signals for some the end of 
autobiography. Bruss (1976:15), for example, writes that "autobiography could 
simply become obsolete if its defining features, such as individual identity, 
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cease to be important for a particular culture". The philosophical idea of the 
unity of the self forms an important precondition of the conception of the person 
on this which this is based. The discreteness of persons, as one of the two 
mutually supporting functions of personal identity, is coupled with the 
epistemological view that the self occupies a privileged relation to a knowable 
empirical reality, in particular, as Elbaz (1987) notes, to that part of reality 
which is itself. This provides the foundations for privileging personal as 
opposed to social responsibility and the idea of autonomy, with certain 
attributes of the self, such as separateness being emphasised. On this view, the 
discreteness and individuality of persons are given prominence in the positing 
of a self grounded in a particular metaphysics. The traditional understanding of 
autobiography draws on the idea that, as Bruss (1980:304) says "one and only 
one person can have authentic knowledge of that self (and, in turn, that my self 
is the only self I can ever really know)." Self and others, on this view, admit of 
fundamental separation, such that an ultimate division can be made between the 
self and the world, between the inner and the outer world, and between the self 
and others. The basic truth of autobiography is, on this account, expressed by 
Spender (1980:117) in his autobiographical assertion "I am alone in the 
universe." 
This view of the person is particular, not universal. Understood as an 
articulation of, in Olney's phrase (1980a) a "cultural moment," autobiography 
is, as Spengeman and Lundquist (op.cit.: 516) write, "inextricably bound up 
with cultural belief." Along with the wider cultural influences, central among 
these is the preoccupation with the self, its choices and their significance for the 
person. Autobiography and its particular expression can not be considered 
neutral between conceptions of the person or possible structures of self-
representation. 
Autobiography has evolved as a specific means of self-representation which 
relies on privileging certain philosophical positions on the person, embedded in 
the status of the autobiographical self, supplying a source of the authority and 
value of autobiography. This interpretation of the particularity of the 
autobiographical as a distinct form raises the question of the extent to which 
self-conceptions can differ within a cultural context, given the dependence of 
the former on the later. However, the dependence of self-conceptions on 
context disallows differing conceptions only if the context is monolithic, and 
does not in itself encourage or allow differing conceptions of the self. That there 
are differing conceptions within our cultural context is an argument frequently 
made by feminists in the argument that there are gender related differences in 
conceptions of the self. Recent work17 in this area has pointed to identifiable 
differences in the self-schema of men and women. Most notably it has been 
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suggested that women are relatively more likely to create 'connected' or 
'communal' affective/cognitive structures which lend meaning and coherence to 
experience." This is in contrast to self-schema where others are represented as 
separate and distinct. Gender is not the only relevant difference we need to 
consider: conceptions of self also vary across cultures. The conception of the 
person presupposed by the traditional understanding of autobiography is, 
however, the dominant model and ideal in modern Western cultures. As 
previously argued, the features of persons considered essential influence action. 
On this model, where the essential features of persons are their will and capacity 
for choice, persons act and strive to act autonomously and independently. 
Although often stated in universalistic terms this idea, as Midgley (1984:51) 
says "of a free independent, enquiring choosing individual, an idea central to 
European thought, has always been essentially the idea of a male." 
The point of raising the question of differing conceptions of self, and the 
contextualism of the dominant model which has taken on the status of common-
sense, is to point to the importance of not assuming that the dominant model is 
the only one. It is not to argue that metaphysical realism or belief in personal 
autonomy are to be identified as masculine beliefs. The argument is essentially 
an extension of the argument made in the second chapter, that this conception 
derives its importance, in part, from its universalistic status grounded in an 
ontology of discrete individuals. Again, this is not to argue that there are not 
other grounds for valuing this conception, but rather to point to the implications 
of a failure to give adequate recognition to the idea that autobiography is 
expressed in particular forms, forms rooted in social and historical traditions 
which draw on various philosophical positions. This may result in the 
unintentional promotion of the dominant ideal, namely the liberal ideal of the 
autonomous individuated self, and the implicit devaluing and inhibiting of other 
expressions. Essentially this is a plea for awareness of the differences, and for 
awareness of the effects of implicit philosophical assumptions about the nature 
of these differences. It is not a call to devalue the liberal idea of autonomy, but 
to recognise that the presentation of the self not in line with dominant myths of 
progress towards autonomy, perhaps with the stress being placed on 
relationships and connectedness as much as separateness, needs to at least be 
given the opportunity to be seen for what they may be: an alternative conception 
of the self. Thus, even if the argument made in the last two chapters is rejected, 
and it is felt that insufficient grounds have been given for preferring a 
psychological continuity theory of the person to a strict identity theory, this 
does not affect the argument that a person's sense of self is derived from a 
theory of personal identity. On this ground together with the recognition, for 
which there is ample evidence, that a person's sense of self is responsive to 
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various social influences gives grounds for educators to be aware of the 
conception of the self implicated in their theory and practice. We should remain 
mindful that the ideal of the autonomous person is a cultural and ethical value, 
and not a reflection of a particular ontological thesis of which autobiography is 
just one contingent means of expression. As we have seen, the position that the 
value of the discrete person is dependent on the thesis of persons as discrete real 
entities, can be upheld, but this carries with it a division and hierarchy of 
philosophical disciplines, and acceptance of abstract individualism. 
If we want autobiography to be of value to all our students, for it to function 
as a means of showing respect to all students as persons with their own 
subjectivity, and to sanction the view that what a person says about her life is 
significant, not just for the general epistemological stance involved, but for the 
meaning it gives to the individual life, then we must, at least, recognise that 
their value as individuals includes their value as individuals embedded in social, 
cultural and historical structures and practices. If the unity of the person is taken 
as given, the implication is that autobiography operates in effect to give less 
value to some forms of narrative self-representations, i.e., those forms which 
challenge the idea of the self as irreducible. This could be exhibited by 
problematising the referentiality of the self-narrative, or of the author as 
authority. This raises special problems in the educational context where forms 
of expression which do not conform to an implicit standard may not be seen as 
attempts to express a sense of identity but may be interpreted as a 
misunderstanding of the task. This calls for increased awareness of the forms of 
autobiography available, and, to return to the point made at the beginning of the 
second section, awareness of the interplay of between what educational benefit 
this task is to thought to have, and the commonsensical notions of what 
constitutes an autobiography. As with all educational endeavours, the relation 
between what is to be achieved and the understanding of the task has to be 
sensitive to the context. This includes the position of the student in relation to 
the task as well as the teacher's understanding of the task. 
It should be recalled that autobiography is under discussion because it is a 
means of expressing our sense of identity. The fact that autobiography as a 
form of self-representation has been held to be a means to self-understanding or 
self-knowledge on the presupposition of an ontological thesis about the self tied 
to specific epistemological positions, should not obscure this. Our sense of 
identity is logically and conceptually distinct from the criteria of personal 
identity. The thesis being advocated here accepts the general position, argued 
for by Harre (1983:210-12) for example, that the sense of identity is derived 
from the criteria of identity. 
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The questions raised in this section concerning the implication of language 
in the status of the autobiographical subject, naturally leads to further 
consideration of the role of language, and the influence of the narrative structure 
itself on the form of the autobiography, and the light this throws on realisation 
of the aim of self-understanding. 
3 
Narrative and the Self 
The unproblematic identification of the author and the narrated subject is 
coupled with a belief in the transparency of language in the traditional 
conception of autobiography. The self is able to know itself, but the language 
which expresses this knowledge is neutral. It does not, on this view, 
problematise the possibility of knowledge of one's self, or affect the knowledge 
one gains. There is no reason to assume, however, that the language of 
autobiography should differ from the use of language in other contexts. It is 
used functionally, it is not, as Szabados (1992:6) says, unemployed: "it is not 
language gone on holiday". 
In this section the role played by language in the assumption that the self is 
the focus and locus of autobiography and the autobiographical act is explored as 
part of the larger inquiry into the relation between personal identity, a sense of 
identity and the agency of persons. 
Essential to the autobiographical act is the assigning of significance and 
meaning to experiences and selected events in the past. The investing of the self 
and the past with a coherence and meaning which may not have been evident 
previous to the autobiographical act itself, which of course is a motivation for 
its use in education, brings to the fore considerations of the relationship 
between the structure of language and its role in self-representation. Inherent in 
the autobiographical process are such features as the giving of a completely 
formed character to events and experiences in the composing of a coherent 
narrative. This subverts the traditional understanding of autobiography as a 
means of self-discovery, or self-knowledge. "Narrative smoothing," as Spence 
(1987:132) refers to the giving to events and experiences a logical coherence 
and rationalization, is, in Gusdorfs memorable phrase (1980:40-41) the 
"original sin" of autobiography. "The completely formed" is substituted "for 
that which is in the process of being formed" (loc.cit.) in the funnelling of "a 
multivariate reality into an ordered stream of language" (Spence, op.cit.:131). 
Narrative smoothing draws attention to the impossibility of a veridical report of 
a person's life. Autobiography is not the reporting of something completed that 
can now be revealed or told. In drawing attention to the necessary effect of 
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putting experience into language, it also draws attention to the implication of 
language and its structure in the construction of the autobiographical self. In 
other words, the giving to experience a meaning it did not have at the time does 
not need to subvert the idea of agency, even if it does subvert the traditional idea 
of veridical access to the past. The subversion of agency is left to the post-
structuralists. 
The imbrication of language and the subject with the consequent dissolution 
of the subject is found, for example, in De Man's (1979:922) claim that 
selfhood is "fictive". This claim is made by reference to the structural 
constraints and limits of the language which make the autobiographical project 
only apparently possible. The self is an illusion, "the manifestation, on the level 
of the referent, of a linguistic structure" (loc.cit.). Although the view that the 
self is fictive is not limited to literary critics concerned with the theory of 
autobiographical discourse,19 De Man's position is obviously stronger in that he 
takes, as Paul Smith (1988:103) aptly describes it, the autobiographical project 
as a "privileged kind of impossibility". The impossibility lies in the linguistic 
predicament of the autobiographer. While language through its referential 
properties makes the autobiographical project seem possible, the illusion of the 
subject in language is the cause of its impossibility: "autobiography veils a 
defacement of the mind of which it is itself the cause" (De Man, op.cit.: 930). 
The bleakness of this vision for autobiography illustrates a difficulty for the use 
of autobiography in school. If the traditional view of autobiography, with its 
positing of a pre-linguistic self given in experience, known best to itself is 
rejected, the most obvious, if not the only move seems to be to look to the 
influence of structures, such as those furnished by language to construct the 
self. This reveals the self as a fiction, denying the subject of experience not only 
as independent of reality, but in any sense as knowable through language. Such 
a picture denies what autobiography purports to illustrate: the agency of the 
author. 
The vertigo to which De Man refers in the double-bind of the subject or self 
in relation to language is the converse of the "epistemological vertigo" Bruner 
(1988) suggests we should feel in the reflexivity of self-narrative at the very 
idea of telling, writing or even thinking an autobiography, as the autobiographer 
undertakes the dual role of both narrator and the central figure of the narrative. 
Bruner's position is, however, importantly different from a post-structuralist 
analysis. Whereas in De Man language is privileged to the extent that it eclipses 
the agency of the subject, in Bruner and others who emphasise the narrative 
structure of our lives and importance of narrative to the meaning of living a life, 
there is the possibility of rescuing the subject without returning to it the 
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epistemic and ontological authority associated with the traditional conception of 
autobiography with its assumption of a pre-given unity. 
We are as Maclntyre (1981:201) says, "story-telling animals." We live 
'storied lives', with narrative playing a central role in structuring our 
experience. There is an important sense in which the possibilities of our lives 
are determined by the stories we tell and are told. On this view our sense of 
personal identity presupposes narrative intelligibility. The construction of a 
narrative becomes necessary for the unity and coherence of a life. Thus the 
unity of a life is not pre-given or justified according to a metaphysical realism, 
but by reference to available narrative structures. The implication, of course, is 
that the unity of a person, the central idea of personhood, is not a necessary 
feature of human beings,- but something learnt and acquired with narrative 
language. Bruner's (1987, 1988) work on narrative and the self illustrates the 
importance of the structure of narrative on what it means to live a life. He 
argues (1987:31) that this structure is of such importance that it itself, through 
habituation, becomes a directive of experience. It is not the case that the 
patterning of a life is a sculpting process, the smoothing of rough edges to fit a 
pattern which is either contained in the language or the stories of the culture, the 
point is that the experience of life and action is structured by the narrative 
structures which are already present. On this view, Bruner (loc.cit.) argues, "a 
life as led is inseparable from a life as told, ... a life is not 'how it was' but how 
it is interpreted and reinterpreted, told and retold." The telling of our stories is 
what makes our life our life, with the telling of stories constituting what it 
means to live a life. 
The meaning given to a life therefore includes amongst its most crucial 
influences existing narratives and narrative structures. Rather than it being the 
case that one's life has been lived and it is just there waiting to be retrieved or 
interpreted, on this view there is an important sense in which the self is formed 
in language, that autobiography is 'writing the self, that narratives are, as Carr 
(1986:61) says, "told in being lived and lived in being told". The experience of 
narrative structure is necessary for the making sense of experience. This 
includes the perception that the idea of a life is already structured as a narrative, 
highlighting the complex relationship between living a life and writing an 
autobiography. The potential of self-representational narratives to structure 
perceptual experience is explored by Bruner (op.cit.:15), in his argument for the 
claim that "[i]n the end we become the autobiographical narratives by which we 
'tell about our lives'... we also become variants of the culture's canonical 
forms" (italics in original). You become your autobiography in the sense that as 
it becomes believable so it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Outside events 
don't affect you until you fit them into your implicit autobiography. The self has 
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a desire to be unified and consistent (Bruner 1988). The unity of the self is not 
ontologically given, but a desire. 
This thesis is intelligible if we admit with Hanson (1986:103) that "we do 
not need a unitary object to produce a unified object". The unified self is an 
ideal produced by a variety of factors, but importantly including the ideal of the 
person promoted and promulgated in a social environment. This fits with the 
idea that autobiography is the construction of a life, creating rather than 
reporting a life. Autobiography is not about a real life out there. It is constructed 
or created as an act of autobiography. You become the autobiography you tell. 
Life is a conceptual construction (Bruner, 1988). 
This interpretation gives a primary role to narrative language, which 
includes cultural beliefs, in forming our sense of who we are. Arguments such 
as Bruner's imply the universality of narrative forms, while emphasising the 
cultural particularity of certain forms of narrative, and thus the influence of 
these forms on our sense of who we are. If, as the argument has suggested, our 
selves are ontological fictions the meaning of which is based on the various 
ways the concept of the person is utilised in the public life of a society, then the 
construction of a narrative, the available forms this can take and its effects on 
how we conceive of a life, take on a new importance in PSE. The conception of 
the person advocated here when applied to autobiography, which takes as its 
reference this ontological fiction, shifts attention from the self, somehow 
isolated from even the influence of language, to the text and the reader in the 
formation of self, to the writer and the reader, to the graphic of autobiography, 
and the influence of social and historical structures on the formation, structure 
and constraints of the narrative. The extent to which narrative language, 
cognitive and linguistic processes are culturally shaped thus becomes an issue 
of some importance, as does consideration of the dominant patterns of a culture, 
and the constraints imposed by these on our understanding of autobiography as 
the coherent representation of a life. Hence, dominant cultural patterns such as 
individualism, expressed by narrative elements, including the dominant myths, 
which obscure the degree of the individual and group reciprocal participation, 
need to be considered. This serves to direct attention to the various narrative 
constructions our students bring to the task of writing autobiographically, and 
exploration of the importance of narrative structure in the construction of the 
subject. 
The narrative conception of the self is, by implication not an individual 
exercise. The necessary utilisation of existing narrative means, as Maclntyre 
(1981:199) says, that "we are never more (and sometimes less) than the co-
authors of our own narratives". It is not possible to live any life we please, we 
are constrained by the stories of our culture and the stories of others. 
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If the preexistence of narratives and narrative structures determines our lives 
in the way Bruner and MacIntyre describe, language is not privileged in the way 
it is in De Man. Maclntyre's (ibid.:197) approach, that "stories are lived before 
they are told - except in the case of fiction", serves to endorse the view that 
while narrative structure and language is essential it is not privileged to the 
extent that one can say that lives are not lived but told. Thus, unlike De Man's 
position, narrative structures a life and the self, but space is retained for agency. 
Thus, a narrative conception of the self while denying the authority and sole 
authorship of the traditional account of autobiography, retain space for the agent 
as having the potential to play a role in authoring aspects of her life within the 
constraints of narrative structure. 
This can be seen in how the unity of a life is understood. It is, according to 
Maclntyre (ibid:203) "the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. ... The 
unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest". The quest is for the good 
for persons, the unity of persons being constituted by the coherence of a life 
story based in such a quest.20 Carr (1986:96), who also argues for a narrative 
view of the self, takes the unity of a life to be a task, a struggle to bridge the 
gaps between actions and to constitute one's self: "a responsibility which no 
one else can finally lift entirely from the shoulders of the one who lives that 
life". While agency is circumscribed, space is retained for the actor. As Carr 
(ibid:97) says: "The unity of the self, not as an underlying identity but as a life 
that hangs together, is not a pregiven condition but an achievement". 
My sense of my identity is a function of the sense I make of what is around 
me. The necessity of this activity of making sense requires a sense of temporal 
coherence, not only in the events and people around me, returning us to the 
conclusions of the previous chapter. There it was argued that the concern we 
have for our future is influenced by the connections made between the contents 
of first-person mental events, such as the forming of intentions. The content of 
these mental events was seen to be influenced by our knowledge of persons. In 
that case the non-branching nature of persons was emphasised. This account 
can now be supplemented. The forging of connections necessary to constitute 
the unity of the person desired and required for agency are part of our existing 
narratives and our attitudes towards them. Our sense of narrative structures and 
devices affect our understanding of action. Action is a temporal event, which, it 
will be recalled, was taken to constitute an important objection to the 
reductionist view of persons. On the narrative view of the self, the temporality 
of our action is part of the narrative. Our plans to act are affected by our 
experience of the past which is utilised in the present to attain a future aim. The 
past affects the present and the future. This is consistent with our understanding 
of autobiography as a project of the present with future effects, and avoids the 
156 
underestimation of the complexity of our psychology often implied in 
psychological accounts of personal identity. On this view the temporal nature of 
experience directs and shapes experience. 
This view does, however, obscure the self in relation to narrative. 
MacIntyre's position seems to be that loss of meaning in one's life is a problem 
akin to not being able to make out the narrative, "the narrative becomes 
unintelligible" (op.cit.: 202) to the person. This implies that the narrative is 
written and one's task is to make sense of it in order that one can make sense of 
one's life: my responsibility is to make sense of this narrative. Despite the idea 
of co-authoring the narrative, the relation to the narrative as sense giving, seems 
once again to determine the role of the person in the narrative rather than the 
person determining her role in this, or another narrative. Once again, it is the 
problem of finding a space for autonomous or independent action within the 
crowded arena of social ,and cultural roles in which one finds one's self. 
This problem can be approached by reference to the idea of a true or 
authentic self, or by reference to a standard of rationality outside the role or 
narrative one finds oneself in. Both positions rely on the ability to move outside 
the context of a role. The first, the idea of a true or authentic self, must appeal to 
something like the Heideggerian concept of authenticity, a concept notoriously 
difficult to grasp. It clearly cannot be understood here as the coherence of a 
whole self, as Heidegger sometimes implies, since this would be met by the 
strict adherence to a role. Since the idea of an agent freely choosing to accept a 
role cannot be explained by reference to the role or to some external authority, it 
must come from the person herself. For this, Heidegger uses the internal call to 
conscience, which "comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" 
(1962:320). In his later writings, as Zimmerman (1981:129-30) argues, 
authenticity is described as something which happens to an individual. The true 
self is not self-willed but is rather an openness to the temporality of Being. 
Once again the self disappears in the public character of time generated by 
temporality.21 The concept of an authentic or true self seems better understood 
as the concept Sartre appropriated, where the idea of choice is central, and 
where once again we have the abstraction and decontextualisation of the person, 
although this time with no realist assumptions. This moves us back into the 
existentialism of the autobiographical approach of Abbs and his aim of 
autobiographical writing as the search for the true self. For those who continue 
to find this notion obscure or problematic, the idea of a rational action which is 
not dependent on its particular social context seems more appealing. On this 
latter view, whether an action is rational or not is a function of whether it 
conforms to standards which are more general or universal than the standards 
provided by the particular context of the action. The advantage of this approach 
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over the search for a 'real' self is that it promises something beyond the self as a 
standard against which the worthwhileness of an action can be measured. 
I find myself in a role. For me to choose this role for myself I must be able 
to choose it, make it part of myself and do so for good reasons. The problem is 
that the good reasons for behaving according to a role, for example, for 
studying if one is a student, are acquired with the role. They are part of what it 
means to be a good student. If anyone identifies with the role of student, they 
have good reason to study. If, however, I am to autonomously accept the role I 
cannot acquire the good reasons with the role. There needs to be a rational 
procedure that does not make reference to the context of a role for my action to 
be autonomous. This again returns us to the idea of a person defined by its 
capacity for rational choice: defined, in other words, in the absence of any 
constitutive concerns. 
The problem of agency in the narrative conception arises in part because the 
epistemic authority of the author is not guaranteed, as it is on the traditional 
account, given that the identity of persons over time cannot act as an ontological 
guarantee. This seems to deny the special authority of the author, and with it a 
principal reason why autobiographical writing is held to have educational 
advantages. If there is no guarantee that the author is the person narrated in the 
text, the special value and relevance of autobiography is lost. It seems the 
presupposed unity of persons is necessary for autobiography to be 
educationally useful. However, this only follows if the arguments of the 
previous chapter are rejected. There, it will be recalled, although the existence 
of a subject of experience as existing separately from psychological connections 
and continuities was denied, it was not denied that the person could be identical 
over time, and even, in the absence of identity, have all that mattered for 
concern with the future. If these psychological relations are important in 
determining survival or identity, then autobiography retains its importance as 
central to the idea of constructing a self, as a means of assuring a sense of 
identity. On this view the construction of identity is not a fact of being a person, 
is not complete, but is something that needs work, reflection, the forming of 
connections. 
Similar to the points made previously concerning the influence of 
connections and how these connections give rise to the idea of a self, the point 
here is that the structure of autobiographical narrative itself reinforces or 
encourages belief in a unified self prior to its articulation in narrative form. 
While the concentration in previous chapters has been on the referentiality of the 
T and its role in the conception of the person, autobiography highlights the role 
of narrative in our sense of who we are and how we know who we are. 
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The root of the problem is the authorship of action. This can be approached 
through one of the root values of autobiography: its uniqueness. This 
uniqueness does not reside in its special relation to the truth of the person, as 
we have seen. Nor, on the narrative account under consideration, can it be 
construed as originality. It is possible that my story has been told before and my 
part has been played before, as Carr (op.cit.:93-4) points out. Obviously, the 
coherence of my experience with the story which makes it intelligible is not a 
source of its uniqueness. My agency in my life is a recognition of the 
responsibility for action within the constraints of a tradition of authoritative 
stories. This bypasses an objection to which a narrative account would 
otherwise be open. The narrative itself is not, on this view, a closed 
autonomous system in which the author is the ultimate authority. Thus it is not 
guilty of substituting the solipsistic 'true for oneself with the another form of 
solipsism. On the narrative view there is a complex interdependence of the 
culture's narrative store, the availability of narrative structures and the role of 
the person as agent in identifying with and reinterpreting the narrative in the 
attempt to give life a coherence and the unity necessary for purposive and 
relatively independent action. Thus narrative does not have the 'liberatory' 
effects on the continuity of a life now perceived to be illusory, as Valery 
(1975:301-302) implies in his reflection that "I am aware that once my pen 
intervenes, I can make whatever I like out of what was". 
On the narrative conception of the person, the social and the personal can be 
harmonised through the striving to make connections by the individual. A 
person's experience is not patterned by a narrative, the narrative constitutes the 
sense made of experience. The particular point of view of the person can only 
be understood in relation to this. This involves the stories one tells to one's self, 
the contribution of others, and the cultural fund of narratives. 
The narrative account enables us to give an interpretation of a central feature 
or claim of autobiography, its truth-value. Pascal (1960:viii), for example, 
argues that autobiography is "the account of the truth of a life" and that the 
interesting question is "the particular form of truth to be found in 
autobiography" (loc.cit.). The aim of aiding students reach a greater degree of 
self-understanding is predicated on the idea that this self-understanding will 
reflect some truth or enable truths to be discovered. A self-deceptive rendition 
of a happy or unhappy childhood seems to pose severe problems. Beyond this 
there are problems for the aim of giving a true account caused by act of 
narrating itself, as pointed out above. The tension exists because while we have 
a conception of autobiography as having the potential to reflect an aspect of 
reality accurately, we also recognise that the necessary adoption of a stance or 
perspective in autobiography involves seeing autobiography as centrally a 
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matter of interpreting a life. Attention is thus drawn to the interpretative nature 
of recollection and, hence, to the central role of interpretation in autobiography, 
in particular the reading back into events a character, significance or meaning 
they did not have at the time. On the narrative account this does not lead to the 
author having absolute authority, but the truths to be attained lie more in the 
understanding of, and the forging of narrative connections in relation to one's 
self and others. This supplies an answer to the question of whether the relation 
between the narrating 'I' and narrated 'I' is one of identity, or whether the 
relation is better understood as one of forging and understanding relationships, 
without invoking the idea of epistemic privilege with respect to knowledge of 
the contents of first-person present-tense states temporally extended. 
This may, however, be thought to undermine the authority of the author in 
the construction of an autobiography by denying the personal authority of the 
author. The act of construction, the interpretation of experiences according to 
standards of narrative takes the place of the authority of the autobiography 
effected in terms of a pre-existent self whose authority derives from its identity, 
so the authority is not pregiven. That the idea of the authority of the author has 
an important role to play in education, particularly moral education is ably 
illustrated in Tappan and Brown (1989). Tappan and Brown argue that the 
students gain a sense of their own authority and responsibility through 
authoring their narratives. This is seen as crucial in a moral education which 
includes among its aims the importance of making sense of moral demands by 
relating them to one's own life and experience, and thereby making moral 
positions one's own. Thus, Tappan and Brown make use of a general theory of 
narrative and its importance to the meaning of living a life, to enhance values of 
personal responsibility of ownership of action. Meaning and value, on this 
view, are expressed in a dynamic form through the activity of authoring. In this 
way experiences are made one's own. However, we again face the problem of 
what owns these experiences, how the ownership of experience is to be 
understood. What is the stable core which gives the perspective or stance, 
through which ownership is effected? 
There is implicit in Tappan and Brown's privileging of the authority in 
authoring the problem of a pre-given self to which reference is made in the 
claiming or assumption of responsibility according to the perspective taken. 
There is a serious ambiguity in the idea of authoring/authority as used by 
Tappan and Brown. This is illustrated in their interpretation of Haydon White's 
(1981:13-14) position that "every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest 
purpose the desire to moralize the events of which it treats", as consistent with 
the their use of explicit moral narrative. In their effort to make this aspect of 
narrative explicit by constructing moral narratives in the form of dialogical 
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exchanges between students about moral dilemmas, they underestimate the 
effect of the authority of the moral narratives on the authority of those that 
interpret them. Without even mentioning the effect of the authority of the school 
as an institution on the stories chosen and told, more attention needs to be given 
to the idea that students author the stories they tell. The "freedom from the 
arbitrary imposition of culturally bound values and conventional stereotypes" 
(ibid:200-201) as students are encouraged to "authorize" their own voices, 
needs to be further interrogated. The important aim which seems to be behind 
this characterisation of the relation of narrative to moral education is similar to 
the theme running throughout Hunt's (1987) work, that biography, theory and 
practice can be viewed as relational and dialogically determined rather than as 
isolated and mutually exclusive through the autobiographical impulse. 
However, Tappan and Brown's account seems to oscillate between a strong 
notion of authoring, in the expressing of one's own authority and responsibility 
through authoring and the evidence of authorship in narratives, and the situating 
and circumscribing of the narrative through explicitly moral discourse in the 
classroom. This has the effect of reducing the ambiguity of perspective which, 
as we shall see, is often part of our self-presentations. The public form of 
dialogue has to be constructed to allow for this possibility. Tappan and 
Brown's (op.cit.:195) use of interview questions designed to evoke moral 
experience as a means of enhancing authorship is premised on the idea of 
audience. But the student's role as author is to "convince his audience of both 
the legitimacy of his moral perspective and the righteousness of his actions in 
the story he tells" (loc.cit.). He must know or empathise with his audience in 
order to "make his case most convincingly and authoritatively. This, ... is what 
we have called authoring" (loc.cit.). 
If the argument given so far has any validity, then this use of narrative will 
not be foremost amongst those to be encouraged in writing autobiographically 
for the purpose of increased self-understanding. Although Tappan and Brown 
(ibid:197) hold that their method encourages "potentially very different moral 
voices and moral experiences", by not paying adequate attention to the status of 
the self assumed in their use of narrative it is likely that this potential will be 
constrained by the main concern which is to give the students' a strong sense of 
identity, a strength in their convictions and 'righteousness' which students may 
not feel. A more open-ended approach is advocated here which encourages the 
ambiguity persons often feel in their self-presentations. Unlike Tappan and 
Brown's use of narrative, a concern here has been with the role of the structure 
of narrative on reflection itself. This leads us to consideration of some specific 
problems of using autobiographical writing in the PSE classroom, but before 
looking at these, it is important to make explicit the connections between the 
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importance of narrative, the problems it faces with retaining a subject of 
experience, and the continuity theory of personal identity previously 
considered. 
The two approaches to autobiography outlined above clearly derive support 
from the theories of personal identity considered in previous chapters. The 
traditional conception of autobiography with its positing of identity, the pre-
given unity of the self, the priority of the unity of the person to language, and 
the special epistemic relation of the self to the self, is supported by the theory of 
the strict identity of persons. As will be recalled this theory is associated with 
Butler and Reid and more recently with Chisholm (1976) and Madell (1981). 
On such a theory a person is more than a succession of mental and physical 
events and states, the identity of persons holding in virtue of facts of personal 
identity beyond the holding of these more particular facts. The alternative, 
continuity theories of personal identity, hold that, as Parfit (1984:210) says "[a] 
person's existence just consists in the existence of a brain and body, and the 
occurrence of a series of interrelated physical and mental events". On this view 
what matters when we consider the nature of persons over time is the holding of 
psychological continuities and connections which hold to a greater or lesser 
extent. Thus the relation of importance when we consider our future is not 
identity, a one-one relation. This analysis applies very much to our everyday 
lives where mental and physical characteristics converge to produce a seemingly 
single and continuous stream. Following Parfit, it would seem that the problem 
of change in the case of persons is better described in terms of the holding of 
certain relations, rather than in terms of identity. 
This is clearly consistent with the narrative view of the self which takes the 
unity of the person to lie in the making of connections between experiences. It 
also supports the view that autobiography is not transparently self-referential 
due to the mediating effect of the reflexive language of self-narrative. There are, 
however, important differences. Although Maclntyre sees the connections 
forged by the narrative traditions of a community, he pays relatively little 
attention to the point Carr makes concerning the forging of connections. As we 
have seen, Parfit also pays relatively little attention to the active forming of 
connections or the relation between the contents of mental events. What 
Maclntyre and Parfit both underestimate, in short, is the influence of our 
attitudes to and about ourselves and other persons on the construction of 
persons and our sense of ourselves. We shall return to this point later. 
Both the narrative and the continuity theories of persons face the same 
problem with agency, with the subject of experience. Neither denies the 
existence of persons. On Parfit's view, persons exist as thinkers and agents, 
what is denied is that the subject of experience is an entity existing separately 
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from the existence of a brain and a body and a series of interrelated mental and 
physical events. Hence, this view is compatible with the claim that there are 
subjects of experience, possessors of experience, as the truth of this claim is a 
function of language. In Parfit's words: it "is true because of the way in which 
we talk" (ibid: 223). The unity of the self can then be understood as the holding 
of psychological connections and continuities. On this account personal identity 
does not have a special nature, for essential to this view is the denial of the 
holding of a further fact or facts, such as would be required by the unity of the 
self as assured prior to language. 
As well as problems with agency, the narrative conception of self admits of 
further problems. Intuitively, the narrative conception is attractive because it 
restores in its form the the unity of the self, lost in the general confusion over 
subjectivity and the 'crisis of the self evident not only in literature, but in the 
breakdown of many traditional categories in our society. Is this not, however, 
the promise of a chimera? Having lost the certainty of an historical unitary 
subject, the structure of language seems to impose the needed structure. But in 
doing so imposes constraints of a different kind, as we shall see as we look 
specifically at some of the problems the use of autobiographical writing in PSE 
poses. 
Notes 
1. The focus is on the written autobiography, although what is said also 
applies to oral autobiographies. It is not clear that the argument is applicable to 
other forms of 'autobiographical' representation (see, for example, Bruss' 
(1980) argument that the 'I' of the written autobiography is not commensurate 
with the 'eye' of the film). The use of the phrase 'autobiographical writing' 
rather than 'autobiography' is only intended to avoid the implication that what is 
referred to a completed life, and to encompass the legitimacy of the idea of 
autobiographical segments of a life. 
2. This categorisation is based on Maguire and Washington (1983). Based 
on their experiences during a six-week course at the Institute of Education 
London University, they distinguish between two approaches to English 
teaching. One is associated with the Institute of Education, the "orthodoxy 
school", major figures of which include Britton, Dixon and Wilkinson, with the 
other being centred around Cambridge and is associated with the work of Abbs 
and Holbrook. 
3. A broadly therapeutic approach to PSE is evident in Button's (1987) 
work on developmental group work, while the alternative more social approach 
is evident in arguments for the place of peace and world studies in PSE 
(Morrison, 1987, Stephenson, 1987). Some of the problems which can arise 
from failure to distinguish these two approaches are illustrated in Campbell and 
Ryder's (1989) article on the use of 'groupwork' and working in groups. 
4. A similar point is made by Abbs (1974:5). 
5. The importance of autobiography in performing this mediating function is 
frequently stressed. See, for example, Pascal (1960:185) and Rosen (1988). 
6. Abbs (1976:162) provides a good illustration of this point. He recounts a 
conversation with a student who was experiencing difficulty beginning her 
autobiography but who is able to write once she is informed that some 
autobiographies have been written in the third person: "For some reason, an 
impersonal method of writing released her imagination and freed her memory 
which until then had been constricted by the direct first-person presentation we 
normally associate with autobiography". 
The use of the third-person is only appropriate, of course, to the written 
expression of an autobiography. It would strike one as intuitively strange if a 
student used the third person in an oral presentation of an autobiographical 
vignette. 
7. Although the problems with supplying a definitive account are perceived 
differently, De Man (1979:920), Olney (1980a), Sprinlcer (1980), and Pascal 
(1960), afford differing perspectives on what the issues are. 
It is interesting to note that the delineation of autobiography as relatively 
discrete from related areas is a very recent phenomenon. As recently as the 
1930s biography and autobiography were not distinguished, both falling under 
the general categorisation of stories of persons' lives. This is illustrated in 
Johnson's (1937:27) definition of biography which includes "not only formal 
biography, but all kinds of autobiography - letters, journals, reminiscences - for 
all biography is ultimately founded in a kind of autobiography". 
8. This is not to deny that diaries may be interpretative and some criterion of 
selection used in the writing down of experiences. Many of us require or 
encourage journal writing in our courses, a function of which is to encourage 
interpretation and selection. The point is that with autobiography as it is used in 
education, the interpretative aspect is essential, and together with the fact that it 
is an interpretation of the author, is the reason why it is used. 
9. The referential dimensions of autobiography are, of course, a major 
concern in post-structuralism. The referentiality of autobiography, although 
lending itself to the post-structuralist preoccupation with the subject, is a 
concern arising from its reflexive nature. Arguments for the centrality of the role 
played by the referential dimensions of an autobiographical text, are given most 
notably by Eakin (1985, Ch 1), Bruss (1977, 1980) and De Man (1979). 
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This is essentially the "identity-value" of autobiography which, according to 
Bruss (1976:10-11), forms one of three limited generalizations, articulated in 
terms of interrelated "rules", which address the referentiality of autobiographical 
texts. These "rules" compromise a standard that must "be satisfied by the text 
and the surrounding context of any work which is to 'count as' autobiography" 
(ibid). The second and third "rules" concern, respectively, the truth-value of an 
autobiography, (in that the events reported are or were, at least potentially, the 
case), and its sincerity (in that "the autobiographer purports to believe in what 
he asserts"). 
10. Some autobiographers have interpreted this authority as an immunity 
from error. Probably the most explicit statement of this is to be found at the 
close of Rousseau's Confessions: 
I cannot be wrong about what I have felt nor about what my feelings 
have led me to do and this is what it is all about. 
For other autobiographers (Henry James, McCarthy and Sartre, for 
example), the identification of author and protagonist is seen as part of the 
problematic of reaching self-understanding. 
11. It has been argued, by Spengeman and Lundquist's (1965:514) for 
example, that neglect of the necessary identification of the T which "unites all" 
the autobiographer's past experiences, has adverse consequences for both the 
author and the reader: For the author, such neglect will result in her life 
appearing "fragmented and incoherent", and for the reader, it will appear 
"pointless and confused"(loc.cit.). 
12. Porter and Smith (1989) illustrate the importance and educational 
implications of understanding autobiography as including elements of both self-
creation and self-description or display. 
13. We recognise, for example, the possibility of self-deception, the 
problems involved in being sincere with oneself and the problem of the 
genuineness of response where reflection on the past is involved. See Palmer 
and Champlin (1979) on the problems raised for autobiography by the 
possibility of self-deception. 
14. Although we cannot go into the debate here, De Man's argument is 
interesting not least in the position he takes on the problematic issue of the 
relative priority of language and the self. He points to the rhetorical structure of 
language as creating the illusion of self. The aim of moving beyond the text to 
knowledge of the self is an illusion, the author's declaration of herself as the 
subject of her own understanding as something other than the referent of a 
linguistic structure fails. This position is supported by Bruss' (1980) analysis 
of the autobiographical 'I' and the 'eye' of the camera in 'autobiographical' 
film, which highlights the co-incidence between the referential properties of 
language and the aspirations of autobiographical writing. 
15. See, for example, S. Smith (1987), Fleishman (1983), Olney (1980a), 
Gusdorf (1980), Weintraub (1978). 
16. This situating of the origins of the importance of autobiography, and its 
evolution as a distinct form of expression is clearly reminiscent of A. 0. 
Rorty's (1976b) discussion of the concepts of person, self and individual, and 
Taylor's (1989) understanding of the "punctual self' emptied of essential social 
attributes. 
17. See for example, Gilligan (1982), and Markus and Oyserman (1989). 
18. This gender related difference in how the self is perceived is reflected in 
some women's autobiographies. See Mason (1980) and Jelinek (1986), for 
example. An account of the relational way of knowing is found in Belenky, 
Clinchy, Goldberger and Tarule (1986). 
19. It has, for example, been taken as "a biographical fact" by 
autobiographers such as Sartre, McCarthy and Henry James who deliberately 
present the autobiographical act as an instance of self-invention traceable to a 
determining set of biographical circumstances, as Eakin (1985) in his study of 
these autobiographies shows. 
For some autobiographers the fictive nature of a continuous self is revealed 
by reflection on the role and problem of memory, and in general, the problem of 
access to the past. Olney (1980b), Renza (1980) and Sprinker (op.cit.) provide 
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useful discussion of the problems of memory and its role in autobiography. 
Among the issues which are pertinent to autobiography is the distancing of the 
experiences recollected from the writing self, with the memory of these 
experiences necessarily being an interpretation of the original experience. The 
very act of transposing experience into words involves the imposition of some 
order however minimally this is understood. The interpretation of earlier 
experience cannot be divorced or understood outside the filtering of subsequent 
experience or the structures of language and storytelling. 
20. Among the many questions which a narrative account raises, is what 
makes a good narrative? This poses the question of whether there are 
fundamental ethical principles by which narratives can be judged. A positive 
exploration of some of the issues involved in determining such principles is 
given by Kemp (1988). 
21. Heidegger's relation between the idea of temporal authenticity and 
autonomous action is made more complex by his view on the public and 
individual character of the world. On the one hand the public character of time 
generated by temporality effects a public or common ordering of time, but the 
authentic moment (the authentic modality of the present) is realised only by an 
individual Being (Dasein). On some of the problems caused by this dichotomy 
for the idea of an active individual see Olafson (1987, Ch. 4) and Zimmerman 
(1981, Ch. 4). 
Chapter 6 
Writing Autobiographically in PSE: Problematic 
Aspects of the Task 
There are several problems associated with the use of autobiographical 
writing by students. In this chapter some of these, namely the problem of 
autobiographical motivation, the problem of audience, the role of the teacher, 
and the students' right to privacy will be addressed. A few remarks are also 
made on the issue of assessment and, finally, an objection raised to the use of 
autobiography is discussed its implicit individualism. 
Discussion of these issues, which are engendered by the idea of writing 
autobiographically in a school setting, centres around how they may be 
interpreted in light of the understanding of autobiographical writing given in the 
last chapter, and aims to bring out some of the implications of the conception of 
the person which has been developed in this thesis. Thus, this.chapter is 
primarily concerned with how this conception of the person can illuminate some 
of the problems faced in educational practice. We turn first to the problem of the 
motivation to write autobiographically in a school setting and some of the 
problems this can raise for the achievement of self-understanding. 
1 
The Motivation to Write Autobiographically and the Possibility 
of Sincerity 
A salient feature of writing autobiographically in the school context, 
particularly in the context of compulsory schooling, is that the motivation to 
write does not initially come from an autobiographical impulse on the part of the 
student, which is not to say that students do not have an autobiographical 
impulse,' that this may not be utilised, or that the process of writing itself may 
not have the consequence of making the student more reflective about her life. 
The point is that unlike the motivation to write autobiographically outside the 
school context, which while various, in all likelihood comes in the first place 
from the person herself, the motivation in the school context is external to the 
autobiographer being furnished by another's perception of its educational 
advantages. The motivation to write autobiographically originates with the 
teacher or other educators. Whether or not autobiographical writing can be 
distinguished by its intentionality,2 and whether or not there is a natural 
autobiographical impulse, unless students are allowed and encouraged to write 
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autobiographically only when they feel the desire to do so, the placing of 
motivation exterior to the autobiographer raises special problems. 
Formal and public autobiographical expression is unlike the informal need 
to tell stories to one's self and others expressed by an autobiographical impulse, 
and therefore, recourse to the idea of a natural autobiographical impulse, to give 
accounts of one's life and experience in narrative form as a necessary aspect of 
giving meaning to one's life, is insufficient if the aim of writing 
autobiographically is to be increased self-understanding. Unlike other 
autobiographical expression in other contexts, the motivation to write in the 
classroom is to respond to a task set by teachers. The meaning of the task for 
the student therefore centrally includes the fact that it is school work, and only 
contingently includes the desire for self-understanding. 
The basic idea behind asking students to write autobiographically is the 
hope that they will become more reflective about their lives, become aware of 
the importance of their own stories of their lives to understanding themselves 
and others, and develop their own ways of structuring and reflecting upon their 
experience. Essentially we are asking students to develop a self-reflective stance 
to their lives, to recognise and appreciate autobiography as a means of making 
sense of their lives. 
An obstacle standing in the way of achieving this aim, which is peculiar to 
the educational setting, related to problem that it is externally motivated, is the 
fact that it is an "academic task".3 Whether consciously or not, students 
respond to such tasks based on their understanding of what school work 
involves. The students' understanding of what autobiography is will be 
mediated in the educational context by the students' perception of what the 
teacher wants. Students will operate with the concept of autobiography they 
have, and respond to the task as a piece of academic work. There is therefore 
the danger that students will limit themselves to recording 'facts' and not 
interpret the meaning. In other words, the selection of past experiences will not 
be effected according to some criteria of significance dictated by the student 
herself, but by criteria implicit in the task of writing in the context of school. In 
such a case the influence of language on the 'I' written into the text, the effect of 
writing your life down on how you perceive that life, as well as further 
problems with the autobiographical form, risk not being explored or 
understood, with the effect that the occurrence of 'I' in the writing may be 
superficial. Some students will problematise the writing 'r, some will not.4 
Moreover, there is also the problem of the selection of the persona of the 
autobiography, a problem faced by all autobiographers. Selection of 
experiences and personae is necessary in the construction of any autobiography, 
there is however a danger that students will limit themselves to telling a 
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'student's story' in response to the autobiographical task being first of all a 
school task. This in itself may not be a disadvantage, but is something of which 
educators should be aware. Not only, of course, is the selection of the 
perspective, in the sense of the 'person' or personae to be represented, 
necessary, it is also extremely difficult. The student is placed in a difficult 
position, not only in trying to 'choose' the theme or persona which best reflects 
their life or perspective, but choosing one which will meet with approval. 
These features of the use of autobiographical writing in a school setting 
draw attention to the role of the teacher, her appreciation of the task and its 
attendant difficulties for the student, as well as her explanation of what 
autobiography means in this context and what is expected from the students. In 
addition to being sensitive to how this task differs from more impersonal tasks 
set, the teacher also has to be aware of the influence of students' understanding 
of autobiographies. Fortunately, there are student autobiographies available,5 
which perform a number of extremely useful functions. They show students 
that it is not only the rich, famous or dead who have their autobiographies 
published and valued; that one's life need not be filled with extraordinary 
adventures and illustrious connections to be interesting; and that this is a serious 
task which is valued. In my own experience using autobiographical writing the 
most important combined effect of reading these autobiographies before and 
during the writing of their own autobiographies was an increase in the 
seriousness with which students attempted the task, the general confidence 
gained in the value of their own voice, with a corresponding increase in the time 
and effort they put into this task as opposed to some of the other work they 
were expected to do. 
This leads to consideration of the role of certain attitudes in both student and 
teacher towards the autobiographical task, and the student-teacher relationship. 
While these are clearly not going to be particular to the use of autobiographical 
writing in schools, they seem essential to the successful undertaking of an 
autobiographical exercise. This issue is therefore appropriately approached 
through consideration of what counts as a successful autobiography. 
What counts as a successful autobiography will clearly be dependent on the 
aims one hopes to accomplish in writing autobiographically. If one's motivation 
is self-aggrandisement, self-justification, the desire to convert, confess or 
impress, or to please the teacher, success depends on how believable or 
convincing the work is to its audience. Whether the author is sincere is only 
relevant to the extent that it makes the work more convincing. To hold 
otherwise would be to claim that it is a necessary condition for persuasion that 
the person persuading believes what she purports to. It is clearly possible to 
write and to intend to write a convincing autobiography even if one does not 
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believe it. Where the motivation is other than self-understanding, criteria for 
success are therefore framed in terms of reader response. In an important sense 
they are written for the reader. Augustine's Confessions would be successful if 
its readers are reinforced in their Christian faith. Augustine's own faith is not 
necessary to its success, the reader's belief in it is. 
Criteria for success in the case of autobiographies motivated by the desire 
for self-understanding are importantly different. The task is not primarily set or 
undertaken with reader response in mind, except in so far as the author is also a 
reader. This is not to say that reader response may not be crucial, but rather the 
point is that what counts as success lies with the author in terms of the degree of 
self-understanding gained. This returns us to the question of the interpretation 
of 'self-understanding' since how this is understood will affect what successful 
autobiographical writing is taken to involve. 
As mentioned at the beginning of the last chapter, self-understanding is 
open to various interpretations. On the 'mental health' model the question of 
self-deception and the operation of various psychoanalytic categories will 
obviously be an issue. This raises a number of difficult issues, it leads, for 
example to the idea of teacher as therapist. While all teachers, and particularly 
those involved in pastoral care, face the issue of their therapeutic role in some 
form at some time, there is an important difference between a semi-therapeutic 
situation which arises as a result of personal interaction between students and 
teachers in a school, and those required by an academic task. If an academic 
task requires a therapeutic stance, it is not too strong to suggest that it does not 
have a place in the ordinary classroom with teachers who are not therapists and 
with students who are not voluntarily in therapy. Is this mental health model, 
however, a necessary consequence of introducing autobiography with the aim 
of encouraging greater self-understanding, and to what extent are problems 
such as self-deception endemic to the idea of writing autobiographically? 
If self-understanding is the aim, then a necessary condition for a successful 
autobiography is the sincerity of the author. The author must intend to be 
sincere. As we have seen above, this is not primarily understood as faithfulness 
to biographical facts. While our complicated understanding, or at least our 
intimations of the complexity of the human psyche as well as the more obvious 
complications of memory, lead us to reject the idea of certainty in our first-
person interpretations of past events, something like the idea of personal truth 
which comes from reflection on and interpretation of past experiences forms the 
basis of the educational value of autobiography. The possibility of sincerity, of 
believing what one purports to, is therefore paramount. 
This naturally raises the question of whether one can be sincere with one's 
self. The question is complicated once the traditional picture of privileged first- 
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person access to the content of mental states with the rejection of incorrigible 
authority over first-person psychological utterances, is rejected. With this 
rejection autobiography loses its privileged character. If the picture of the self as 
a knowable aspect of reality, known to itself and valued on the basis of 
epistemic privilege, is rejected, so is Rousseau's (1953:262) confident assertion 
that while he may be wrong about dates and such things, "I cannot be wrong 
about what I have felt, or about what my feelings have led me to do: and these 
are the chief subject of my story". 
For us the possibility of epistemological guarantees, as well as the 
theological guarantees appealed to by Augustine to underwrite his sincerity are 
not available, or at least with the latter we can not presume that they are 
available to all students. Both of these underpinnings of traditional 
autobiography are absent, and so autobiography, in the absence of its anchor, 
becomes unmoored. To assume that these guarantees are still there would be as 
Szabados (1992:3) says, to exhibit or invite bad faith or remarkable naiveté. 
If the-possibility of guarantees of sincerity are not available to us, is the 
teacher exhibiting bad faith in encouraging students to be sincere? The emphasis 
seems to shift back to biographical facts as the only aspect of autobiography 
which have the possibility of being true reports, yet it is precisely this aspect 
which is educationally uninteresting, and uninteresting from the point of view 
of the autobiographer seeking self-understanding, where the focus is intended 
to be on autobiographers' interpretations and construction of the meaning of 
their experience. On the traditional understanding of autobiography and the 
conception of the self on which it draws, sincerity, although no doubt difficult 
to achieve is not, in principle, impossible. The self is transparent to itself and 
self-knowledge, through reflection and introspection is possible: though 
hidden, the self can be known and is best known to itself. On the conception of 
the person advocated here what is meant by sincerity is importantly different. If 
a sense of identity is derived from the conditions of personal identity, and if 
these conditions are as described here, then the connections between 
experiences gain in importance, as does the idea of identification. Identification 
is a difficult notion and clearly needs to be further investigation. As was argued 
in the fourth chapter, it cannot solely be a matter of individual legislation, and as 
Griffin (1986:377-378) argues, ultimately rests on fuller explication of what is 
meant by psychological continuity. This understanding of the person does, 
however, provide a coherent perspective from which to view Wittgenstein's 
(Bowsma, 1986:70) remark that "Mt is one's attitudes towards one's own 
actions and the explanations of them that are certain to introduce a false note." 
While the conceptualisation of the person suggested here does not deny this, or 
paper over the insight by demanding that the person work harder at making 
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one's autobiography consistent, it gives an account of what matters when we 
consider our past, present and future which allows for the ambiguity in one's 
description of one's self. Thus, it is consistent with Wittgenstein's (loc.cit.) 
comment on the problem of adopting the consistent and coherent stance 
characteristic of autobiography: the autobiographer writes "'I am a spiteful 
person; he reflects about this self-ascription and then retracts it, saying 'I am 
not a spiteful person.' No account of himself can stand before his own attitude 
towards it". 
Is this impossibility of a consistent or unambiguous attitude towards one's 
self a reason to be wary of using autobiographical writing to aid students' in 
their understanding of themselves? It is clearly a rejection of the idea that there 
is any direct access, or mirror to which introspection provides faithful access or 
which gives a consistent reflection. But at the same time it draws attention to the 
situatedness of the author, of the importance of the present perspective on 
events. There can be no illusion that one is studying with detachment another 
person to whom one has privileged access in virtue of identity. This 
concentration on the present context of the author, has the added effect of 
reinterpreting the objectification and alienation of the self in the attempt to write 
it. If the stance is reflective, the imposition of a complete description such as 'I 
am spiteful' will immediately be perceived as inaccurate, as will its converse. It 
becomes clear that the implication of separation of the narrated and the narrator 
is not a separation in the sense of that the narrator is disengaged. The narrator is 
incorrectly on this view, depicted as an observer on a life, rather she is the liver 
of a life. 
The ambiguity and instability in the perspective of the author does not herald 
the end of autobiography, but rather directs attention back to the function of 
narrative, and the role played by the perceived need to fashion a coherent story. 
It leads in particular to exploration of different forms of narrative. The variety of 
narrative forms to be experimented with, their effects on the perception of the 
life described are all fertile areas for exploration where autobiographical writing 
is used in the PSE. 
On the relation between self, others and language advocated here, the 
ambiguity of the relation of the self to itself, is something to be explored and 
encouraged, which is not to say that it is to be prescribed. For example, it is no 
part of the current concern to judge harshly the autobiography of the student 
who is completely unambiguous, a Rousseauesque character, who retains a 
faith in the truthfulness of her reports of what she thought and felt. The point is 
not to 'correct' students' sense of self, but to allow the possibility of 
exploration of the relation between language and the sense of self.6 A strength 
of the conceptualisation of the person suggested here is that it recognises the 
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value of different conceptions of self, including the ideal of unity, and in and of 
itself does not prescribe substantial ethical stances, such as the unity and 
harmonisation of the self. It does, however, allow for such stances. The 
controversy is over the basis of such claims. As Parfit (1984:446) notes, on the 
Non-Reductionist View: 
the deep unity of each life is automatically ensured, however, 
randomly, short-sightedly, and passively this life is lived. On the 
Reductionist View, the unity of our lives is a matter of degree, and 
is something that we can affect. We may want our lives to have a 
greater unity, in the way that an artist may want to create a unified 
work. And we can give our lives greater unity, in ways that express 
or fulfil our particular values and beliefs. 
This possibility of valuing unity is therefore admitted, and while there may 
be problems with this view,7 it denies that unity is a value based on the 
ontological status of the self. 
2 
Privacy and Audience 
At the beginning of the last chapter the respect shown to students' lives and 
experiences was mentioned as one of the benefits of encouraging students to 
write autobiographically. By respecting the stories of their lives, a measure of 
dignity and respect is afforded to the students. However, this seems to be 
undermined by the charge that in requiring autobiographies from students 
educators overstep their authority and misuse their power by requiring students 
to disclose personal details and experiences. In short, it could be argued that the 
use of autobiographical writing does not respect the student, but shows 
disrespect for students as persons, by encouraging them to disclose what they 
have a right to keep private. This objection can be overstated, but the root issue 
concerns personal disclosure by students as a requirement of their compulsory 
education. Clearly one option is not to make it compulsory. But for this to be a 
viable option, genuine alternatives must be available which do not prejudice the 
child in any way, and which contain no element of coercion. This is a tall order, 
and almost beside the point if autobiographical writing is thought to be of 
genuine educational benefit. The question is whether the student's right to 
withhold aspects of their personal lives is infringed by the request to write 
autobiographically. 
The important point in relation to the privacy of the person and the 
autobiographical task as set in a school is that there is no necessary connection 
such that infringement of any right to privacy follows. The conception of the 
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self suggested here does not give the importance to privacy which the traditional 
conception of the person as private and hidden and known best to itself implies, 
or the right to privacy associated with autonomy.8 On the conception of the self 
suggested here there is nothing to suggest that the significance given to events 
and experiences need not be something which the student regards as a private 
matter.9 While the concern may legitimately shift, on this view, towards 
concern with contextual constraints and implications of any autobiographical 
assertion, it remains the case that a student's sense of privacy will be 
threatened. Clearly, the issue of the right of the student to not reveal herself 
should not be infringed. Some light is shed on this matter, however, if 
autobiography is not approached as primarily a matter of student privacy. An 
emphasis on privacy has the effect of devaluing social relationships and their 
implication in the formation of an autobiography. Thus, while privacy is an 
issue of which teachers and students should remain mindful to overemphasise it 
may well have a detrimental effect on the production of an autobiography. It 
may increase the sense of isolation autobiographers frequently refer to and 
promote the feeling of separateness engendered by the concentration on the 
subjective self which autobiography can foster.'° 
The problem of the privacy of the student and how this is to be reconciled 
with the autobiographical task is clearly an issue closely related to student 
perception of the task, which, unfortunately is not always positive," and the 
role of teacher in intervening in the autobiographical process as well as her role 
in assessing autobiographical work. 
The account of autobiography favoured here, consistent with the conception 
of the person argued for in previous chapters gives explicit recognition to the 
influence of language and narrative structure, as well as experience on both the 
form and content of an autobiography. This raises the question of influence of 
the teacher's perception of the task on her response to students' work. Some of 
the issues involved are highlighted once the social influences on a person's 
sense of identity and sense of self is recognised. As mentioned above, one of 
the advantages of the approach to autobiography advocated is that it does not 
prejudice different conceptions of self based, for example, on gender. But does 
this not substitute one idea of what a person is with another which is presumed 
to be more correct? To what extent will the teacher's perception of what is 
appropriate for a female working class student to express in her autobiography 
affect the teacher's assessment of the work, influence her comments, 
suggestions and so forth? This raises the further question of the extent to which 
the teacher, the author, and other readers can or should be neutral on these 
cultural questions. The fault in the past may well have been the neglect of 
differences, the fault with the approach suggested here, which has taken 
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seriously some aspects of a post-modem critique of the unitary self and social 
implications of the narrative view of self, may be to elevate the importance of 
categories, class, gender and race, to which students belong, and institute 
implicit criteria reflective of the teacher's perception of appropriateness of self-
expression of these groups. To some extent, of course, once these questions 
and problems have been made explicit and the teacher is sufficiently reflective 
about the criteria she uses in assessing a 'good' autobiography, these problems 
will be mitigated, particularly so the issues are shared with the students. This 
may in fact be the extent to which the problems raised by the cultural 
assumptions involved in writing and responding to autobiography can be met. 
What is important to note is that once the focus moves to the construction of 
self, to the social influences on the formation of a sense of self, these issues 
will be more important than if the idea of autobiography is to reveal the truth of 
a pre-given self. 
The readership of a text is something which always needs to be taken into 
account. In their autobiographies students should be encouraged to adopt the 
role of critic. Authors, as well as readers, need to be encouraged in self-
conscious discussion of the selections made, the possible alternative stories, 
and other limitations which are made possible by viewing the text from the 
distance of a critic. This involves explicit recognition of the objectification of the 
self, the distancing occasioned by the very act of writing autobiographically, of 
the effect of reflection on the meaning and significance of experiences. In 
passing, it is interesting to note that the distancing of the author from the subject 
of the text, which of necessity occurs in the writing of an autobiography, means 
that the subjective meaning is gained through the objectification of subjective 
experience. This distancing, on the theory of the person advanced here, is part 
of the construction of the self, in the identification and non-identification with 
earlier periods of a life and with future aspects of it. As mentioned above, this is 
not a matter of individual legislation. The fact that I am not very proud of a 
period of my past may lead me to distance myself from it, but a negative attitude 
to it is not sufficient for me to say that it not me. The consequences of this 
possibility of identification and non-identification, consequent on the continuity 
aspect of the Reductionist View, need to be further explored. 
This leads to consideration of the assessment of autobiographical writing. 
The teacher is the instigator of the task, and will be called upon to assess it, no 
matter how informally this is done. In setting the task the teacher has a 
responsibility to respond. It should not be forgotten that not only is the task of 
writing autobiographically difficult but it places the student in a vulnerable 
position.12 If the task is to have a possibility of achieving its function there must 
be a relationship of trust between the teacher and the students.13 Given the 
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special nature of autobiographical writing, as opposed to impersonal writing 
required of students, a consequence for some students may be that the task will 
never be meaningful. This situation is exacerbated by the desire of the student to 
please the teacher, but is mitigated if there a relationship of trust between teacher 
and student. In general, for any reader of a student's autobiography, the appeal 
Augustine made to the charity of his readers,14 holds. One could go so far as to 
say that the student, having complied with the request to write 
autobiographically, has the right to have her work received charitably. While 
this holds for all readers, it does little to address a principal area of concern, the 
differential power relation between the student and the teacher. Among the 
audience of the student's autobiography the teacher is likely to be privileged if 
for no other reason than she is presumed to be more of an authority, and have 
more authority than other members of the class.15 
On the model of autobiography so far advocated, assessment should be 
consistent with the aim of directing students to explore the effects of a writing a 
life. To this end dialogue with the student and dialogue between students is 
appropriate since autobiography is no longer conceived on a model of an 
individual attempting to retrieve or reflect a self, to express the truth found, but 
a more ambiguous activity in which others have a role. The criteria of 
assessment will be a response to the aims to be achieved and the nature of the 
autobiographical task. Thus they will clearly not involve giving primary 
importance to the impossible task of verifying the events depicted in the 
autobiography, nor will the primary concern be with the extent to which the 
author reveals or creates a true self. Concern is more likely to be directed to 
creating an atmosphere where students will be able to explore questions of what 
it means to be sincere with one's self. The problem of assessment will not 
therefore involve putting the teacher and other readers in the position of 
assessing another person's life in terms of the independent verifiability of 
events described, or the 'truthfulness' of the author, nor with consideration of 
the psychological impediments of particular autobiographers which stand in the 
way of gaining 'true' insight into one's character or personality. Rather than 
concentrating on these aspects of autobiography, the interest is always on the 
significance given to events for the student's self-understanding. This again 
raises the issue of truthfulness and the problem of what the autobiography is to 
be truthful of, or to. This will touch on the psychological aspects of 
autobiography just mentioned, but it is suggested that these should not be the 
focus. The teacher's role in these exercises is to facilitate, aiding in the 
structuring of the narrative, and providing support. 
Although a full account of the likely criteria of assessment cannot be given 
here, the account of autobiographical writing in PSE outlined above, gives 
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some indication of the type of issues which any assessment will need to 
consider. Given the concern with language in 'writing the self, aspects of the 
literary form increase in importance, while others will assume less significance. 
For example, that aspect of the literary form, the characterm with its dual 
personae in the form of the subject of the text and the author, would not 
constitute a major concern. The conventions surrounding the presentation of the 
author's 'self-portrait', as Howarth (1980:86) refers to this aspect of 
autobiography, has been a major issue here. If the argument has any validity 
then violation of some of these conventions, such as that of separation, would 
not constitute a major problem for the student autobiographer. Those aspects of 
the narrative form which are likely to increase in importance are the technique 
(style, imagery and structure), and the theme of the autobiography. 
If the style of an autobiography is not subservient to the content, but rather 
is responsive to the conditions of the genre, as Starobinski (1971) and Howarth 
(op.cit.) have argued, and has been implied here, then aspects of style represent 
criteria for assessment, since they have direct meaning in the work. If those 
assessing the autobiography, the author and readers, are looking to the efficacy 
of the work as a vehicle for the articulation of personal meaning, then the choice 
of theme will also clearly be significant. Here, awareness of the variety of 
narrative forms on which students can draw, the stories, myths and metaphors 
of the self that are available, is clearly relevant. Part of the role of the teacher 
should be to make these resources available, along with their cultural context. 
The style and theme of an autobiography will thus compromise criteria of 
assessment. This involves, among other things, discussion of the extent to 
which choice in these areas is possible and feasible, and experimentation with 
style and theme. Relating to the work and the reader they involve assessment of 
the method, and the autobiographer herself gauging the extent to which the 
meaning given to events and experiences is significant for her own 
understanding of her life. 
3 
Individualism and The Aims of Autobiographical Writing in 
PSE 
To this point the use of autobiography has not itself been questioned. 
Interpretations of the autobiographical task have been taken to be consistent 
with a student-centred approach and with the specific concerns in PSE, which 
have been understood generally as a concern with increasing self-understanding 
as a value to be promoted as an important aspect of personal and social well-
being. In this fmal section, we turn to an objection to the use of autobiography. 
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It can be argued that the use of autobiography in PSE implies an 
individualism or is an instance of a generally individualist approach in PSE. 
There are two objections here, the first is that autobiography is inherently or 
essentially individualist, and the second is that autobiography will be used in an 
individualist way in PSE because of individualist tendencies within PSE. 
Although it has been alleged that there is an implicit individualism at the core of 
its practice. Barnes (1987:8), for example, argues that there is "always" found 
at the centre of PSE courses "a concern to influence at some depth the attitudes 
and behaviour of the students" with stress being placed on the individual's 
reflection on his or her strategies for living. This objection will not be 
considered here since whether or not the practice of PSE reflects these 
individualist tendencies, it is clearly not the case either that there is something in 
the idea of PSE itself which necessitates such an approach or that such an 
individualist approach is universally accepted. 
The objection to be addressed, therefore, is that autobiography is essentially 
an individualist exercise. It is important to be clear what form of individualism 
is thought to be implied by autobiography. The most obvious is that it promotes 
an unhealthy concern with the self. That this could be a result of the use of 
autobiography would be a result of the interplay between the interpretation of 
autobiography as a genre and its usefulness in achieving the aims which prompt 
its use. This returns us to the point made at the beginning of the last chapter: 
that the definition and approach to autobiographical tasks will be a response to 
the aims to be achieved. 
These were roughly delineated according to the view taken on the rationale 
for the focus on personal experience of students. On the one hand there is the 
therapeutic model, which takes the importance of reflection on experience as 
being necessary for 'mental health', and on the other hand, the social model, 
which looks to reflection as revealing connections between modes of expression 
and thus is essentially a more social and impersonal view. Thus while there is a 
common stress on the importance of reflection on experience as a means to self-
understanding, the views diverge on the status of the individual. This 
disagreement is based on different conceptualisations of the self or person. If 
the self or person is considered a discrete entity, which is best known to itself, 
this may promote a more individualist approach. If on the other hand, the 
individual's sense of self is seen in large part as a construct, which is remade 
and developed through language, and is to a significant extent constituted 
through social relations, importance is likely to be given to the more social 
implications of autobiography. 
Neither approach is likely to be so clearly delineated in practice, where 
aspects of both are likely to be found within a single approach. It is particularly 
178 
likely, given both the teacher-student relationship and concern with the self, that 
the therapeutic model will always be present, even if in an attenuated form. It is 
not even clear that the two aims need be incompatible. Certainly there have been 
attempts to reconcile wider social concerns with 'a return to the subjective' and 
the attempt to mark out a place for individualism within a generally social 
approach, extending to the advocation of forms of individualism within socialist 
theory.17  The general concern with theorising subjectivity is evident in 
psychology of education,18 where the importance of understanding the person 
as the site of multiple subjectivities is stressed in opposition to a generally 
individualistic approach. 
In a fairly facile way, the therapeutic model can be aligned with the 
conception of self implied by and reinforced by the traditional conception of 
autobiography. Both reinforce the importance of the separateness and 
discreteness of persons, and a corresponding sense of self, with the values of 
personal authority, autonomy and independence being emphasised. The idea of 
autobiography as revealing a self, that there is a truth of the self which can be 
known by this method is consistent with the idea that there is a true self. This 
view, with the identification of the narrator and protagonist at the centre, is part 
of what Howarth (1980:84) has referred to as "the evolutionary bias" of 
autobiography. This view is more clearly open to the charge of individualism 
than the account which stresses the dependence of the idea of the unity of the 
person on the existence of narrative structures and the implication of others in 
the construction of autobiographical tasks, which supports the social approach 
with its emphasis on the influence of students' mode of expression on the 
construction of experience. 
This alignment seems, however to avoid the salient issue. Do both 
approaches imply an individualism which cannot be avoided, an individualism 
rooted in the autobiographical task? As mentioned above in connection with the 
use of autobiography in PSE, autobiography is an activity which involves a pre-
occupation with the self. The question is whether this need necessarily be given 
an individualist interpretation. 
The autobiographical task seems to conform to the norms of modern 
individualism in, as Weintraub (1978:1) argues, the "inwardness" of the 
activity. This naturally leads to an emphasis on self-discovery or self-revelation. 
While not conceptualised as an activity which can be accomplished in isolation, 
in that the form and content will always to some extent be a reflection of 
influences outside the self, this concern with the self leads to the form of 
autobiography being guided, as Gunn (1982:23) points out, by the myth of 
Narcissus. It is perhaps the inwardness and self pre-occupation suggested by 
autobiography motivated by the desire for understanding one's self, that 
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prompts the accusation of individualism, with a narcissistic concern with who 
one really is. 
The value of the individual is the major premise of autobiography. An 
appreciation of the importance of individual lives to a culture,19 together with 
the value assigned to the subjective and the role of agency in human life, 
functions to give autobiographical expression a place in PSE, given that PSE 
professes similar beliefs in the importance it attaches to the personal 
interpretation of experience, and its focus on the individual as a source of 
meaning and value. Appeal to autobiographical writing as a means of 
addressing the self-esteem and self-confidence of students through awareness 
of each person's unique relationship to the world and, in particular, their own 
situation, circumstance and life, can be seen as falling under this umbrella belief 
in the value of the individual. 
If autobiography is used in PSE as a means of helping students to see value 
and significance in their own lives, then it must be presumed that the focus on 
the self, on "the self searching quest" which, according to Weintraub (1978:2) 
is the result of "genuine autobiographic activity," at least has the potential for 
resulting in such insights, given that it is one's own subjectivity, the meaning of 
living one's own life which is at issue. Understood as the search for the self, it 
may therefore seem easy to dismiss autobiographical writing as yet another 
instance of the emphasis on the personal in PSE in isolation from the influences 
of wider societal factors. As we shall see, however, this would be to tell less 
than half the story. 
Gunn makes the interesting suggestion that rather than Narcissus, the myth 
of Antaeus, with the idea that contact with the earth is essential to life, would be 
a preferable model. This would involve substituting the question of 'who am r 
as the question of the autobiographer with 'where do I belong?' Much as the 
myth of Narcissus may be an inappropriate one for education, the question 
'who am I?' does, however, seem to be the question that is, and should be 
asked. Gunn's objection to this question lies in its 'unworldly' stance, and its 
affiliation with a view of the self as separate and inessentially connected with 
the world. But is it not possible to give the question a non-individualistic 
interpretation in the unfolding of autobiographical expression? That such an 
interpretation is possible is suggested by the role of narrative language. As has 
been stressed throughout this chapter, the structure of language tempts the 
positing of a discrete subject, the priority of the doer to the deed. 20 The narrative 
view rejects the idea of a pre-linguistic subject, unitary and discrete, and so 
rejects the necessity of a narcissistic view of autobiography, and in accepting 
the self as a linguistic construction is consistent with Parfit's view, mentioned 
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above, that persons are not entities which exist separately from their thoughts 
and actions. 
As we have seen throughout, this raises the question of agency. For this 
reason, it is important to retain the question of 'who am I?' at the centre of 
genuine autobiographical activity in the classroom. The question 'where do I 
belong?' is in some ways similar to the question 'what am I?', except that 
whereas the question of 'what am I?' can be completely impersonal in that it can 
be answered by a list of roles occupied, the question of where do I belong, 
reintroduces the idea of a self looking for a situation. The question 'who am I?' 
can be answered narcissistically, but it can also be answered by the story of the 
questioner's life, which need not be given this individualistic interpretation. In 
fact if the argument above on the importance of narrative language for idea of 
selfhood has coherence, then Arendt's (1981:186) claim that we can only know 
who someone is by knowing the story "of which he is himself the hero" is 
plausible. There is no selfhood outside of language. While it is possible to give 
this interpretation, it is important not to let the pendulum swing the other way, 
and allow the importance of language to obscure the agency of the 
autobiographer. This reintroduces the problem of the connection between self 
and others in autobiographical expression, for it seems in rejecting the 
absolutism of modernism with its universal formulations, that which is 
substituted has the effect of negating the personal, rather than, as first appeared 
to be the case, the glorification and elevation of the personal. Thus, by placing 
the student at the centre of the educational process, an individualism is not 
necessarily implied. It is not the individual student, isolated in her self-reflection 
on which the gaze is directed. 
Autobiographical work in PSE seems appropriate if for no other reason than 
that it enables the student to give a unique interpretation of her life. As 
mentioned, this does not mean original, nor, of course, is there any connotation 
that this account will reflect the truth, either in the biographical facts or in its 
interpretation of motivation, intention and other psychological states, better than 
someone else's. The uniqueness seems to be, in light of this investigation in the 
understanding the person gains for herself of her life. It is in the meaning given, 
the understanding gained of the influences on, and the way she has influenced 
events which is important. 
Again the problem of autobiography reinforcing an individualist stance to 
the person can be seen as symptomatic, in part, of what is taken to be a 
definitive characteristic of autobiography, its ostensible referentiality. If the 
value of autobiography at least partially lies in the expression it allows of 
different lives, of the value of living different lives, then it seems we can 
approach autobiography from at least two perspectives. The first looks to the 
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importance of the separateness of persons, giving this aspect of personhood 
great weight, emphasising the ownership of experience. The second approach 
looks to the uniqueness of the person in terms of the interpretation given to 
experiences, supporting, for example, Rosen's (1988) understanding of the 
"autobiographical impulse": the ways in which we use our own stories to 
connect with and make sense of the stories of others. This is part of the 
attraction of autobiographical writing, it is a means of realising communalities 
and connections between students' stories, through its very emphasis on the 
subjective. Again this emphasises the mutual function of theories of personal 
identity, and thus our sense of identity, serving both to 'glue' together the 
different parts of our lives and to keep us separate. Autobiographical writing 
contains at its heart the possibility of, as Howarth (1980:113) phrases it, the 
"merg[ing]" of the self and others, even though these may be perceived as 
"diametrically opposed." A sense of isolation may, as Yeats21 noted, lie at the 
centre of the project, yet for many, an important aspect of the autobiographical 
project is the expression of connections not only with one's own past but with 
others. One of the features of autobiographical writing is that it is open to such a 
variety of interpretations. It can emphasise a sense of isolation, or it can 
transform the author's experience so that as Spender (1980:117) says: "It is no 
longer the writer's own experience: it becomes everyone's." 
Although this interpretation of the autobiographical project is consistent with 
how autobiography has been perceived by some autobiographers,22 stressing 
the connections between the self and others seems secondary to the main 
emphasis in autobiography, the continuity and unity of the self. This would 
only be so, however, if the continuity and unity of the self is understood as 
based in the metaphysical and epistemological positions outlined above which 
inhibit giving the connections which the autobiographical self may have with 
others a more prominent role, by an understanding of the autobiographical self 
which is privileged in its epistemic position, supported by its ontological status. 
Once it is recognised that autobiographical writing need not conform to this 
understanding of selfhood, the wider issues raised by the use of autobiography 
in PSE can be addressed more comfortably, with emphasis on the meaning of 
human experience. 
On this view, the individualist tendencies in autobiography are undermined 
by adoption of a notion of person where the unity of the person over time is 
seen as a matter of continuities and connectedness. An important consequence 
of Parties views on personal identity follows from his claim that "a person's 
life is less deeply integrated than most of us assume" (ibid.:336) on the grounds 
that "a person's identity over time just consists in the holding of certain more 
particular facts" (ibid:210). If the unity of a life is a matter of degree, then it can 
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plausibly be argued that the unity of a life is less deep than would be the case if 
a strict or absolute view of personal identity were true. This does not mean, of 
course, that the unity of the person is not important, but rather that it is not 
fundamental in that it is not grounded in a metaphysical realism. What is denied 
is that what makes us uniquely distinct individuals is not as important as we 
may have thought. This is to be contrasted with the Non-Reductionist View 
where identity is taken to involve a deep fact according to which all of a 
person's life is as much her life, and thereby the boundaries between lives take 
on a greater ethical importance. The idea that we may be less integrated than we 
thought means that autobiographical writing can still function in giving a sense 
of self, and at forging connections, but less emphasis is placed on some past 
experiences as being mine, and the importance of connections with others is 
given a different type of emphasis. If the unity of the self is not pre-given, the 
autobiographical project does not fail, in that the success of the principal 
reference is no longer assured, but is given less weight. Although the claims 
that the separateness of persons is to be given less importance, and that parts of 
each life are less deeply unified, may seem to undermine the autobiographical 
project with its emphasis on the continuity and sameness of the self, this does 
not mean the end of autobiography. The identification of the protagonist and 
narrator, on this view, is no longer a pre-linguistic given of which 
autobiography is a report or reflection, a structure outside the narrative of the 
self, but a response to a belief in individual identity. Thus the unity and 
continuity of a life can still be admitted as values. What is denied is that they 
have a metaphysical foundation in some fact of personal identity. The 
interpretation of the self given here, supported by the theory of personal identity 
advocated in previous chapters, supplemented by a narrative view of the self, 
and also by versions of social constructionism23 and aspects of 
deconstructionism, sees the uniqueness and value of autobiography as residing 
more in the particular interpretation and structure each self-narrative takes, than 
in the importance of the separateness of persons. This enables an understanding 
of the significance and function of autobiography compatible with the pluralist 
nature of the PSE classroom, by giving value to the diverse articulation of 
experiences available. 
Autobiography, understood as a cultural and historical artifact, responsive 
to particular conceptions of persons, can encourage reflection by the 
autobiographer on the influence this has on the formation and understanding of 
her life as she constructs an autobiography. Thus we can recognise the 
connections made necessary by the autobiographical contract and those required 
by certain conceptions of the self, these aspects of autobiography gaining more 
importance on this interpretation. The move is away from concentration on the 
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self as something, which can be isolated in terms of its autonomy, away from 
autobiography as a choice of self-expression in which the significance of 
choices made are the focus, towards a more inclusive understanding retaining 
the value of autobiography as a means of giving recognition to the specificity of 
experience. 
It can be concluded that individualism, in the sense of promoting a self-
concern in a way that is detrimental to appreciation of social connections and the 
extent to which they .are integral to living a life, is not inherent to the 
autobiographical project, though as Olney (1980a:23) says, our fascination with 
it may lie with the "lure of the self'. A further issue, which this discussion 
prompts, with its emphasis on both the idea of autobiography as the articulation 
of, in Olney's (1980a) phrase, a "cultural moment", is the phenomenon of at 
least two very different conceptions of the self, and the option we have of 
adopting either perspective. If autobiography as a distinct genre is a response to 
social and historical conditions, then the various views on the nature of the 
person, the self and the concept of the author, which have been given a very 
different interpretation to the traditional view, should cause us to look at the 
wider social factors which have given rise to this situation. It suggests, for 
example, a disruption in the practices and traditions which supported the 
traditional conception and in which it was embedded. Unfortunately, this 
ambitious suggestion can not be followed up here, save to remark that the 
situation is neither so abstract nor so elitist in its implications as may at first 
sight appear. The conception of the self suggested here is not completely alien 
to our experience. In line with the tolerance of our concept of the person for 
embracing a variety of incompatible understandings of what it means to be a 
person, this idea of the person as not necessarily identical throughout time is 
contained in many of our self conceptions. What is interesting about the use of 
autobiography in PSE is that it provides one means of exploring our 
conceptions of the person. 
Conclusion 
Several basic points have been made in this chapter. An underlying idea has 
been that one of the principal reasons for encouraging students to write their 
autobiographies, as well as some of the perceived problems, result from the 
valuing of a particular conception of the person. This is consistent with 
Weintraub's (1975:834) argument, for example, that the way the nature of the 
self is conceived, "largely determines the form and process of the 
autobiographic writing". The valued conception of the person as unified, 
discrete and potentially autonomous is a source of our understanding and 
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valuing of autobiography as a work of special authority and significance. The 
value of autobiography therefore goes beyond valuing the particular person and 
her interpretation of the story of her life, being an expression of an ideal of 
persons. Failure to recognise this obscures certain questions about the status of 
the self as the focus of the narrative whilst privileging others. The important 
point is that the traditional autobiographical project is a particular way of helping 
students to see themselves as persons in accordance with the dominant ideas of 
personhood. Consistent with the arguments made in the previous chapters, this 
conception, although operating at one level as common-sense, is seen as 
grounded in the cultural and historical practices from which it has arisen and 
from which it continues to derive support. This is not to undermine the 
legitimacy of the various perspectives we have on persons, but to draw attention 
to the cultural influences which encourage the privileging of one perspective 
over another. Although, as Blits (1989:299) says, "since it seems better known 
than anything else, what is self-evident forestalls reflection", the conception of 
the person highlighted here provides a space for such reflection and highlights 
the importance of the choice of perspective from which we view ourselves. 
It has been argued that there are conceptions of the self which may differ in 
the significance given to relationships and the connections between self and 
others. If the use of autobiographical writing in PSE is premised on the concern 
to allow full expression and exploration of the variety of experience brought to 
the classroom the existence of these conceptions needs to be accommodated in 
any understanding of autobiography employed, thereby reducing the risk of 
prejudicing forms of self-representation because they fail to conform with 
privileged conceptions of personhood. Thus, the most important reason for 
advocating the approach outlined above is that it accommodates what we wish 
to achieve by the use of autobiography and extends it, in that allows for and 
gives opportunity for the negotiation of different narrative forms which reflect 
the various experiences of our students, and so supports a wider expression and 
interpretation of what it means to live a life. 
The position advocated here, with its implication that the conception of 
autobiography should be such as to allow these different expressions of what it 
means to live a life without privileging some expressions on the basis of their 
more accurate reflection of an underlying reality, gives priority to the concerns 
of PSE over the definition of autobiography. Autobiography, as a distinct 
genre, is not clearly defined, although it may be argued that the only remaining 
live issue is whether it should be understood as fictive or not. Whatever the 
problems of definition are, it is clear that the conceptualisation of the self is 
central, and this is open to the interpretations given here. The view argued for 
here has philosophical as well as educational advantages. It does not assume the 
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transparency of the self to the self, or the transparency of language. It requires 
neither the existence of the self as an entity, not the priority of self to language. 
The unity of the person has been interpreted as something which is be to 
achieved, rather than something which is given. For this to be achieved, the 
function of language in constraining as well as a potentially liberatory force, 
needs to be emphasised. This interpretation does not undermine the idea that 
autobiography is of value to the author through the construction of personal 
meaning. The achievement of the aims of autobiographical writing are not 
dependent on the acceptance of any of the beliefs rejected in this chapter. 
If the interpretation of autobiography and the conception of the person given 
here are acceptable, then a distinctive feature of autobiography, that it is, as 
Bruner (1988) has remarked, "drenched in agency", someone is at the center of 
things, is not denied. While the idea that the self is an 'ontological fiction' has 
been accepted, it has been possible to retain the idea of an active subject of 
experience. There is however, the problem of the posing the issue, as has been 
the case here, as a convenient dichotomy of views. In essence, it has been 
argued that the concept of autobiography can be used either with the 
presupposition of a pre-given unity of the self which assures the priority and 
independence of the self, or with the underlying assumption that the self is in 
some sense a fiction constructed through the autobiographical act, along with 
other linguistic and social practices. Beyond the fact that such clear cut 
dichotomies are intuitively suspicious, it is not clear that in this case it exhausts 
the possibilities. By posing the problem as either a privileging of language or 
the self, the tensions within each view have most likely been obscured. The 
argument has pointed to the importance of the narrative conception, in line with 
the view on the importance of personal identity in the previous chapters. The 
suggestion is that this conception is more acceptable given the context in which 
autobiographical writing is to be used, rather than that defmitive arguments for 
the choice of one conception over the other have been provided. 
The argument has shown that the value of autobiography as a means of 
determining meaning rests on metaphysical positions on the person which admit 
of problems, notwithstanding their support from social and cultural practices. 
That it can continue to play this role has not been denied. All that has been 
suggested is that the emphasis move from autobiography as a means of 
achieving personal meaning, understood as the revelation or creation of the truth 
of a life, based on the idea of ownership of a life, to autobiography as a means 
to greater understanding of the meaning of living a life, based on increased 
awareness of the contextual implications of autobiography, including the 
responsibilities of authorship and the responsibilities peculiar to the 
autobiographical act itself, those which give rise to the coherence of an 
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autobiography and the unity of a life through its construction. The main 
suggestion is that this aspect of autobiography receive greater attention, in order 
to increase the likelihood that the task be potentially meaningful, and of benefit 
to all our students. This suggests that the use of autobiography in PSE should 
be accompanied by teachers' awareness of the complexities of the issues 
surrounding the conception of the person, or conceptions of the person which 
will necessarily be promoted. It also suggests that this would be a valuable 
subject for discussion in the classroom. 
We have concentrated on the conception of the self at the centre of the 
endeavour to tell, and retell earlier experiences as we reflect on later ones. The 
conception of the person suggested, which moves from a concentration on the 
evolution of the 'true self or the discovery of such a self, to the imbrication of 
language and social structures in the construction of the self, and what it means 
to live a life, suggests a less individualist stance towards the writing of an 
autobiography. This approach includes exploration of the implications and 
problems of identification, the possibility of identifying as well as not 
identifying with past events, and identification with others. This goes beyond 
the liberatory effects of 'authoring' experience, although it does have 
implications for how we understand the authority of the author, as on this view, 
the authority emanates from the interpretation of experience, and is not effected 
in virtue of the identity of the person. The emphasis on the conception of the 
self has hopefully shown that the structures surrounding the autobiographical 
act, and those that constitute it, need to be made explicit and the narrative 
structure itself needs to be given attention in PSE if it is to be capable of 
yielding educational benefits consistent with the pluralist nature of the 
classroom and to act as a tool in helping students to become more aware of 
themselves as 'becoming', rather than as completed selves, and to be aware of 
the role of personal narratives in determining their sense of identity, who they 
are. 
Notes 
1. As Maguire and Washington (op.cit.: 25) learnt from their experience at the 
Institute of Education: "All children are fluent in autobiographical story-telling". 
2. Pascal (1960), for example, argues for this position. 
3. The use of the phrase "academic task" is intended to correspond to Doyle's 
(1983). Doyle's work on the effects of student perception of an academic task 
on the achievement of educational aims is relevant in this context, although he 
does not discuss the use of autobiography. 
4. The idea that writing autobiographically should encourage explorations of 
this sort is only relevant, of course, if the aim is increased self-understanding. 
Buley-Meissner's (1990) exploration of the variety of student responses to the 
autobiographical task illustrates the point in the text. I would suggest, unlike the 
Buley-Meissner, however, that the variety of responses illustrates the varying 
perceptions of the academic task within a formal education setting as much as it 
reveals the extent to which students are prepared to raise existential questions 
about the nature and meaning of their lives. 
5. Obvious examples are the ILEA English Centre publications, Our Lives and 
its sequel. In my experience as an English teacher these books were enormously 
helpful, as well as being some of the most popular reading in the class, in 
helping students see that their own autobiographical work was valued. The 
initial incredulity amongst my students in Norfolk that someone would actually 
make a book of ordinary students' autobiographies is a small example of the 
point made in the text. 
6. Although the purpose of this discussion is not to advise on pedagogical 
strategies, a strategy used by Grumet (1976:160) provides an illustration of 
how the ambiguity in an autobiography can be developed. In a teacher education 
course, Grumet asked students to rewrite a paragraph of their autobiographies, 
"reversing every assertion, conviction, interpretation it expressed". These 
accounts were shared, and the fact that both accounts contained truths explored. 
7. As Schultz (1986:744) for example, points out the understanding of the value 
of the unity of a life may lend itself to a sort of perfectionism where only those 
with the appropriately unified lives would be the object of certain moral 
concerns, since only they have the appropriate sort of agency. Unfortunately, 
we can explore this, and similar implications here. 
8. See Kupfer (1987), for example, for the argument that privacy is a necessary 
condition for the development of an autonomous self. 
9. I owe this point to Patricia White. 
10. This is supported by Unger's (1986:92-3) point concerning the effect of 
adopting the subjective point of view on experience. From this perspective: 
each of us is utterly distinct from anyone else and from anything 
else. On this view, this distinctness is a brute, fundamental fact of 
reality. We are not distinct in virtue of any other facts, or in virtue of 
anything at all. The differences between us people are 
metaphysically basic. So these differences loom large in our 
thoughts about ourselves and others: they appear greatly important. 
11. Evidence of students' dislike for personal writing is given in Barnes, 
Barnes and Clarke (1984:133). The variety of student's negative responses is 
summarised as showing a "conflict with sub-cultural values, a desire for 
privacy, and conflict with some young people's self-images" (loc.cit.). 
12. Pagano (1991:195-196) gives a good illustration of this point. Commenting 
on an autobiographical essay she submitted as part of her tenure dossier, she 
writes "Nothing I've ever written, including my Ph.D. dissertation, was ever so 
difficult for me as that autobiographical essay. Never had I felt more 
vulnerable." 
13. Grumef s (1976) report on her experience of using autobiographical 
expression, including writing, in teacher education, includes the hostile reaction 
of many students. Part of the resentment and hostility was clearly due to the fact 
that they were not comfortable with this type of task, but also because they 
could not see its immediate applicability to their primary concern, their 
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upcoming teaching practice. These causes of resentment are not likely to be 
applicable to PSE where conventional academic tasks are interspersed with 
more personal work. However, the general point she makes about the 
importance of trust is applicable. 
14. Addressing himself to God, Augustine (1961:208) makes an appeal to the 
charity of his readers: "charity believes all things ... which are spoken by those 
who are joined as one in charity". It is not the verifiability of the events 
described which is important, but the attitude of the readers: "For although I 
cannot prove to them that my confessions are true, at least I shall be believed by 
those who ears are opened to me by charity". 
15. An important point, though only indirectly related to the issue addressed in 
the text, is the general problem of the status of PSE in the curriculum. Given 
recent changes in the examination system, the argument that personal writing 
was associated with and required more of CSE students rather than 0' level 
students may no longer be appropriate. Without extensive empirical research it 
is hard to know whether the association of personal writing with 'less 
academic' students is a factor in its presentation by teachers and reception by 
students. The more general point is the receptiveness of students to this form of 
expression, and their response to it. There is some evidence that the "deep 
criteria" (Barnes et al., 1984:70) which influence teacher's response to personal 
writing are more available to middle class students. These criteria, unlike 
surface ones such as the form of autobiography and its correct grammatical 
execution with attention to spelling and so on, are difficult to teach and seem to 
rely on certain cultural assumptions. Thus, deep criteria concern such ineffables 
as the atmosphere and tone of the piece. The difference in what Bourdieu 
(1974:32) refers to as the "cultural capital" brought to the classroom influence 
both teacher reception and student response to tasks such as writing 
autobiographically. 
16. This account of the elements of the contexts and relationships guiding the 
writing of autobiography draws on Howarth's (1980:86) interpretation of 
Northrop Frye (1957:52-73). The three elements are: character, the "image or 
self-portrait" (Howarth, op.cit.:87); technique, the devices used to build the 
self-portrait; and theme, the ideas and beliefs that give the autobiography its 
meaning. 
17. See, for example, Leadbeater (1988) who argues for a "socialist 
individualism". 
18. Henriques et al. (1984) illustrate the attempt to move from assumptions in 
psychology concerning the unitary, rational nature of the subject to a 
subjectivity theorized as multiple, not purely rational and potentially 
contradictory. 
19. It can be argued that the value assigned to the autobiography, as a distinct 
genre, is a reflection of this idea. See, for example, discussions on the historical 
origins of autobiography such as Smith (1987: Ch.3) and Gusdorf (1980). 
20. This idea finds clear expression in Nietzsche (1968:631): "The separation of 
the 'deed' from the doer ... this ancient mythology established the belief in 
cause and effect after it had found a firm form in the functions of language and 
grammar". 
21. "RI his moments of lofty speech, he himself was alone no matter what the 
crowd". 
22. See, for example, discussions in Howarth (op.cit) and Mason (op.cit.). 
23. In social constructionism, of course, we also find arguments for the view 
that 'self is a concept which has sense but no reference. See, for example, 
Harre (1988). 
Conclusion: What Matters? 
The thesis began with the claim that the conceptualisation of the person as 
agent was central to all feasible aims of PSE. Whether this conception is 
promoted explicitly through the advocation of some form of autonomy or less 
obviously in the promotion of other valued personal and social attributes, the 
aims of PSE presuppose that students are able to act on the world, and 
themselves, in significant ways. 
The importance of this fairly uncontentious claim lies in the suggestion 
made here that investigation of a minimum necessary condition for this 
conception of the person provides a means of diffusing a tension evident in 
philosophical treatments of the aims of PSE. This tension is between student-
centred aims and approaches, and the conception of the person as agent. The 
interpretation of agency and appreciation of students' actual experience 
potentially results in incompatible conceptions of the persons involved. On the 
one hand, respect for students' experience in writings on PSE extends beyond 
the idea that students are owed respect in virtue of being persons, to include the 
valuing of their particular experience and view on the world. On the other hand, 
the conception of agency drawn on in the aims of PSE, conceptualises persons 
as able to choose between actions, where the choice between actions is not to be 
explained solely by reference to the occupation of a particular role, or by 
reference to a character trait. Thus, the conception of agency centrally includes 
the possibility of reflecting on and challenging roles and character. The values 
promoted in the aims of PSE presuppose the ability of persons to raise 
questions of the form: "Do I want to be a teacher?" and "Do I want to be the sort 
of person who would do that?" These questions, although raised from an 
encumbered perspective, are also asked from the perspective of the person 
conceptualised as agent. The aims of PSE recognise both perspectives, but 
privilege the latter, from which persons are conceptualised as 'that which 
chooses'. 
The tension is therefore between the person conceptualised as the occupant 
of several roles, which are integral to being the particular person one is, and as 
able to free one's self from any one of these attachments in order to reflect on 
the extent to which actual or contemplated actions conform to some ideal, either 
of rationality or personhood. The tension arises because while students' 
experience is valued, the value of these experiences is recognised to partially 
consist in their role in making one the person one is. In short, the person is 
viewed as both essentially and contingently encumbered. 
Although this tension is evident in the philosophical treatment of the aims of 
PSE considered here, namely the work of Pring (1984, 1987) and White 
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(1990), this problem is of more than theoretical interest. Conceptions of the 
person are not only contained in theoretical works on education but are part of 
the practice of education. This is especially so in PSE where the educational 
concern is with the promotion of personal and social values which are to be of 
benefit to the actual lives of students. Teaching PSE involves promoting 
conceptions of the person. The conception of the person promoted may be 
explicit, but it is more likely to operate as one of the background assumptions 
that inform practice. An educational activity where this is made explicit is 
autobiographical writing by students. For a number of reasons, writing 
autobiographically is likely to form part of PSE whether PSE is implemented as 
a separate subject, or is conceived as consisting in cross-curricular activities. 
The thesis therefore aims to illuminate problems both at the level of the aims of 
PSE and problems that arise at the level of teaching activities which involve a 
conception of the person. 
The work is undertaken from the perspective that although the 
presupposition of the person as active is held in common, the tension outlined 
above can profitably be approached through a necessary presupposition of this 
conception of the person, namely the presupposition of personal identity. In 
order to show the value of this way of approaching the issue in the first chapter 
the importance of making explicit the conception of the person implicit in the 
aims of PSE was argued. This was achieved through discussion of Pring and 
White. These accounts of the aims of PSE recognise the importance of the 
conception of the person, but reveal the tension between the conception of 
person as potentially autonomous and as being constituted in significant 
respects by powerful social forces. It has been argued in the first chapter that 
this problem should not be conceptualised as how the necessary social context 
of action can be grafted onto the,conception of the person as agent. The problem 
is not how to fit a conception of the person as legitimately influenced by family, 
peers and the larger community, into the conception of the person as 'free' to 
resist or challenge social forces. The problem has been conceptualised as 
providing a conception of the person as agent adequate to our knowledge of 
persons. It was argued that Pring and White can meet objections raised to the 
promotion of autonomy as a major aim of PSE, if these objections are, as they 
seem to be, merely calls to recognise the legitimacy of social concerns on the 
formation of a sense of identity. 
The problem needs to be posed as a problem of the conceptualisation of the 
person as agent, given that the criticisms of autonomy are very careful not to 
abandon the idea of agency. Thus, the impression is that criticisms of autonomy 
take aim at a position which few would accept or advocate, and one which is 
certainly rejected by Pring and White, namely that there is such a thing as 'pure' 
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autonomy, where persons are conceived of, or valued, as being independent of 
all influences. The position taken here has acknowledged the criticism, that an 
adequate conception of the person must recognise the legitimacy and value of 
social influences and determinants of thought and action, but it has been argued 
that this is not a criticism to which White and Pring are open. As mentioned 
above, the problem lies in the conception of the person as agent. This was 
illustrated by distinguishing White's and Pring's positions on the basis of their 
conception of the person. The distinction showed that although in both cases the 
agency of persons is privileged, White privileges the idea of personal agency, 
and Pring privileges the idea of agency according to some objective standards. 
That these two conceptions of the person are possible, and that both can be 
valued has been interpreted as a consequence of features of the concept of 
person. In particular, the idea that the concept of person affords differing 
perspectives. In addition to seeing the person as both passive and active, the 
person is also subject in the sense of being subject to, and subject of 
experiences and social forces. On this way of construing the distinction between 
Pring and White, Pring can be seen as stressing the idea of the person as subject 
to moral demands, though being a locus of moral value and authority, and 
White can be seen as stressing the importance of the subjective self. 
This distinction should not be overstressed, however. In the fourth section 
of the first chapter, the commonalities in the two positions were shown to be 
equally important to the conceptualisation of the person. In this section the 
essentially modernist idea of the person as only contingently attached to social 
roles was argued to be central to both conceptions, and a source of the 
persuasiveness and well as some of the ambivalence engendered by views such 
as Pring's and White's. Having distinguished the two views, and having 
shown what they have in common, the question was raised of how these 
differing conceptions are justified. This was addressed in the fifth section where 
it was argued that although Pring and White do not appeal to the concept of the 
person as a major source of justification, relying rather on theories drawn from 
other areas, this is in fact an important area of investigation. 
The concept of person is central to PSE, both in articulating the aims and in 
practice. As Pring (1983:101) notes in the concluding section of an issue of 
Educational Analysis devoted to PSE, at the centre "lies the understanding of 
what it is to be a person and the ability to behave appropriately towards oneself 
and towards others as persons." Of clearest relevance, therefore, is the person 
as a forensic concept. This expresses in general terms the interest in the concept 
of person in PSE, and provides the focus for discussion of the particular 
qualities which should be promoted. Notwithstanding this, the underlying 
concept of the person as a potentially self-determining agent demands that 
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certain conditions are met. In particular, the demand is for criteria of identity 
which can ensure the separateness and continuity of persons. This is necessary 
for the idea of persons as self-determining. In the second chapter, the 
importance of personal identity to understanding the concept of the person in 
general was argued, with attention being given to relevance of personal identity 
to the concerns addressed in PSE, and its importance to the problem outlined 
above. 
The most obvious objection to this approach is that it either implies an 
objectionable foundationalism, in that it implies that the criteria of personal 
identity are determining factors in ethical and political theory, or that this 
investigation of a presupposition of a presupposition is too far removed from 
the actual concerns addressed in the aims of PSE to be of any relevance. The 
argument against these objections was first set out in the second chapter, but 
relies for its force on the development of the argument running throughout the 
thesis. In the second chapter, the first objection was addressed directly when it 
was argued that the relation of personal identity to the aims of PSE is one of 
interdependence. The relevance of the question of personal identity is derivative: 
it gains its relevance from its association with matters of immediate concern 
such as the justification for self-concern, future concern, identification with 
projects, and relations with others. 
Having established the relevance of questions of personal identity, the 
general position taken was strengthened in the third chapter where it was argued 
that a source of the tension outlined above between the conception of the person 
as agent and important interpretations of student-centred approaches to PSE, 
lies in the requirement for criteria of strict identity by the conception of the 
person as a potentially self-determining agent. In the third chapter, the question 
of why this should be considered a problem was addressed. It was argued that 
the aims of PSE should not have the effect of privileging a conception of the 
self on the basis of its ontological status. In other words, relying on the 
argument that a person's sense of identity is derived from a theory of personal 
identity, it has been argued that the acceptance of strict identity as a requirement 
of the general conceptualisation of the person implicitly privileges some 
conceptions of the self, namely those that accord this theory of personal 
identity, on the basis that they are a more accurate reflection of reality. While 
this does not have the consequence that other conceptions may not be valued, 
the value accorded these other conceptions will be importantly different. 
This led to consideration of the strict identity, or non-reductionist theory. It 
was argued that the strongest claim, and the source of the plausibility of this 
view is as a response to the phenomenon of the first-person point of view on 
experience. However, non-reductionist theories support the thesis that personal 
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identity is determinate by drawing a disanalogy between persons and other 
entities. Thus, it is claimed that the trans-temporal identity conditions for 
persons are unanalysable, or absolute. It was argued that this distinction is 
difficult to uphold. One avenue of possible support lies in the necessary unity of 
consciousness. Using Kant, it was argued that appeal to the transcendental 
unity of apperception, or the necessary unity of consciousness is insufficient to 
establish a non-reductionist position since Kant's argument is designed to show 
the necessity of unity of consciousness as a precondition for experience. It does 
not deny that there are empirical criteria to be discovered or determined. 
On this basis it has been concluded that the strongest argument for non-
reductionism is not sufficient to warrant its acceptance over the alternative, a 
continuity theory Taking Parfit's Reductionist View as representative, on the 
grounds that the developments Parfit has made have advanced the case for 
reductionism and that his major claims are consistent with all continuity 
theorists, chapter three concluded with a short exposition of Parfit's main 
claims emphasising that the difference between reductionist and non-
reductionist accounts of personal identity is that while the latter claims that 
personal identity has a special nature, the former denies it. The reductionist and 
non-reductionist views are therefore distinguished according to whether 
personal identity is thought to consist solely in relations of continuity and 
connectedness, or whether personal identity involves, in Parfit's phrase, a 
'further fact'. 
This, however, left a major question unanswered. It has been argued that a 
non-reductionist theory of personal identity is required by the conception of the 
person as autonomous. If non-reductionism is unacceptable on the basis of its 
internal coherence, then does this have the consequence that the conception of 
the person as autonomous must be rejected? This consequence would only 
follow if reductionism and non-reductionism were the only alternatives, or if 
non-reductionism could not rejected on other grounds. 
These two issues were addressed in the fourth chapter where the issue of 
what conditions other than logical adequacy must be met for a theory of 
personal identity to be acceptable was considered. The argument has essentially 
two parts, the first addressed to showing that although non-reductionism is the 
theory we believe, there are no constraints which would prohibit belief in 
reductionism, and thereby favour non-reductionism. This is not to deny that it 
may be psychologically difficult to believe reductionism, but to deny that these 
difficulties are sufficient to constitute a constraint on the possibility of belief. 
This argument is important for two reasons. The first is that given the argument 
for the relevance of this approach reductionism must be believable at a level 
other than that of armchair philosophy. It must, in other words, be possible for 
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it have an influence, as non-reductionism does, on our attitudes to ourselves 
and others. The second reason why this argument is important is that it reveals 
that the strength of the non-reductionist theory, the prominence given to the 
first-person point of view on experience is closely allied to the realist position 
on persons taken by advocates of the non-reductionist view. 
The argument has not been all in favour of reductionism, however. The 
argument of the fourth chapter established that while there are no pragmatic or 
metaphysical constraints which would prohibit the acceptance of reductionism, 
there is an epistemological constraint which leads to a modification of Parfit's 
view. The operant constraint is the knowledge we have of persons. The 
knowledge that is relevant is that persons do not undergo fission. This rarely if 
ever articulated belief has a profound effect on how we conceive of ourselves. 
In particular it influences our interpretation of our past, and the formation of our 
intentions as well as other forward looking mental states. Crucially, those 
mental events which are influenced by this knowledge are first-person events: I 
form intentions to perform personal actions with the knowledge that I will not 
branch. The effect of this argument is twofold. It effectively denies Parfit's 
impersonality thesis, and thereby allows retention of the conceptualisation of the 
person as potentially autonomous, and the way in which this is achieved allows 
for a strength of the non-reductionist position to be more fully explained 
consistent with a psychological continuity or reductionist view. 
It will be recalled that the strength of the non-reductionist position was that 
it articulated the first-person point of view. This is the subjective point of view 
from which identity seems undeniably determinate. The continuity or 
reductionist view denies that identity is what matters, and thus that what matters 
is determinate. An effect of the indeterminacy thesis is that there may 
legitimately be no answer to the question asked of some future set of 
experiences 'Will it be me?' The strength of the reductionist view is that it 
affords a third-person perspective which denies that a person is in a significant 
sense utterly separate from others and the world. 
The chief advantage of the reductionist view is that it allows us to decide 
between theories of personal identity. On the non-reductionist view, the unity of 
the person is ensured. Whether we choose to value the unity of a person or not, 
persons are unified and separate from others. There is an unbridgeable gap 
between being me and being you. Reductionism, while rejecting this view of 
the unity of persons, allows unity to be a value and something to be strived for. 
Thus the argument of the thesis has been that a continuity view is to be 
preferred, in the context of PSE, to a non-reductionist view, not because it is 
possible to definitively say which is correct, but because, consistent with other 
values, the conceptualisation of the self which is preferred should not be 
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implicitly privileged on the basis of its ontological status. Given that there are 
alternative theories of personal identity, each of which adopts a differing 
perspective on the person, the grounds for determining which should operate as 
a presupposition in the aims of PSE is a decision which rests on several factors. 
There is the option of privileging either a subjective view of the self or an 
objective view. On the conceptualisation of the person argued for here, although 
the two perspectives remain incompatible, the subjective view is accounted for. 
On the non-reductionist view, or on Parfit's view, one perspective can only be 
taken account of in a way that does not correspond to our experience as 
persons. The interpretation of the subjective view, on this modified continuity 
view, is importantly different from the non-reductionist view in particular. It 
remains, however, consistent with Parfit's main claim, that identity does not 
involve a 'further fact' and has the effect that the subjective view on experience 
can be interpreted in a way which permits the separateness of persons to be 
interpreted as a value while denying a strong thesis of autonomous access to 
first-person trans-temporal states. What is important is whether or not 
reductionism is preferred over non-reductionism, the grounds for choosing 
between the two is influenced by the effects of the adoption on ethical and other 
educational concerns. This is consistent with the argument made in the second 
chapter that a relation of interdependence exists between theories of personal 
identity and the aims of PSE. 
How these conclusions affect practice was illustrated in the final two 
chapters where the use of autobiographical writing by students in PSE was 
discussed. It was first of all argued that the value of autobiographical writing as 
an educational task is based on a conception of the self, and then through a 
discussion of the genre of autobiography it was shown that the reductionist or 
continuity view of the person or self is not inconsistent with recent 
interpretations of autobiography. It was argued that the conceptualisation of the 
person advocated here has clear advantages over some post-structuralist 
interpretations, which deny the subject, and also is to be preferred to the 
narrative conception of self for similar reasons. The narrative conception of the 
self is, nevertheless, seen to add to the continuity view advocated in that it 
deepens and enriches the conception of continuity and connectedness on which 
the continuity theory relies. The final chapter considered some of the problems 
traditionally faced in using autobiography in education. These were addressed 
through the conceptualisation of the person suggested in this thesis, showing 
that this conception has advantages over the traditional conception in certain 
crucial areas. 
It has been argued that even if the major claims suggested here are rejected, 
the concept of the person is fundamental to discussions of the aims of PSE and 
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its practice. The aim has been to draw attention to some of the complexities of 
this central concept. The fact that it is a concept which admits of several 
perspectives, means that a certain amount of care should be taken with its use in 
the aims of PSE. As was argued in the first chapter, this does not preclude the 
privileging of one perspective over another, but suggests that care should be 
taken to avoid obscuring the fact that there is more than one perspective, and 
that the basis for preferring one conception of the person should be consistent 
both with the theoretical adequacy of the conception and its implications for 
students' experience of self. 
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